

GTL Methanol Plant Burrup Peninsula



Public
Environmental
Review



INVITATION TO MAKE A SUBMISSION

The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) invites people to make a submission on this proposal. If you are able to, electronic submissions emailed to the DEP/EPA Project Assessment Officer would be most welcome.

GTL Resources PLC proposes to construct a methanol plant on the Burrup Peninsula, Western Australia. In accordance with the *Environmental Protection Act 1986*, a Public Environmental Review (PER) has been prepared which describes this proposal and its likely effects on the environment. The PER is available for a public review period of 4 (four) weeks from 9 September 2002, closing on 7 October 2002. Comments from government agencies and from the public will help the EPA to prepare an assessment report in which it will make recommendations to government.

Why write a submission?

A submission is a way to provide information, express your opinion and put forward your suggested course of action – including any alternative approach. It is useful if you indicate any suggestions you have to improve the proposal.

All submissions received by the EPA will be acknowledged. Submissions will be treated as public documents unless provided and received in confidence subject to the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, and may be quoted in full or in part in the EPA's report.

Why not join a group?

If you prefer not to write your own comments, it may be worthwhile joining with a group interested in making a submission on similar issues. Joint submissions may help to reduce the workload for an individual or group, as well as increase the pool of ideas and information. If you form a small group (up to 10 people), please indicate all the names of the participants. If your group is larger, please indicate how many people your submission represents.

Developing a submission

You may agree or disagree with, or comment on, the general issues discussed in the PER or the specific proposals. It helps if you give reasons for your conclusions, supported by relevant data. You may make an important contribution by suggesting ways to make the proposal more environmentally acceptable.

When making comments on specific elements of the PER:

- clearly state your point of view;
- indicate the source of your information or argument if this is applicable; and
- suggest recommendations, safeguards or alternatives.

Electronic submissions

It is requested that a single consolidated email response be provided after you have reviewed the full PER. Please note that, where an email response is received, an additional hard copy is not required (except for attachments that cannot be forwarded electronically). You will receive an electronic acknowledgement of your submission and will also be advised electronically when the EPA's report and recommendation become available.

Points to keep in mind

By keeping the following points in mind, you will make it easier for your submission to be analysed:

- attempt to list points so that issues raised are clear. A summary of your submission is helpful;
- refer each point to the appropriate section, chapter or recommendation in the PER;
- if you discuss different sections of the PER, keep them distinct and separate, so there is no confusion as to which section you are considering; and
- attach any factual information you may wish to provide and give details of the source. Make sure your information is accurate.

Remember to include:

- your name;
- address;
- date; and
- whether you want your submission to be confidential.

The closing date for submissions is: 7 October 2002

Submissions should ideally be emailed to: ann.barter@environ.wa.gov.au

OR addressed to:

The Environmental Protection Authority
Post Office Box K822
PERTH WA 6842
Attention: Ms Ann Barter

Appendix M

*Preliminary Risk Assessment
by QEST Consulting Group*



Department of
Mineral and Petroleum Resources

Your ref:

Our ref: JK:DME-296293:6125-01

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Attention: Ms Ann Barter

**METHANOL PLANT AND PRODUCT EXPORT (ASSESSMENT NO. 1438)
GTL RESOURCES PLC
PRELIMINARY RISK ASSESSMENT - REV 1**

I refer to the revised Preliminary Risk Assessment (PRA) submitted by Qest Consulting Group for the proposed GTL Resources Methanol Plant.

I have reviewed the document and am of the opinion that the PRA is a reasonable representation of the risk levels from the proposed methanol plant, given that the PRA was conducted based on preliminary drawings with limited information relating to the facility.

An outcome of the PRA is that the fifty-in-a-million contour does not extend beyond the site boundary. However, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) individual risk criterion for 'non-industrial activity' or 'active open spaces', may be exceeded depending on the classification of land-use around the site, as the ten-in-a-million contour extends beyond the site boundary by approximately 110m to the north and 60m to the south.

It is noted that the land to the north of the site is classified as an industrial area. As the ten-in-a-million contour extends into this area, it is recommended that the affected area be restricted to industrial use only.

As to the land within the ten-in-a-million contour to the south of the site, it is recommended that measures be implemented to ensure that this land is not used in a manner contrary to the expected level of risk from the plant. This is particularly important, as I understand that there are rock engraving sites and related artefacts in the vicinity of the ten-in-a-million contour.

As the PRA was conducted based on preliminary information, a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) based on the final design, is required prior to commissioning of the plant, as per the recommendation made in the PRA. The QRA should verify

the assumptions made in the PRA and in particular it should address the following items:

1. The potential for all knock-on/escalation effects associated with the operation of plant as well as the pipeline and loading facility, should be considered in sufficient detail. For the pipeline and loading facility, the potential impact to and from any other dangerous goods pipelines and stores in the vicinity needs to be included.
2. Calculation of consequences and assessment of risk from all hazardous events associated with the loading operations to determine whether an exclusion zone is required.
3. Calculation of risk based on the actual inventory likely to be released in a hazardous event taking into consideration the capability and limitations of the emergency shutdown system, such as time required to achieve an isolation.
4. The possibility of catastrophic failures and full-bore releases of all equipment should be considered.
5. Verification that a 60-second response time for manual shutdown is achievable.
6. A list of credible scenarios and a description of each event should be included.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries regarding the above.




Jeff Kong
Major Hazards Inspector
SAFETY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT DIVISION

1 August 2002

::ODMAIDME-MSEIDME-296293

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PRA FOR A METHANOL MANUFACTURING PLANT



GTL RESOURCES LTD

Prepared by: Qest Consulting Group

Rev 1, May 2002

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Risk, Safety and Health Consultants



PRA for a Methanol Manufacturing Plant for GTL Resources Ltd

Acknowledgment

Qest Consulting Engineers compiled this report, but it is a joint effort between QEST team members and GTL Resources personnel. The author of this report wishes to thank the participants for their diligence during the assessment, and for their efforts in providing the information required to prepare this report.

Disclaimer

Qest prepared this report as an account of work for GTL Resources. The material in it reflects Qest's best judgement in the light of the information available to it at the time of preparation. However, as Qest cannot control the conditions under which this report may be used, Qest and its related companies will not be responsible for damages of any nature resulting from use of or reliance upon this report.

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GLOSSARY

ALARP	As Low As Reasonably Practicable
APC	Advanced Process Control
ASU	Air Separation Unit
BAT	Best Available Technique
BFW	Boiler Feed Water
BLEVE	Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
DBNGP	Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline
DCS	Distributed Control System
DEP	Department of Environmental Protection
DOLA	Department of Land Administration
DPA	Dampier Port Authority
EPA	Environmental Protection Authority
ESD	Emergency Shutdown System
FEA	Fire and Explosion Analysis
GTL	GTL Resources
HAZOP	Hazard and Operability Study
HP	High Pressure
HTS	High Temperature Shift Converter
IDLH	Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
IMO	International Marine Organisation
IRPA	Individual Risk Per Annum
LNG	Liquid Natural Gas
LP	Low Pressure
LPG	Liquid Petroleum Gas
LTS	Low Temperature Shift Converter
MP	Medium Pressure
MPS	Machine Protection System
OD	Outside Diameter
OTS	Operator Training Simulator
PFD	Process Flow Diagram
PLC	Programmable Logic Controller
PRA	Preliminary Risk Assessment
PSA	Pressure Swing Adsorption Unit
QA	Quality Assurance
SCW	Sweet Cooling Water System
SIL	Safety Integrity Level
SIS	Safety Instrument System
STP	Standard Temperature and Pressure
TLV	Threshold Limit Value
TMR	Triple Modular Redundant System
URS	URS Australia Pty Ltd
WA-DMPR	Western Australian Department of Minerals and Petroleum Resources



1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

GTL Resources (GTL) have requested QEST Consulting Engineers to prepare a Preliminary Risk Assessment (PRA) for the proposed GTL Methanol Manufacturing Plant located in the Withnell East area of the Burrup Peninsula.

The objective of the PRA is to demonstrate that as far as reasonably practicable:

- offsite risks have been minimised, firstly through elimination of hazards and secondly through control of remaining hazards; and
- the level of risk to persons located offsite as measured by defined criteria is within tolerable limits.

The scope of the PRA comprises the following:

- Hazard identification;
- Hazard and risk assessment; and
- Evaluation and selection of hazard and risk control measures.

The hazards under consideration in this study are those associated with the operations at the GTL Methanol Manufacturing Plant that have the potential to extend beyond the boundaries of the plant area.

1.1 Results

1.1.1 Risk Criteria

The IRPA criteria as stated in EPA Guidance Note No. 2 [6] are:

- a A risk level in residential zones of one in a million per year ($1\text{E-}6$) or less, is so small as to be acceptable to the EPA.
- b A risk level in "sensitive developments", such as hospitals, schools, child care facilities and aged care housing developments of between one half and one in a million per year ($0.5\text{E-}6$ to $1\text{E-}6$) is so small as to be acceptable to the EPA. In the case of risk generators within the grounds of "sensitive development" necessary for the amenity of the residents, the risk level can exceed the risk level of one half in a million per year ($0.5\text{E-}6$) to a maximum of one in a million per year ($1\text{E-}6$) for areas that are intermittently occupied, such as garden areas and car parks.
- c Risk levels from industrial sites should not exceed a target of fifty in a million per year ($50\text{E-}6$) at the site boundary for each individual industry, and the cumulative risk level imposed on an industry should not exceed a target of one hundred in a million per year ($100\text{E-}6$).
- d A risk level for any non-industrial activity or active open spaces located in buffer areas between industrial facilities and residential zones of ten in a million per year ($10\text{E-}6$) or lower, is so small as to be acceptable to the EPA.
- e A risk level for commercial developments, restaurants and entertainment centres, located in buffer areas between industrial facilities and residential areas, of five in a million per year ($5\text{E-}6$) or less, is so small as to be acceptable to the EPA.




1.1.2 Individual Risks

The 50E-6 risk contour from the GTL Methanol Plant does not extend beyond the site boundary. The 10E-6 contour extends no more than 200m from the north and south of the site boundary. The area north of the site boundary is within the Withnell East Industrial Estate and thus the risk above 10E-6 is acceptable. There is a road which the 10E-6 contour washes over, but this is designated and marked as a private road for access to the Woodside communications tower, thus the risk above 10E-6 is acceptable due to the infrequent use of the road. The area to the south of the plant is conservation land with elements that are significant to aboriginal heritage. However, there are no areas designated as “significant” heritage location within the 10E-6 contour. The infrequent use of the land means this level of risk is acceptable. Therefore the plant is considered to comply with the EPA Criteria [6] for individual risk.

The various risk contours considered for the GTL Methanol Plant are presented in Figure 1-1. A version of the contours with geographical detail is available in Appendix M.



Figure 1-1 Methanol Plant Risk Contours






1.1.3 Societal Risks

The Societal Risks from the GTL Methanol Plant are given in Figure 1-2.

For the GTL Methanol Plant analysis, the criterion used to assess societal risk are demonstrated by the legend in Figure 1-2. This is the societal risk model developed for the Kwinana (W.A.) industrial area which is accepted by the W.A. regulatory authorities as no formal W.A. criteria exists.

In the figure, the three lines represent limits of acceptable risk. As seen in Figure 1-2, the societal risk from this plant satisfies the societal risk criteria as the F-N curve lies beneath the limit of unacceptable risk for new plants.

Figure 1-2 : GTL Methanol Manufacturing Plant Societal Risk Contours





1.1.4 Impacts from internal events

A brief summary of the major risk contributors and their potential knock-on effects are provided in the following table.

Table 1.1 : Risk Contributions Including Internal Knock-on Effects

Internal Event	Comment
Natural gas feed line release	Releases due to pipeline failure because of material of construction or maintenance faults or external impacts. The ignited jet flame extends for approximately 212m for a full pipe rupture. Unit 200 Methanol Synthesis is within this 212m radius. The impingement on the Methanol Synthesis unit may result in fires and/or explosions in this unit.
Methanol Plant – Flammable (methane, hydrogen or methanol) release	Risks from knock-on effects from fires and explosions are minimal, as the frequency for these events is relatively low. The knock on release would have minimal impact as the process would be isolated and blown down / vented away from the process area before vessels would fail.
Methanol Storage	The risk is minimal as the large scale poolfires which could result from the methanol storage tanks would require a substantial external impact to initiate.
Export Pump	The likelihood of an event impacting beyond the boundary is very low due to the number of protection devices that would ensure any release was of short duration.
Pipeline from Plant to the Wharf	Risk is very low due to the low frequency at which fully welded pipelines leak.
Marine Loading Arm	Risk is very low due to the low frequency of the event (and minor consequences) due to the many protection devices that would have to fail for an ongoing release. Protection includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• ESD system automatically activated on no-flow signal.• All other activity on the wharf cease throughout tanker loading operations.• An operator stationed at the wharf throughout the entire loading operation.
Shipping Hazards Collision, Grounding, and Onboard Incident	Risk very low due to the very low frequency of the event.



1.1.5 Impacts from external events

The possible impact and knock on effects from other existing or potentially hazardous operations in the surrounding area are given in the following Table 1-2.

Table 1-2 : External Knock-on Effects

External Event	Comment
LNG Plant and export jetties	The 1×10^{-6} contour for the Woodside LNG plant does not impinge on the GTL Methanol plant, thus a knock-on effect from these facilities is very unlikely.
Plenty River Ammonia Urea Plant	This plant is located approximately 3.3 km to the SSE and hence will be unaffected by any incidents.
Burrup Fertilisers Site	This plant is located approximately 3 km to the SSE and hence will be unaffected by any incidents.

1.1.6 Risk Reduction Measures

The risk reduction measures considered for this facility are in Table 1-3.

Table 1-3 : Proposed Risk Reduction Measures

	Risk Reduction Measures
1.	Develop a Safety Management Plan
2.	Put in place an Emergency Response Plan that provides a rapid response to identified releases that would facilitate early manual isolation of any leaking equipment
3.	Develop a Joint Industrial Integrated Emergency Management Plan with Woodside.
4.	Ensure fire fighting measures such as deluge systems are addressed and incorporated in the final design.
5.	Ensure the gas detection systems in the final design include sensors for the fuel gas and CO ₂ in areas that are both enclosed and open to increase likelihood of the detection of leaks.
6.	Ensure the final design of the offloading systems incorporate shutdown systems that can be controlled by the operator at the loading point.
7.	Designate an exclusion zone during loading of the export tankers at the wharf. This will be assessed when the final wharf and offloading system are designed.



2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background to this Study

GTL Resources Limited (GTL), the proponent for this project, proposes to construct an export oriented Methanol complex in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. The proposed plant will convert natural gas into Methanol at a design capacity of 3,000 tonnes per day (tpd). A site has been selected for the complex at the Withnell East area on the Burrup Peninsula.

The Western Australian Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has advised GTL that further consideration of the selected site for the proposed project would be subject to the preparation and government review of a Preliminary Risk Assessment (PRA) document. URS have been commissioned by GTL to provide the necessary technical information to enable the PRA to be prepared based on proprietary methanol manufacturing technology.

QEST Consulting Engineers Pty Ltd have been commissioned by URS as independent risk assessment consultants to carry out a Preliminary Risk Analysis for the project.

2.2 Study Aims and Objectives

The aim of this study is to:

- Review the proposal, identify potential hazards and assess the risks associated with these hazards; and
- Demonstrate that the proposal meets the DEP requirements as outlined in EPA Guidance No.2: Guidance for Risk Assessment and Management: Offsite individual risk from Hazardous Industrial Plant [6].

2.3 Scope of Work

The work involves the undertaking of a preliminary risk analysis for the proposed Methanol plant and will discuss and recommend measures that may be used to minimise risks.

The Study addresses all aspects nominated in the EPA guidelines (refer Appendix D) and specifically included assessments of the following risks:

- Leakage or failure of process equipment;
- Hazards of supply, process, storage operations proposed;
- Knock-on effects, process fires and explosions, and external events (cumulative risks);
- Methanol export loading; and
- Shipping.



The method by which the proposed plant hazards has been assessed is:

- a Hazard Identification**
Identification of credible hazardous events for the facilities. This is done using the analysts' experience, the design engineers engineering knowledge, experience and a systematic review of the proposed plant.
- b Consequence Analysis**
Analysis of hazardous events identified to define causes and consequences. The following analyses were performed:
 - Fire Analysis;
 - Toxic Release Analysis; and
 - Pipeline and Transportation Hazards Analysis.
- c Frequency Analysis**
Determination of the frequency at which the hazardous events may occur.
- d Quantitative Risk Analysis**
Quantification of the risk arising from all hazardous events by cumulatively combining the product of frequency and consequence for each event.
- e Assessment of the total project risks by comparing them to the EPA guidelines [5].**

The methodology is described in Section 5 and includes a summary of the inputs and outputs provided. All assumptions have been listed. Results are presented in the form of risk contours. The results are then compared to the EPA criteria and conclusions drawn.

2.4 Nature of the Project

The proposal is to establish an export oriented Methanol complex that meets the captive needs of the international market. The plant would be of modern and proven design incorporating contemporary safety standards.

The proposed plant capacity is 3000mtpd of Methanol, stored in two atmospheric Methanol storage tanks.

The proposed site for the Methanol plant is in the Withnell East Area.

2.5 Philosophy of Approach to Risk Assessment

The potential for major incident events arising in plants that process, store or transport hazardous materials warrant special measures to ensure the safety of the public, the workforce and the environment.

One of the best approaches, designed to assist in maintaining the safety of the public and the workforce when developing such facilities, is Risk Assessment. This approach requires the use of a range of analytical techniques and calculation methods to identify and evaluate the hazards and risks associated with a process or facility.



The primary purpose is to ensure that all significant risks are identified and properly evaluated to enable appropriate action to be taken to eliminate or reduce the potential for major incident events. The techniques used enable the risk to be quantified in terms of consequence of the hazardous events and frequency of occurrence of these events. These risks can then be reported in terms of the total frequencies (risk levels) of exceeding designated hazard impact levels such as human fatality.

The risks as assessed, can then be compared with the risks associated with other processes and to community standards. Consequently, risk assessment can be used to assist in the approval process for new plant proposals. The risks associated with a new plant are measured against nominated criteria to assist in determining the acceptability of the risk for the proposal involved.

The Preliminary Risk Assessment is conducted using preliminary drawings with limited access to information about the facility. Therefore a more thorough Quantitative Risk Analysis shall be completed prior to the commencement of construction and production operations.

It is essential that competent analysts who achieve an understanding of the processes and risks involved carry out the risk assessment in an objective manner. The risk assessment must be completed in a clear auditable manner with all assumptions detailed.



3 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

3.1 Site Location and Environment of the Project Site

3.1.1 Background - Site Selection

The proposed site for the Methanol plant is located on the Burrup Peninsula which is in the northwest Pilbara region of Western Australia, approximately 1,300 kilometres north of Perth. The Burrup Peninsula extends approximately 20 kilometres north of the coast into the Dampier Archipelago and is surrounded by the shallow waters of Nickol Bay to the east and Mermaid Sound to the west.

The selected site is about 50 hectares in area and is located east of Withnell Bay and east of Woodside's LNG Plant. This site is within the Withnell East Industrial area. The site is approximately 14 and 10 kilometres from the towns of Karratha and Dampier respectively.

Natural Gas feed is taken from a line directly from the Woodside Onshore Treatment Plant (LNG), entering the plant's western lease boundary. GTL Resources' title will be an easement under the Petroleum Pipelines Act from the State (through DOLA) acting with the consent of the Shire of Roebourne and of the Commissioner of Main Roads (within the Burrup Road). Native title has been extinguished on road reserves and therefore the gas supply pipeline raises no native title issues.

An easement will be sought for the Methanol export pipeline to the new purpose-built Dampier wharf.

3.1.1.1 Compatible industrial zoning and adjacent industries

Two proposed ammonia plants (Plenty River & Burrup Fertilisers) are located to the south-east and the proposed Syntroleum synthetic fuels plant is located to the south. The LNG facility (Woodside) is located approximately 1 kilometre to the west.

The Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline (DBNGP) traverses the Burrup Peninsula and is located approximately 1.5 to 2 kilometres south-west of the proposed site.

3.1.1.2 Proximity to existing available port facilities

The Dampier Public Wharf is located about 4.5 kilometres to the south-west of the proposed site and is one of the largest ports in Australia based on tonnage of cargo. The project will have access to the ship-loading facilities at the new purpose-built loading wharf (approximately 300m south of the existing Dampier Public Wharf).

3.1.1.3 Existing trafficable roads

The Burrup Peninsula is serviced by the main north-south aligned Burrup Road. Bordering the site to the west is Withnell Bay Road, which is unsealed.



3.1.1.4 Utility services

Services such as power and water are available primarily through synergies with other proposed projects. The Proponent is designing the plant to be self-sufficient in terms of power.

3.1.1.5 Proximity to the townships of Karratha and Dampier

The proposed site is located about 10 and 14 kilometres from Dampier and Karratha respectively. This distance will ensure minimal impact of the plant on local communities while providing a practical commuting distance for employees.

3.1.2 Burrup Peninsula Facilities

3.1.2.1 Location

The plant will be constructed in the Withnell East Area with the potential to maintain considerable separation distances from residential areas. Figure 3-1 shows the Location Map and Figure 3-2 shows the site layout for the proposed Methanol Plant. The Plenty River and Burrup Fertiliser Ammonia Plants marked on Figure 3-1 are proposed developments and are not currently populated.

Nearby populated areas, according to [20,21] are:

Area	Population	Location
Woodside Onshore Treatment Plant (LNG)	100	1 km W
Plenty River Ammonia Plant	40	3 km SW
Burrup Fertilisers Ammonia Plant	40	3 km SW

The King Bay Port Area is comprised of:

- the offshore support jetty at the King Bay Supply Base from which Mermaid Sound Port and Marine Services supply Woodside offshore facilities;
- the Dampier Port Authority General Cargo Jetty; and
- the Port Industrial Area.

Transportation / Service Routes include:

- Public Jetty;
- Gas Pipeline within the utilities corridor; and
- Road Transport.

3.1.3 Meteorology

3.1.3.1 Data Sources

For the consequence modelling, suitable combinations of wind speed and stability class are chosen. These combinations must reflect the full range of observed variations in these quantities. As such combinations of wind speed and stability were grouped into representative weather classes; to cover all conditions observed. The choice of weather classes for the examination of the site is given in the following section.

The data required for the risk analysis came from the Bureau of Meteorology and was collected at the Dampier weather station. Qest then summarised and grouped the wind (speed, direction and stability) data for use in the consequence and risk modelling.

**3.1.3.2 Processing the Data**

The meteorological data provided has hourly measurements of wind speed, direction and stability coefficient for a year. The stability coefficients are detailed in Table 3.1.

The six (6) most common wind conditions, three (3) for day and three (3) for night, consisting of speed and stability coefficient are determined. Each condition has a distribution or directions covering the eight (8) points of the compass. The breakdown of wind conditions and associated fractions of time per direction are presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.1 : Stability Class Definition

Class	Type	Description
A	Unstable	Daytime - sunny, light winds.
B	Unstable	Daytime - moderately sunny, light to moderate winds.
C	Unstable / Neutral	Daytime - moderate winds, overcast or windy and sunny.
D	Neutral	Daytime - windy, overcast or Night-time - windy.
E	Stable	Night-time - moderate winds with little cloud or light winds with more clouds.
F / G	Stable	Night-time - light wind, little cloud.

Table 3.2 shows the processed wind / weather probability data for the site used in the risk calculations.

Table 3.2 : Meteorological Probabilities (Percentages)

Direction (From)	Wind						Total
	2.5B	4.2C	6.3C	1.8F	3.0F	5.1D	
N	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.10
NE	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08
E	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.13
SE	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.15
S	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.09
SW	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.17
W	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.20
NW	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.08
Total	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.18	1.00

For other key meteorological parameters, averages are taken from the local data [17]. The data used was:

Ambient Temperature: 29°C (302K)
 Atmospheric Pressure: 101325 Pa
 Relative Humidity: 43%



3.2 Process Description

The proposed Methanol plant will produce 3000mtpd of Methanol product using natural gas as a feedstock, which will be available for export to outside users. This plant will be operated on a 24 hour basis and for this Study the plant is assumed to operate 365 days per year.

Two (2) pure Methanol storage tanks each with a capacity of approximately 60,000 m³ will be provided. Methanol for export will be off-loaded via a specially designed loading arm to storage tankers. Approximately 36 loadouts to export of 30,000 tonnes of methanol will be required per year.

Process flow diagrams (PFD's) for the methanol plant are presented in Appendix B. The detailed process description presented below follows the sequence of PFD's.

3.2.1 Methanol Manufacture

3.2.1.1 General

The manufacture of Methanol from natural gas is described in detail below.

3.2.1.2 Process

Unit 100 – Reforming

The objective of the natural gas reforming unit is to produce methanol synthesis gas at suitable fractions of H₂, CO and CO₂ from the natural gas feed. The composition of methanol synthesis gas is usually characterised through the stoichiometric ratio:

$$SN = (H_2 - CO_2) / (CO + CO_2),$$

In terms of molar fractions (on a wet or dry basis), Methanol synthesis is most efficient with a synthesis gas of SN about 2.0 – 2.1. This is achieved here using a suitable combination of steam and autothermal reforming.

In summary, the following steps are performed on the natural gas feed in unit 100:

- Hydrogenation and desulphurisation
- Saturation
- Pre- and steam reforming
- Autothermal (or secondary) reforming
- Reformed gas cooling

Hydrogenation and Desulphurisation

The sulfur components in the natural gas would poison the reforming and methanol catalysts in units 100 and 200 and therefore have to be removed. To achieve this standard catalytic processes are implemented, working at around 380°C.

Before the natural gas is preheated, purge gas from the methanol synthesis loop is added. It provides the hydrogen required for hydrogenating the organic sulfur components in the feed.



First hot purified natural gas of 380°C coming from the desulphurisation heats the cold natural gas to 320°C. Final preheating to 380°C occurs in the natural gas preheater in the flue gas waste heat system of steam reformer.

The hot gas passes through a hydrogenation reactor containing a cobalt molybdenum based catalyst. Organic sulfur components are converted to H₂S.

The H₂S content of the gas is then reduced to less than 0.1 vol.-ppm as required for the downstream processes through conversion to ZnS when passing the ZnO catalyst in two zinc oxide vessels. These reactors are passed in a row and their sequence may be changed. One reactor may be taken offline for changing the catalyst with the other one in service at 100% plant load.

Saturation

A significant part of the process steam needed for reforming is added to the purified gas feed as water in a saturator absorber column. The almost dry gas enters the column bottom and leaves the top at about 210°C. Most of the water added in the saturator is process condensate knocked out in the reformed gas cooling train and process water separated from the crude methanol in distillation unit 300.

The advantages of this saturation step are:

- Reduced demand of vapour phase process steam
- Reduced capacity of process condensate treatment
- Reduced capacity of process waste water treatment

Reforming

After purification and preheating, the conversion of the natural gas feed to CO, CO₂ and H₂ is performed in different reforming steps.

Prereforming

The saturated feed is first preheated to 510°C in a feed preheater in the reformed gas cooling train and the flue gas waste heat system. Part of the stream is directly routed to the secondary reformer. The remaining part is mixed with process steam and sent to the prereformer. A major advantage of prereforming is the low allowable steam / carbon ration which is only 1.4 in this case.

The prereformer is a simple adiabatic fixed bed reactor where hydrocarbons heavier than methane are cracked so that only methane, H₂, CO, CO₂ and steam (and some N₂) are present at the reformer outlet. Lurgi and BASF have jointly developed this process stage already in the early 1960's for converting naphtha into a methane-rich gas. The prereformed gas is therefore also called rich gas. Early applications were for producing town gas and later also CO rich synthesis gases. However, it is useful also for steam reforming of natural gas, because it reduces the size of a downstream steam reformer and leads to more favourable operating conditions.

Steam Reforming

After adding process steam the prereformed gas is superheated to 560°C in the flue gas waste heat system of the steam reformer and fed to the primary reformer.

A single top-fired Lurgi steam reformer with 240 tubes is used. The burners are installed in rows in the ceiling of the firebox burning a mixture of natural gas and offgas from the pressure swing adsorption unit (PSA). A combustion air blower



supplies combustion air to the burners. The firebox is kept at a slight vacuum using a flue gas fan. Both fans are turbine-driven.

Autothermal Reforming (Secondary Reforming)

The top section of a secondary reformer holds a burner where the feed gas is mixed with oxygen and steam preheated to 230°C. Part of feed gas is burnt generating heat to further promote the reforming reactions. The amount of oxygen is adjusted in a way that the gas mixture leaves the bed of reforming catalyst below the combustion zone at 975°C. At this temperature nearly 97% of the dry reformed gas are H₂, CO and CO₂. The (dry) residual methane content is less than 2%. There is also more CO than CO₂, which is favourable for methanol synthesis.

A water-cooling jacket keeps the cylindrical shell surface at a uniform temperature independent of weather conditions.

Reformed Gas Cooling

The hot reformed gases leaving the secondary reformer are immediately routed to waste heat boilers through short pieces of refractory lined transfer lines. These boilers generate saturated HP steam (104 barg) at normal operating conditions. The boilers are connected through risers and downcomers with a steam drum forming a natural water-steam circulation system.

The reformed gas leaving the waste heat boilers is further cooled in the feed preheater where saturated natural gas feed from the saturator is heated to 380°C on the shell side. Cooling to about 165°C is achieved in the circulation water heater where water of the saturator loop is heated to 240°C on the shell side.

The reformed gas is then routed to the gas reboilers in the distillation unit and ensuite to the demineralised water preheater. Process condensate is removed in separators.

The reformed gas is further cooled by aircooling, and a final water cooler to 40°C. Process condensate is knocked out in separators.

The major part of the collected process condensate is recycled back to the saturator. The remaining process condensate is routed to unit 500 for treatment.

Reformer Flue Gas Cooling

The hot flue gas leaving the reformer firebox is a huge source of energy to be recovered. Several bundles are arranged in the flue gas duct to allow an optimum heat recovery.

The hottest bundles in the system are used for preheating the reformer feed to 560°C. The steam reformer inlet temperature is controlled through boiler feed water quench.

The following heat exchanger is the prereformer feed with a tube side outlet temperature of 510°C. Again this temperature is controlled through addition of boiler feed water upstream of the bundle.

Downstream of the prereformer preheater auxiliary burners are located in the flue gas channels. They boost the flue gas temperature to about 900°C. This results in reasonable temperature differentials and surface areas of the downstream heat exchanger bundles.



The remaining energy is used subsequently for HP-steam superheating, MP-steam superheating, natural gas preheating, process condensate heating and combustion air preheating.

Unit 200 – Methanol Synthesis


Synthesis and Recycle Gas Compression

The reformed gas routed to the methanol synthesis unit is mixed with hydrogen from the PSA to adjust the stoichiometric ratio to 2.05. This gas is compressed to about 75 barg using a single casing centrifugal compressor.

Recycle gas is the major part of the remaining vapour phase after the methanol reactor effluent has been cooled and the liquid crude methanol been removed. To make up the pressure drop in the synthesis loop the recycle gas needs to be re-compressed using a recycle gas compressor. Both compressors are driven by a single steam turbine. This turbine is one of two major steam turbines consuming the superheated HP steam generated in unit 100 and 1400. The turbine has extraction at the MP steam level for process steam. The balance steam is condensed.

Methanol Synthesis Reactors

Methanol is synthesised from H₂, CO and CO₂ using a highly selective copper based catalyst. The two basic and very exothermic reactions are:



For large capacities Lurgi has developed a two-stage reactor system.

The first stage is the classical water-cooled reactor known from any Lurgi plants with capacities up to 2500 mtpd of methanol. The heated synthesis and recycle gas passes the catalyst tubes of a water-cooled methanol reactor. The heat of reaction is removed from the catalyst tubes through boiling water on the shell side of the reactors generating MP-steam.

The effluent of the first stage is then routed to a gas-cooled reactor passing the catalyst on the shell sides. In this case the heat of reaction, which is less than in the first stage, is absorbed through synthesis and recycle gas flowing on the tube side. This reactor resembles the gas-gas interchanger of classical Lurgi methanol units where the hot methanol reactor outlet gas flows on the tube side heating up the reactor feed on the shell side.

Reactor Outlet Gas Cooling

The effluent from the second reaction stage has a temperature of approx 220°C and is of vapour phase. Crude methanol is recovered from this gas through cooling and condensation.

First the gas passes the HP boiler feed water preheater heating the water to about 180°C. Further gas cooling including heat recovery occurs in a trim heater and the MP-BFW preheater.



Finally cooling is undertaken by aircooling and final water cooling to 40°C. The condensed crude methanol is separated from the gas phase in the methanol separator.

Purge Gas

A fraction of the vapour phase is purged from the loop. Otherwise inert components such as methane and nitrogen would build up in the loop. Most of it is routed to the PSA unit, where hydrogen is recovered and recycled to the suction of the syngas compressor. The rest is mixed with the natural gas feed supplying H₂ for hydrogenation.

Unit 300 – Methanol Distillation

A prerun column and two pure methanol columns operating at different pressures are the main components of the methanol distillation unit. The overhead vapours of the pure methanol pressure column are used to heat the reboiler of the pure methanol atmospheric column reducing the heating steam demand of the unit.

Apart from methanol, the crude methanol produced in the synthesis unit contains water, solved gases and small quantities of undesirable but unavoidable impurities, which may have higher or lower boiling points than methanol.

The distillation unit serves to remove these impurities at low loss of methanol and low steam consumption with the pure methanol product meeting the given grade AA specification. This is achieved in the following process steps:

- Degassing
- Removal of low-boiling impurities
- Removal of high-boiling impurities

Degassing

Crude methanol is flashed from synthesis pressure of about 67 barg to about 4.5 barg in an expansion vessel. The flash gases (CO₂, CO, H₂, CH₄, N₂ and some methanol) are released through a pressure control valve and are mixed to the fuel gas of the steam reformer. The flashed crude methanol is routed to the distillation process.

The vessel is level controlled. Surplus of crude methanol is discharged to the crude methanol tank in unit 400 whereas a deficit is made up from the same tank.

Prerun Column

The degassed crude methanol is fed flow controlled to the prerun column. The residual solved gases and low boiling by-products (mainly dimethylether and methylformate) are removed overhead together with some methanol vapour. The overhead vapour passes through the air-cooled prerun column condenser, where most of the methanol vapour is condensed.

The condensate is collected in the prerun column reflux vessel, removed from this vessel on level control and recycled to the column top. The uncondensed vapours are cooled further in an off gas cooler where some more methanol condenses from the off-gas. This condensed methanol runs back while the off-gases are heated and mixed to the steam reformer fuel.

A small quantity of caustic is fed to the column to prevent corrosion in the columns.



During normal operation, the reformed gas reboiler provides the reboiler duty for the prerun column. A steam reboiler is used for start-up and is heated with LP steam of 4.5 barg.

The stabilised methanol – free of low boiling impurities – leaves the bottom of the prerun column through a level control valve and is pumped to the pure methanol pressure column.

Pure Methanol Column

High boiling impurities – mainly higher alcohols and water – are separated from methanol in the pure methanol pressure column and the pure methanol atmospheric column. The overhead vapours are condensed in a reboiler/condenser where the heat released is utilised for boiling the bottoms of the atmospheric column.

Distilled liquid methanol is collected in the pressure column reflux vessel. Part of it is recycled to the column top. The balance is further cooled in the pure methanol cooler and routed to one of the shift tanks in unit 400. The pure methanol column has two steam reboilers heated with LP steam reformed gas respectively.

The remaining methanol containing high boilers is withdrawn level controlled from the bottom of the pressure column and fed to the pure methanol atmospheric column.

Pure Methanol Atmospheric Column

The pure methanol atmospheric column operates little above atmospheric pressure and produces pure methanol overhead. The bottom product is more than 99 wt-% pure water. The overhead pure methanol vapour of the column is condensed in an air-cooled atmospheric column condenser and then subcooled using cooling water in pure methanol cooler. The cooled pure methanol is collected in the atmospheric column reflux vessel. Part of the methanol is recycled to the column top and the balance is sent to shift tank in unit 400 as product.

The bottom stream of the column is process water containing only about 0.1 wt-% of alcohols. This process water is fed to the saturator system in unit 100.

Unit 150 – Steam and Condensate System

The plant's steam system features the following headers:

- superheated HP steam (101 barg, 510°C)
- saturated MP steam (45 barg, 259°C)
- superheated MP steam (43 barg, 390°C)
- de-superheated LP steam (4.5 barg, 160°C)

HP Steam

During normal operation HP steam is produced in unit 100 in the waste heat boilers where reformed gas is cooled from 975°C to 480°C. The Boiler feed water supplied to the boilers is preheated in the methanol synthesis loop. The rest of the HP demand is covered by the auxiliary boiler in unit 1400. The total HP-steam is superheated to 510°C in the reformer flue gas waste heat system.

HP superheated steam is consumed in unit 200 by the steam turbine driving the syngas compressor, in unit 1300 by the steam turbine used in the air separation plant and used for power generation.

*MP Steam*

MP Steam is generated in the water-cooled methanol reactor of unit 200 and superheated in the flue gas waste heat system to 390°C. A small part of the saturated MP-steam is used for oxygen preheating. The superheated MP-steam is mainly used for driving various backpressure steam turbines in the plant.

LP Steam

Normally LP steam comes from the turbines. As all come with different temperatures above the header temperature the combined LP turbine steam must be quenched to 160°C. LP steam is consumed in unit 300 for heating the pressure column steam reboilers.

Boiler Feed Water Preparation

All the plant's steam generators are supplied from the boiler feedwater drum. HP boiler feed water is pumped to unit 100 and unit 1400 by HP boiler feed water pumps. HP BFW is also used for quenching various process and steam streams. MP BFW is transferred to unit 200.

Most of the consumed BFW is made up from directly recycled turbine condensate and from unit 300 LP steam condensate. The balance is demineralised water from boiler feed water treatment unit 500. Some LP heating steam is used to keep the drum at the bubble point.

Unit 400 – Intermediate Methanol Tank Farm

Two pure methanol shift tanks alternatively provide intermediate storage for the methanol product from the distillation section during each shift. While one tank is filled with methanol from the plant, the contents of the other is sampled and checked for purity. When the sample is "on-spec", it is approved and the contents pumped to pure methanol storage tanks in unit 1100. Otherwise the "off-spec" product is routed to the crude methanol tank and reprocessed in the distillation section together with crude methanol from the methanol synthesis unit.

Apart from storing off-spec methanol, the crude methanol tank serves as a buffer between the methanol synthesis and distillation unit and can accommodate temporarily different production rates of both units.

Unit 500 – Boiler Feed Water Treatment

The process condensate of unit 100 is treated in unit 500 using ion exchangers and a degasser. The pretreated water is mixed with parts of the fresh water from B.L. and routed via two parallel mixed bed filters. The demineralised water produced in unit 500 is sent to the boiler feedwater drum in unit 150 for further distribution.

Unit 550 – Sea Water Desalination

The sea water desalination unit 550 serves to produce the required make-up for the sweet cooling water system and balances the water consumed in the reforming process. Most probably a flash-type evaporation will be used.



Unit 600 – Sweet Cooling Water System

A closed sweet cooling water system – cooled back with sea water – is used.

Unit 650 – Sea Water System

The seawater in-take system is located at the coast. It is equipped with screens and a blow back system, which allows periodic cleaning of the screens. The seawater is pumped from the in-take to the desalination unit 550 where it serves to produce the desalinated water required in unit 500 and 600.

Unit 700 / 750 – Power Generation

The power required in the plant is produced in unit 700 using a turbine generator. The steam turbine driving the generator is fed with HP superheated steam. During emergency upsets a diesel driven power generator is used to provide the necessary power to restart the plant.

Unit 800 – Instrument and Plant Air System

Unit 800 provides Instrument and Plant Air to the plant. In case of failure of the instrument air compressor a buffer vessel will ensure the instrument air supply for approx 30 min. allowing reasonable time to restart the compressor.

Unit 900 – Waste Water Treatment

The Waste Water Treatment is mainly used for treating the sanitary sewage of the plant. Depending on statutory requirements the blow down from the saturator, which may contain minor traces of organic compounds, will be treated as well.

Unit 1000 – Flare System

During the start-up of the plant, when safety valves on lines or vessels containing flammable gases blow off or during sudden shutdowns there are gas streams which have to be routed to the flare.

The flare is a hot-type flare which is ignited by continuously burning pilot burners fed with natural gas. Nitrogen is used as seal gas. Condensate is collected in a flare knock out drum located at the bottom of the flare and discharged via a slop pump.

Unit 1100 – Methanol Product Tank Farm and Ship Loading

The Pure Methanol Storage Tanks have a capacity of approximately 60,000 m³ each. Pure methanol is pumped with transfer pumps from the tank farm to the ship loading arms.

Unit 1200 – Fire Fighting System

The proposed fire fighting system includes a water storage tank, pumps, main fire ring equipment like hydrants, hose cabinets, fire extinguishers, etc. A fire alarm system and sprinkler system will be installed in the administration building.



The final design for the plant will incorporate all fire fighting systems to make the plant as safe as practicable, but at the early stage of design which is available for this study the fire fighting systems have not been finalised.

Unit 1300 – Air Separation Unit

The oxygen blown secondary reformers are essential for the full methanol capacity and proper performance of the plant.

Oxygen is the main product of the air separation unit and produced in a cryogenic distillation process. Nitrogen is another product of the unit and mainly needed for methanol tank blanketing in units 400 and 1100. During start-up and shut down of the plant nitrogen is needed as general utility.

Unit 1400 – Auxiliary Boiler System

During normal operation the auxiliary boiler will produce superheated HP-steam to make up the requirements for the syngas turbine, the steam turbine of the air compressor in unit 1300 and the power generator. The major producer of HP superheated steam in normal operation is unit 100. During start-up unit 1400 will solely ensure power and steam supply for the plant.

The auxiliary boiler will be a natural circulation type boiler fired with natural gas in a pressurised furnace. A forced draft air is used to supply combustion air, making a flue gas blower unnecessary.

Unit 1600 – Rainwater Sewer System

Rainwater is collected in a drain system. The collected rainwater will be pumped to suitable battery limit.

3.2.2 Methanol Storage

It is proposed that two 60,000 m³ pure Methanol storage tanks would be installed adjacent to the intermediate storage tanks. The Methanol will be stored as a liquid at atmospheric pressure and temperature.

The approximate dimensions of each storage tank will be overall diameter 60m and height 21m.

It is proposed that both tanks will be single walled. Other design safety features common to all contemporary atmospheric Methanol storage installations will also be incorporated.

3.2.3 Export Systems

3.2.3.1 Liquid Methanol Export

Dedicated export pump(s) will be provided to transfer Methanol from the Methanol storage tank(s) to ship loading facilities via a 24" pipeline at a maximum rate of 1500 tonnes/hr. The pipeline route is shown on the location map provided in Figure 3-1. The pumps will be provided with instrumentation to detect abnormal conditions such as low discharge pressure and seal leakage and will be connected to an Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system. Off-loading to tankers is expected to occur approximately 36 times per year, with each transfer taking approximately 20 hours.



The Methanol product pipeline will be situated on the underside of the new loading wharf to the ship loading point. Loading of the ship will be undertaken with the use of a specially designed marine loading arm, capable of loading up to 1500t/hr. The flexible arm will be connected to the permanent product pipeline. The ship will also comprise permanent piping with a flexible attachment to allow for the rise and fall of the ship due to changes in tide and the sinking of the ship as it becomes increasingly heavier as it is loaded.

The Methanol loading process is activated from the plant site. Once complete, the pipeline will remain full of methanol and will not be emptied.

The ships that will be required to export Methanol are likely to be 50,000 t ships capable of storing approximately 30,000 t of liquid Methanol.

The slops tanks and the associated nitrogen supply for this tank are to be located on the shore near the approach to the wharf deck. The slops tank has been designed on the basis of retaining 30 seconds of full flow in the event of a surge relief. This represents a total tank volume of 25 m³.

Once the ship is loaded, the supply of Methanol from the plant site is terminated and the valves of the loading arms are closed.

3.2.4 Natural Gas Pipeline

The natural gas feedstock for the Methanol plant will be provided via the DBNGP, which extends from the Woodside LNG plant entering at the north west of the proposed plant site. It is assumed that gas will be supplied at battery limits at approximately 6.0 MPag.

3.2.5 Environmental Considerations

A full assessment of environmental impacts is beyond the scope of this PRA report, however the plant will be designed and constructed to meet contemporary effluent and emission standards with particular consideration to local regulations governing environmental protection. A modern Methanol plant is a chemical manufacturing installation with very limited impact on the surrounding environment.

Gaseous emissions will be within acceptable limits and will not cause air pollution nuisances or hazardous conditions for the neighbourhood. Liquid discharges will be within acceptable limits and will not pollute the sea or other waters with wastes which would contribute excessive quantities of dissolved or suspended solids, oil, harmful or oxygen depleting chemicals or coloured material. Provision will be made to ensure that any process spills are collected and treated as required. No toxic or hazardous materials will be discharged from the plant.



Figure 3-1 Methanol Plant Proposed Site Location







Figure 3-2 Methanol Plant Proposed Site Layout





4 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROPOSAL

4.1 Properties of Process Materials

From reviewing preliminary process information, the following process materials are of interest in this study:

- Methanol;
- Methane (in natural gas);
- Carbon monoxide;
- Oxygen;
- Hydrogen; and
- Various catalysts.

4.2 Potential Hazards Associated with Methanol Plant

4.2.1 In-Plant Hazards

Principal hazards encountered in a Methanol plant may be grouped as follows:

- Chemical: particularly Methanol, methane and hydrogen (see 4.2.2 below for details).
- Operating Conditions
- Pressure System Components:
 - Furnaces
 - Compressors
 - Air Separation Unit

For a Methanol plant, the materials required to handle the above operating conditions are well understood, and covered by the relevant engineering codes and standards.

4.2.2 Chemical Hazards

As this preliminary risk analysis is primarily concerned with the impact of the facility on the surrounding environment and population, discussion of hazardous events will focus on those chemicals which will be present in quantities large enough to cause potential problems outside the site if a release occurs.

Appendix F describes the detailed properties of process materials to be used at the facility. The physical and chemical properties of these materials and, where relevant, flammability and toxicity data are also detailed.

The main hazards will arise from the loss of containment of pressurised gases or flammable liquids. Resulting vapour clouds mixing with air will be dangerous, both from the potential environmental effects of the spreading material and also from the possibility of a flammable mixture being ignited.

4.2.2.1 Methanol

Methanol (Methyl Alcohol) is a clear, colourless flammable liquid (and vapour) with a faint characteristic alcohol odour. It is a moderate explosion hazard and dangerous fire hazard when exposed to heat, sparks or flames. It has a boiling point of 65°C



and a flash point of 11°C. Above flash point, vapour/air mixtures are explosive within 6 to 36.5% vol. in air. There is potential for rupture of sealed containers when heated. Methanol is sensitive to static discharge.

Methanol is harmful / life-threatening if ingested or absorbed through the skin. Excessive heating and/or incomplete combustion will generate highly poisonous CO and CO₂.

In the event of an ignited release, a methanol fire may not be visible to the naked eye.

The TLV of methanol is 200 ppm, and IDLH is 25000ppm.

Methanol is highly reactive with strong oxidisers and should not be stored or mixed with the agents such as nitrates, perchlorates or sulfuric acid. If methanol is released on to soil it is readily biodegradable and would quickly evaporate. Methanol is completely soluble in water. However if released into water, it will be slightly toxic to aquatic life.

At the proposed plant, bulk storage will be in two atmospheric 60,000 m³ vessels. Liquid methanol will also be present at various combinations of pressure and temperature in other intermediate stages of the process plant.

Sections of the process where methanol may be present as vapour are also examined. However, the quantities are generally small compared with liquid inventories and the releases are likely to be less dense.

In Section 6, the identified (possible) methanol release events are modelled as part of the consequence and risk level assessment.

4.2.2.2 Methane

Methane is not stored on site but is present as the principal component of the natural gas feed. It is also present in (reducing) quantities in the desulphurisation and reforming sections of the Methanol plant.

A large release of methane may result in the formation of a cold dense cloud due to a large reduction in pressure following an inadvertent release to atmosphere.

Methane is not toxic except as a simple asphyxiant. It is flammable between 5 and 15% (vol.) in air. When unconfined it is not explosive.

4.2.2.3 Hydrogen

Hydrogen exists in varying quantities as a product of the reforming process throughout the methanol facility presenting the potential for explosions either internal (resulting from ingress of air) or external (from leaks). The impact of such explosions is likely to be local, however the secondary or domino effects (such as damage to a liquid methanol vessel) could result in offsite harm.

4.2.2.4 Carbon Monoxide

This gas is present in sufficient amounts post reformer to warrant quantification of offsite risk. It is also possible that it can impose an occupational risk to personnel working in the area.



Carbon monoxide is a toxic gas (by inhalation) with no obvious warning properties as it decreases the ability of the blood to carry oxygen to the tissues. Since it is odourless, colourless, and tasteless, unanticipated overexposure to this highly dangerous gas can readily occur.

Although carbon monoxide has not been found to be carcinogenic in humans, it is a chemical asphyxiant that exerts its effects by combining preferentially with haemoglobin (the oxygen-transport mechanism in blood) thereby excluding oxygen. Some symptoms of exposure to CO at 500 to 1000 ppm include headache, palpitations, dizziness, confusion and nausea. Loss of consciousness and death may result from exposure to concentrations 4000 ppm and higher. High concentrations may be fatal without producing any significant warning symptoms.

4.2.2.5 Nitrogen

The liquid nitrogen from the Air Separation Unit facilities is used for purging from the process equipment. This can present some risk to personnel involved.

Nitrogen is an odourless, tasteless, colourless, inert gas and personnel that come in contact with large concentrations of nitrogen will have difficulty breathing. It is sometimes stored as a liquid and personnel who come in contact with it can suffer severe burns and lacerations due to extremely low temperatures.

Short term exposure via inhalation causes effects such as nausea, vomiting, drunkenness, tingling sensation, suffocation, convulsions, and possibly coma.

4.2.2.6 Oxygen

Oxygen is not being stored, but is being produced on demand by the Air Separation Unit. The extreme cold provides an on-site local risk.

Oxygen release would increase the thermal effects of any flammable scenario, but it is not flammable or toxic in its own right.

4.2.2.7 Catalysts

The process catalyst materials could be sourced from a number of companies. These substances do not pose any particular hazard during normal operation, although precautionary measures are necessary to minimise dust exposure during handling.

Location	Composition
Reforming:	
Hydrogenation	CoMo based
Desulfurization	Zinc Oxide
Prereforming	Ni based
Steam reforming	Ni based
Autothermal reforming	Ni based
Synthesis:	
Methanol synthesis	CuO/ZnO



4.2.2.8 Operability Hazards

In-plant failures leading to the releases discussed above could be caused by:

- mechanical or material failures;
- utility failures;
- operational mishaps; and
- start-up / shut-down mishaps.

Detailed treatment of operational failure causes will be covered in Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies carried out when detailed design information and drawings are available. For this preliminary analysis, frequencies of potential hazardous events are estimated using historical failure rates for mechanical or material failures.

4.2.3 Product Export

4.2.3.1 Methanol Export

Failure of the methanol export pipeline will result in the release of methanol on land. A failure of the marine loading arm will lead to a spill of methanol on the jetty, ship or water. Methanol is readily miscible in water, thus spills onto water would rapidly diffuse into the water, and maybe toxic to aquatic life.

4.2.3.2 Shipping Hazards

There will be 36 export ship movements per year. The likelihood of an incident is discussed in Section 6.5.5.

4.2.3.3 Other Risk Events

Aircraft Risks

Commercial aircraft are not allowed to fly over the industrial area, therefore aircraft risk to the proposed methanol plant is negligible. Small aircraft may occasionally fly over the site and could present a crash risk. The resulting frequency of this event is likely to be very small and is considered not to present a significant increase in risk levels to the plant.

Earthquake

To minimise potential earthquake damage Australian Standard 1170.4 1993 will be used to determine the minimum level of design.

Cyclone

This is a cyclone affected region and the facilities will be designed according to the Australian Standards (AS 1170.2). In the event of a cyclone, personnel would evacuate in accordance with the Emergency Management Plan.



4.3 Review of Operating Philosophy and Safety Management

4.3.1 History of Similar Facility & Lurgi Technology

Lurgi Oel · Gas · Chemie GmbH designs and builds turnkey plants for the product lines of Hydrocarbon Technology, Gas Technology and Petrochemistry. Hydrocarbon Technology includes the processing of crude oil and production of aromatics in refineries. In Gas Technology, Lurgi offers its proprietary processes for synthesis gas production, for sulfur recovery and methanol synthesis and, in cooperation with Ammonia Caseale, also ammonia synthesis. In the petrochemical sector, the company boasts significant know how with processes for producing monomers, polymers – such as PVC and rubber – and petrochemical feedstocks like acetic acid.

Advantages for the Methanol Synthesis

The special advantages of the combined converter synthesis (2-stage reactor concept) of Lurgi compared to conventional technologies are:

- Higher syngas conversion per cycle and, as a result, a circulation system on a lower scale
- Generation of 50 bar high-pressure steam
- Reduction of capital expenditure by 30 to 40 %
- Suitability for very high capacities (over 5000 t methanol per day and train)
- Increase of catalyst service life
- Boost in the capacity of existing plants

Lurgi Methanol Plants

Year Built	Location	Feed Stock	Capacity (t/y)
1969	Germany	Cracker Residue	5000
1970	Germany	Vacuum Residue	220000
1971	Austria	Natural Gas Naphtha	77000
1971	Taiwan	Natural Gas	50000
1973	Italy	Natural Gas	50000
1974	USA	Natural Gas	410000
1975	Mexico	Natural Gas	150000
1976	USA	Heavy Residue	605000
1976	Slovenia	Natural Gas Naphtha	200000
1977	Taiwan	Natural Gas	10000
1977	Germany	Vacuum Residue	365000
1978	China	Vacuum residue	100000
1979	USA	Natural Gas	375000
1979	USA	Natural Gas + CO ₂	390000
1979	USA	Natural Gas + CO ₂	810000
1979	USA	Naphtha + Refinery Off-Gas	300000
1980	USA	Coal	180000
1981	Malaysia	Natural Gas	660000
1981	USA	Coal	6000
1981	Brasil	Vacuum Residue	8000
1982	Germany	Vacuum Residue	700000
1982	Indonesia	Natural Gas	330000
1982	Burma	Natural Gas	150000



Year Built	Location	Feed Stock	Capacity (t/y)
1982	Iran	Natural Gas	85000
1985	India	Naphtha	65000
1991	USA	Natural Gas	82500
1992	Norway	Oil Associated Gas	830000
1992	USA	Natural Gas	550000
1993	China	Natural Gas	100000
1994	Indonesia	Natural Gas	660000
1995	Iran	Natural Gas	660000
1996	South Africa	Coal Gas	140000
1997	Trinidad	Natural Gas	850000
1998	Kuwait	Natural Gas	660000

4.3.2 Safety Standards and Features to be Incorporated

Incorporation of safety standards and features starts with the selection of technology. During all phases from engineering through to procurement and construction, quality assurance systems will be in place to ensure that the designed plant safety features are implemented correctly.

Automatic shutdown of the plant, or parts thereof, will be initiated if certain limit values of operating parameters are exceeded. In addition, emergency manual trip initiation will be provided at strategic locations. The trip system will be designed to be fail safe, ie. failure of trip system elements or unintentional interruption of trip system signals will result in the plant or plant sections being automatically brought to a safe shutdown status.

To ensure that release sizes are minimised an Emergency Management Plan will be put in place. This will provide a plan for rapid response to identified releases, and would facilitate early manual isolation of any leaking equipment.

4.3.3 Process Shutdown / Control

The shutdown process of the GTL Methanol Plant, during an emergency, will result in an emergency shut down in Unit 100, where the natural gas supply is closed and steam is admitted to the system via 010-P01. The pressure of the steam is as indicated on the PFD's 37.5 bar. The pressure of the system is then gradually reduced to approx. 2-5 bar by control of PV 031. If the plant is shutdown completely, steam is continuously fed to the reformer while the temperature is gradually lowered. When the temperature is low enough, steam is replaced by nitrogen until the system cools down to ambient. The complete procedure takes approx. 12-24 hours.

The only isolating valves located in the section are for the make-up and recycle compressor.

The overall process control philosophy, from concept to actual plant operation, will be developed by Lurgi. They will also develop the control strategy, control systems and operator interface as well as selecting the proper field instrumentation.

4.3.3.1 Methanol Plant Flare System

Under normal operating conditions, gas is purged from the synthesis loop. This gas, which contains nitrogen with quantities of hydrogen, methanol, methane and oxides of carbon, is passed to the fuel gas system and is not flared. During certain process



upsets and emergency situations the plant will be depressurised to flare. The flare stack will be designed and positioned to minimise safety risk to the workforce, plant equipment and the natural environment.

Under emergency conditions, the plant safety system provides for a blowdown condition in the worst case. Under a blowdown condition, the whole plant or sections of the plant may be discharged to atmosphere through the flare. When it does, the inventory of the plant is released under controlled conditions to the flare. This event will discharge less than one day's normal emissions to the atmosphere in the form of a typical flare discharge composition. The precise amount of discharge depends upon the plant inventory, which will be known only when the plant is substantially designed.

It must be noted that the likelihood of a flare-out (extinguished flare) during a major upset is extremely remote.

4.3.3.2 Nitrogen Purge Facilities

Liquid nitrogen storage and manufacturing facilities will be included as a plant utility used for cooling, inerting/purging flammable and other gases from process equipment and in process startup.

4.3.3.3 Fire Fighting Facilities

Fire Fighting Facilities will be provided for the supply and distribution of fire fighting water for the whole plant.

4.3.3.4 Emergency Response

An Emergency Management Plan will be developed as an integral part of the plant operating procedures.

4.3.3.5 Safety Management and Training

A Safety Management System and appropriate procedures will be developed in conjunction with appropriate personnel. To ensure the safe operation of the facility, this will also include emergency procedures.

4.3.4 Engineering Codes and Standards

The plants will be designed and constructed in accordance with relevant Australian codes and standards. Where suitable Australian standards do not exist, other internationally recognised standards such as German or U.S. standards will be applied.



5 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

The objective of a Preliminary Risk Assessment (PRA) is to demonstrate that, as far as is reasonably practicable, all credible accident events that have the potential to cause fatalities off site have been identified and the EPA Criteria for the assessment of risk from industry has been met [5].

The methodology used for the PRA is based on hazard scenario identification, analysis and assessment carried out in well-defined stages. The methodology follows the philosophy laid down in the Guidelines for a Preliminary Risk Assessment [6] from the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).

The stages in the risk assessment methodology are summarised in Figure 5-1 and given in an overview below:

a Hazard Identification:

Identification of credible hazardous events for the facility. This is done using the analysts' experience, the design engineers engineering knowledge, experience and a systematic review of the proposed plant.

b Consequence Analysis:

Analysis of hazardous events identified to define causes and consequences. The following analyses are performed:

- Fire Analysis;
- Toxic Release Analysis; and
- Pipeline and Transportation Hazards Analysis.


c Frequency Analysis:

To determine the frequency at which the hazardous events may occur.

d Quantitative Risk Analysis:

Quantification of the risk arising from all hazardous events by cumulatively combining the frequency and consequence for each event.

e Assessment of the total project risks by comparing them to the EPA guidelines (Bulletin 611) [5].

**Figure 5-1 : Preliminary Risk Assessment Process**

The Methodology to be adopted for each of the steps 1 - 5 listed above is described in the following sections.

5.2 Hazard Identification

The objective of the Hazard Identification process is to systematically examine the plant and facilities in order to identify all hazards with the potential to cause fatality to persons offsite. This is done using the analysts' experience, the design engineers engineering knowledge, experience and a systematic review of the proposed plant and operations.

Each functional area of the plant has been reviewed and the hazards documented. Hazards considered to have the potential to impact offsite are evaluated further.

The functional areas evaluated represent the plant in its entirety and are as follows:

- Natural Gas Feed Line;
- Methanol plant;
- Methanol Storage Tanks;
- Methanol export pipeline (Plant - Wharf);
- Methanol Marine Loading Arm; and
- Shipping Channel.



5.3 Consequence Analysis

5.3.1 Introduction

The objectives of the Consequence Analyses are to demonstrate that:

- toxic and flammable inventories have been identified;
- a representative set of release cases has been chosen for analysis;
- the effects of an unignited release have been evaluated (in terms of hydrocarbon and toxic gas concentrations);
- the effects of an ignited release have been evaluated; and
- the consequences of each release have been identified in terms of the potential for:
 - offsite fatalities;
 - damage to inventory holders, such as vessels and pipework.

The methodology used to achieve these objectives is described below.

5.3.2 Inventory Identification

The analysis is based on the identification of all inventories existing on the Methanol Plant, either contained in storage or in 'live' plant. All inventories are quantified in terms of an operating 'basecase' which is a set of basic operating parameters which consist of inter-alia operating pressure and temperature of each plant section, typical inventory compositions, and so on.

Plant inventory volumes are described in terms of the volume contained in isolatable sections separated by designated ESD valves. In some instances an isolatable section consists of one or more process vessels and associated pipework. The inputs for this estimation process are conservative and are based on the proposed process flow diagrams and equipment datasheets.

An extension to this philosophy of inventory identification was used in this study. Due to the variation of process conditions that are not separated by ESD valves, non-return valves were used as isolation points. But this situation by design the inventory could flow downstream to the next isolation section but not upstream to the previous. This was taken into account when determining the inventory for a release from a given section, ie the inventory available includes all that upstream to last ESD valve, but not the material downstream of the next non-return valve.

The Quantitative Risk Assessment, to be conducted at a later stage, will have available more detail and greater accuracy with regards to the process equipment, isolatable sections and inventories and the effect of the control and shutdown system.

To ensure conservatism in the consequence models the available inventory is assumed to pass through the release and not flow to the flare or venting systems described in Section 4.3.3.

5.3.3 Release Types and Scenarios

Based on the results of the inventory estimation processes, each inventory may be expected to give rise to one or more release scenarios, which are characterised as follows:



- high pressure gas jet fires;
- flash fires arising from the ignition of a flammable gas cloud;
- explosions arising from the ignition of a confined or semi-confined flammable gas cloud; and
- toxic gas clouds.

The above list is typical of scenarios encountered in the Preliminary Risk Assessment.

There are 259 different events considered in this preliminary risk analysis of the proposed methanol plant. A list of the events and the frequency of each is included in Appendix O.

5.3.4 Release Sizes

The size of release affects the following consequences:

- Likelihood of ignition;
- Likelihood of explosion given ignition;
- Magnitude of an explosion;
- Magnitude of a fire;
- Fire duration; and
- Toxic cloud size.

Release frequency information is available for hole sizes ranging from 7 mm to full bore ruptures of large diameter piping. Representative ranges of release sizes have been modelled. Details of each release are provided in Section 6.

In assessing release duration for isolatable sections, consideration is made of the time taken to detect the release and effect ESD.

5.3.5 Consequence Modelling

Discharge rate modelling, toxic effects, fire and explosion scenario modelling follows on from the foregoing inventory identification and release size classification schemes.

Consequence analysis of flammable releases is of importance in evaluating the effects of an ignited release in terms of radiation, overpressures, and the consequences of the release on other vessels.

Release dispersion, and subsequent fire, explosion and toxic effects, are performed with the DNV consequence modelling package Phast [10]. Full details of the modelling contained in Phast are available on request.



5.4 Frequency Analysis

5.4.1 Introduction

The objectives of the Frequency Analysis are to demonstrate that:

- the event development is valid;
- the failure data used are valid; and
- the frequency of each of the hazardous events has been correctly determined.

The achievement of these objectives is described as follows:

- Initiating event frequencies are selected from a review of available data sources. A parts count of the plant is conducted.
- Ignition probabilities for flammable releases are selected from a review of available data and expert judgement published for onshore plant.
- Combining release frequency with ignition probabilities (and applicable mitigation measures) gives rise to a range of gas release, fire and explosion event frequencies.
- Combining release frequency with wind direction and weather state probabilities gives rise to a range of flammable and toxic clouds.



5.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

5.5.1 Introduction

The objectives of the QRA are to demonstrate that:

- the frequency of each of the Hazardous Events and the associated consequences has been evaluated;
- individual risk and societal risk contours produced;
- the major risk contributors have been identified;
- the sensitivity of the results to key assumptions has been addressed and is understood; and
- the offsite risks have been assessed.

5.5.2 Risk Calculation Methodology

The risks are determined for each hazardous event by combining each event frequency with the event outcomes, which are defined in the consequence analysis in terms of structural and human response. These are then cumulated for all events.

The risk arising from these events is calculated using the risk calculation package Riskplot II [18].

Riskplot II calculates Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) contours and societal risk taking into account the following:

- Release scenario frequency (including releases initiated by escalation of an adjacent event);
- location of release;
- magnitude of consequence;
- local meteorology; and
- local topography.

The risks are calculated so that for given locations, the risk profile can be identified over and above the average IRPA as given by the risk contour.

In calculation of the risk from toxic events, it is assumed that exposed personnel are "nailed to the spot" for 60 minutes. Considering the turbulent winds of Burrup Peninsula and the distances to the nearest offsite populations, giving ample time to warn these people, then this is a conservative assumption.

For fire events in this Study, the approach is described below and one assumption included is that there will be a response time of 60 seconds. Heat radiation effects as described in the *Hazardous Industry Planning Guidelines for Hazard Analysis* [15] are given in the following Table 5-1.

The resulting assumption of 60 seconds exposure has been deemed reasonable as thermal consequences are short lived and the worst case results are used in the thermal probit to determine fatality and these elements of the scenarios are extremely short lived. Jet fire consequences are worst within the few seconds following ignition, and the drop off as the pressure in the plant drops off. A pool fire has the source, the pool, increasing in size until ignition, but once ignited the burnrates typically exceed the release rates from the leak, thus the worst case



consequences are near the initial ignition and are short lived. The thermal effects from a flash fire are short lived, typically over within 20 seconds, thus the 60 second exposure assumption is extremely conservative in these cases. The thermal probit require thermal exposure and duration of exposure, thus the worst case exposure coupled with the assumption of 60 seconds exposure is considered reasonable by QEST risk analysts.

For overpressure events in this Study overpressure effects on humans are used as described in the *Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 4* [14] are given in Table 5-2.

Table 5-1 Radiation Effect Levels

Radiation Level (kW/m²)	Effect
4.7 kW/m ²	Will cause pain in 15-20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds exposure (at least second degree burns will occur)
12.5 kW/m ²	There is a significant chance of fatality for extended exposure and a high chance of injury. Causes the temperature of wood to rise to a point where it can be ignited by a naked flame after long exposure. Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach a thermal stress level high enough to cause structural failure.
35 kW/m ²	Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute's exposure. There is a significant chance of fatality for people exposed instantaneously.

Table 5-2 Overpressure effect levels

Overpressure Level (kPa)	Effect
21 kPa	Reinforced structures distort Storage tanks fail 20% chance of a fatality to a person in a building
35 kPa	House uninhabitable Wagons and plants items overturned Threshold of eardrum damage 50% chance of fatality for a person in a building and 15% chance of fatality for a person in the open
70 kPa	Threshold of lung damage 100% chance of fatality for a person in a building or in the open Complete demolition of houses

The human toxic impact figures are determined using the following TNO Green Book probit [4], a source widely respected in industry.

The fatality probability values given for a range of concentrations and a 60 minute exposure time to carbon monoxide is given in Table 5-3.

**Table 5-3 : Toxic Fatality Probability**

Concentration (ppm)	Exposure Time (mins)	TNO Predicted Fatality Prob (%)
100	60	1%
500	60	3%
1000	60	11%
2500	60	37%
5000	60	64%
7500	60	78%
10000	60	86%
15000	60	93%
20000	60	96%
30000	60	99%



5.6 Assessment of Results

The risk levels as calculated are compared against the DEP acceptance criteria. The DEP acceptance criteria are as follows:

- the offsite risk at the site boundary is less than 5×10^{-5} per year;
- the risk levels from pipeline incidents are less than 5×10^{-5} per year at the utilities corridor boundary; and
- the risk levels from the site are less than 1×10^{-5} per year at Withnell Bay.

5.7 Checking, Audit and Review

5.7.1 Checking of Input Data

The basis of the PRA is the Facility Process Flow Diagrams. The Facility Process Flow Diagrams provide the 'basecase' data concerning plant layouts, operational conditions and so on, that are input to the PRA risk calculation.

Where necessary, additional input data for the PRA studies consist of information from various sources within GTL, operating companies in the vicinity of the proposed plant and government bodies and authorities.

The responsibility for ensuring that the input data provided by these groups is correctly incorporated into the studies lies with QEST Consulting Engineers. QEST operates a quality control system in accordance with AS/NZS 9001:2000 and all work associated with the Project has been performed under the standard QEST Quality Assurance (QA) System.

5.7.2 Review of Assumptions

Numerous assumptions are made as part of the Preliminary Risk Assessment process and it is vital that all assumptions can be traced and verified. Assumptions are commonly made where data are not readily available, or calculations could not be undertaken, or alternatively where it is necessary to define certain operational aspects. All assumptions are recorded in Appendix E.



6 RISK ASSESSMENT

6.1 Introduction

The objective of the Preliminary Risk Assessment (PRA) of the Methanol Plant is to demonstrate that, as far as is reasonably practicable:

- all credible accident events that have the potential to cause fatalities offsite have been identified;
- the offsite risk at the site boundary is less than 5×10^{-5} per year; and
- the offsite risk at Withnell Bay is less than 1×10^{-6} per year.

To these ends, the methodology outlined in Section 5 has been followed.

6.2 Hazard Identification

Risk analysts using the typical Process Flow Diagrams for the plant, and discussing plant details with the plant designers and GTL conducted the Hazard Identification.

The identified hazards considered as having the potential to impact offsite and therefore evaluated in the risk analysis studies are presented in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1 : Potential Hazardous Events Examined in Risk Analysis

Location	Event	Release
Natural Gas Feed Line	Major leak or rupture.	Methane
Unit 100 – Reforming	Major leak or rupture.	Methane, Hydrogen, Carbon Monoxide
Unit 200 – Methanol Synthesis	Major leak or rupture.	Methane, Hydrogen, Carbon Monoxide, Methanol (g)
Unit 300 – Methanol Distillation	Major leak or rupture.	Methanol (l)
Unit 400 – Intermediate Methanol Tank Farm	Major leak or rupture.	Methanol (l)
Unit 1100 – Methanol Product Farm & Ship Loading	Major leak or rupture.	Methanol (l)
Unit 1170 – Methanol Pipeline Corridor	Major leak or rupture.	Methanol (l)
Shipping Channel	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ship to ship collision.• Grounding.• Collision with fixed structure.• Fire/explosion onboard.• Tank material failure.	Methanol (l)



6.3 Consequence Analysis

6.3.1 Inventory Identification

In order to properly characterise and quantify the consequences of a release from the process plant it is necessary to identify the toxic and flammable inventories which may be released.

As the plant is not at design stage, not all inventories can be accurately determined. However, isolatable inventories have been conservatively estimated based on a plant of similar capacity and technology.

Inventory information is shown in Table 6-2. This is used to arrive at estimates of vapour and liquid inventories in component equipment items in each isolatable inventory, and is used as a basecase from which to proceed in consequence analysis. This table also gives an overview of the pressure and temperature in each isolatable section. The use of the lowest temperature and highest pressure for any given section gives the greatest flowrate across a release and thus more conservative consequences.

Detailed piping information for the plant was not available for this analysis from which to derive inventories. Instead, a conservative estimation of the piping inventory was made and a simple factor of 20% was added to the volume of the associated vessels and equipment to approximate the piping volume.

Table 6-2: Isolatable Section Inventories

Isolatable Section	Location	Compounds Modelled	T min (C)	P max (kPa)	V (m ³)
ISO1	Unit 100	CH ₄	40	2300	23
ISO2	Unit 100	CH ₄	210	4000	128
ISO3	Unit 100	CH ₄	210	4000	1
ISO4	Unit 100 / Unit 200 / Unit 300	H ₂ , CO	560	30	153
ISO5	Unit 200	CH ₃ OH, H ₂	40	8000	138
ISO6	Unit 200 / Unit 300	CH ₃ OH	40	550	45
ISO7	Unit 300	CH ₃ OH	38	300	199
ISO8	Unit 300	CH ₃ OH	92	860	1
ISO9	Unit 300 / Unit 400	CH ₃ OH	40	600	2462.8
ISO10	Unit 400	CH ₃ OH	40	300	1191
ISO11	Unit 400	CH ₃ OH	40	300	1
ISO12	Unit 400	CH ₃ OH	40	300	60000
ISO13	Unit 400	CH ₃ OH	40	300	4
ISO14	Unit 300 / Unit 400	CH ₃ OH	25	101.3	1190
ISO15	Unit 300 / Unit 400	CH ₃ OH	25	101.3	4
ISO16	Unit 1100	CH ₃ OH	25	300	4
ISO17	Unit 1100	CH ₃ OH	25	101.3	25
ISO18	Unit 1100	CH ₃ OH	25	101.3	1870



The following chemical release events were analysed in the process area:

- A major leak from the natural gas feed line to the Methanol complex;
- A range of representative releases of methane;
- A range of representative releases of hydrogen at various combinations of pressure and temperature;
- A range of representative releases of Methanol at various combinations of pressure and temperature.
- Carbon monoxide releases for the post reforming products.

Further release events analysed were:

- A range of representative releases of Methanol from the Methanol storage;
- A range of representative releases of Methanol from the Methanol export pump;
- A range of representative releases of Methanol from the pipeline to the jetty;
- A range of representative releases of Methanol from the marine loading arm.

6.3.2 Release Sizes

The range of release sizes used for this analysis is 7mm, 22mm and 70 mm. This is the range of release sizes deemed appropriate by E & P Forum [7]. Ruptures are considered for certain equipment such as process vessels; as well as, pipework.

In assessing release durations for isolatable sections, consideration is made of the time taken to detect the release and effect ESD.

6.3.3 Release Types and Scenarios

6.3.3.1 High Pressure Gas Jet Fires

For the purposes of fire risk analysis, high-pressure jet fires have two distinct sets of consequences. Firstly, personnel are directly affected by the radiation from the flame which can cause death or injury if persons are exposed for a sufficient length of time. If meteorological conditions are not favourable, then combustion products may also pose a threat to escaping persons. Secondly, if the flame impacts on structure, pipework or adjacent inventories, then these may fail and give rise to additional releases, thus exacerbating the initial hazard.

High-pressure releases are particularly hazardous due to the inherent results of burning a relatively large amount of inventory in a short space of time. This is accentuated by the high momentum of the release, which gives rise to rapid entrainment and mixing of air, in turn resulting in efficient combustion and levels of radiation which are severe. On the other hand, because the jet release involves a rapid release of inventory, the fire may be of comparatively short duration. These releases will not therefore lead to knock on releases as the release will burn out before surrounding structures fail.

6.3.3.2 Flash Fires

Flash fires may result from the ignition of a cloud of released material. For example, this may be from a jet of released gas where the momentum has been expended. The flash fire occurs due to the delay in ignition of the initial release which gives an opportunity for the development of a flammable cloud. Now, ignition and combustion of the cloud results in its rapid expansion. If this expansion is impeded then overpressures are produced and the combustion process is modelled as an explosion (see below). For clouds released in open, unenclosed conditions then overpressure effects are minimal and the principal hazard is due to the high levels of



radiation produced by the ignition and swift combustion of a large mass of gas. Escalation to structures and inventory is not of principal concern due to the short duration of the flash fire. However, if the release is still ongoing, then the flash fire will be followed by a jet or pool fire where escalation issues regain importance.

6.3.3.3 Explosions

A flammable release may give rise to an explosion if the resulting flammable cloud forms in an area which is semi-confined, for example a piperack, or where there is a degree of congested pipework. In these circumstances, if ignition were to occur then turbulence resulting from the movement of burning gases may result in flame acceleration to a point where combustion products may not be able to vent efficiently, resulting in an overpressure with the capability of damaging buildings or structure. In these circumstances the hazards to personnel are three-fold. Firstly, exposing personnel to overpressure directly or indirectly has the potential to cause injury or fatality. Secondly, the overpressure may result in damage to adjacent vessels and pipework, causing additional flammable releases. Lastly and most importantly overpressure may result in damage to adjacent vessels and pipework, causing additional toxic releases.

6.3.3.4 Toxic Releases

A release of carbon monoxide will result in the development of a toxic cloud. As carbon monoxide has a slightly lower density than air it will readily diffuse into air and reach safe concentrations. However, there can be fatal consequences for people enveloped in a cloud with carbon monoxide concentrations of greater than 1000 ppm.



6.4 Consequence Modelling

This section describes the methods by which flammable releases are characterised and the consequences analysed. The analysis of the frequencies with which these releases occur is described in Section 6.5.

All consequence modelling has been performed using the computer consequence analysis package Phast Version 6.0 [10]. Phast is able to model all the events listed above by considering parameters relating to the following:

- release geometry;
- material properties; and
- meteorology.

6.4.1 Modelling Assumptions

In order to model the behaviour of ignited and unignited releases from the inventories described in Table 6-2, it is necessary to establish basic parameters for the climatic conditions for the models to run.

6.4.1.1 Methanol Plant Site

The Site was assumed to have the following properties, which are input to Phast:

- The mean day time temperature is taken to be 302K (29°C);
- Ground temperature for day time is assumed to be 302K (29°C);
- The mean night time temperature is taken to be 288K (15°C);
- Ground temperature for night time is assumed to be 288K (15°C);
- Mean annual humidity is assumed to be 43%; and
- Roughness length for dispersion calculations is assumed to be 0.03m (corresponding to "flat land with few trees").

6.4.1.2 Leaks and Emissions

For leaks and emissions, the following basic assumptions apply to the modelling process:

- all leaks are assumed to originate 1.0 m above ground level;
- all jet leaks are assumed to be horizontal;
- leaks are assumed to be through a sharp-edged orifice with a leak path of negligible length;
- where 'rupture' leaks are modelled as initiating events, these are analysed as continuous leaks where the leak diameter is that of the largest connection attached to the vessel; and
- spills are assumed to take place on the Phast option of "concrete".

6.4.1.3 Fires and Explosions

For fires and explosions, the following basic assumptions apply to the modelling process:

- Jet and pool fires are modelled using steady-state conditions using Phast; and
- It is assumed that initial release rates can be used to define effect distances for dispersing gas clouds and jet fires.



6.4.2 Phast Modelled Criteria

The results from the consequence analysis are presented and discussed in the following sections.

In order to use the Phast package to model a leak and ignition scenario it is necessary to define impact criteria for the consequences against which the models can be evaluated.

The criteria used for the consequence analysis are those described below:

Thermal Radiation

As discussed in Section 5.5.2, the human impact of heat radiation is determined using the method discussed in the TNO Green Book [8].

Structural damage is considered where a structure is impacted by thermal radiation of 50 kW/m² for greater than 15-20 minutes. However all vessels on this plant would be depressurised within that time.

An example of thermal radiation consequences are presented in Table 6-3.

Table 6-3 : Thermal Consequence Distances for a Methane Gas Release

Flux (kW/m ²)	Fatality Probability (%)	Downwind Distance (m)		
		70	22	7mm
4	10	157	51	17
12.5	50	145	47	16
37.5	100	141	46	15

Explosions

The criteria input to Phast for the calculation of overpressures (explosions) from a release in the plant, derived from TNO [8], are summarised in Table 6-4.

Table 6-4 : Overpressure Consequence Distances for Explosions

Probability of Fatality (%)		
Inside	Outside	Overpressure (kPa)
20	0	21
50	15	35
100	100	70

An example of the consequences of an overpressure due to a methane release from the feed and desulphurisation section is presented in Table 6-5. All consequence modelling results are available on request.

Table 6-5 : Overpressure Consequence Distances for a Methane Release

Overpressure (kPa)	Radial Distance (m)
21	60
35	57
70	55



Toxic Consequences

An example of the toxic consequences due to a carbon monoxide release from the post-reformer section of the plant is presented in Table 6-6. All consequence modelling results are available on request.

Table 6-6 : Toxic Consequence Distances for 22mm Release

Concentration (ppm)	Fatality Prob (%)	Downwind Distances (m)
1000	10	155
3500	50	135
35000	100	56

6.4.3 Natural Gas Feed Line

A 219mm (OD) feed Steel Grade pipeline operating at approximately 6 MPag with a flow rate of 72TJ/day has been assumed in this assessment. The pipeline will run directly from the Woodside Onshore Treatment Plant located less than 1000m from the west boundary of the site. The battery limit is located in the north west corner of the site. There will be no intermediate facilities however there will be a meter/regulator station at the battery limit of the plant site.

6.4.3.1 Release Events

Releases resulting from pipeline failure due to material of construction or maintenance faults, or external impacts would range from pinhole to full pipe ruptures. The jet flame extends for approximately 212 m for a full pipe rupture. This has the potential to impinge on the western half of the plant site. Unit 200, Methanol Synthesis, is within this 212 m radius. This could result in the domino effect of causing further fires and/or explosions in this unit.

The thermal effects resulting from jet fires for a range of hole sizes are included in Table 6-7.

Table 6-7 : Thermal Effects for Methane Fires from the Feed Pipeline

Heat Flux (kW/m ²)	Fatality Prob (%)	Downwind Distances (m)			
		Rupture	70 mm hole	22 mm hole	7 mm hole
37.5	100	250	103	33	11.5
12.5	50	285	117	37.5	13
4	10	345	140	45	15.5

6.4.3.2 Basis for Modelling

A jet fire, which could result from a rupture of 6 MPag natural gas, is likely to travel in the direction of the gas flow through the pipe. The battery limit is located in the north west corner of the plant, in the event of an ignited rupture the jet will be in the direction of the plant (as the gas flow is to the east towards Unit 100), thus not placing offsite locations at risk.



6.4.4 Methanol Process Plants

6.4.4.1 Release Events

Isolatable sections 1 through 16 from Table 6.2 describe the events that are modelled for the on-site releases.

6.4.4.2 Basis for Modelling

All vessels and associated equipment within the methanol production units within the plant are able to be remotely isolated. The vast majority of releases will occur in small inventory items such as small heat exchangers, pipes etc. 90% of large releases (≥ 70 mm) are assumed to cease in less than 60 seconds.

6.4.5 Methanol Storage

6.4.5.1 Release Events

The Methanol Storage tanks have a capacity of 60,000 m³ each, thus providing for potentially large scale consequences if a leak were to occur. The releases modelled are sustained releases from pinhole leaks through to rupture.

6.4.5.2 Basis for Modelling

It is conservatively assumed in this study that the wall of the tank is breached and the full contents are released.

6.4.6 Export Pump

6.4.6.1 Release Events

A release from seals or valve rupture. The pump is assumed to be isolated within 60 seconds.

6.4.6.2 Basis for Modelling

The pump will stop automatically on activation of the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system.

6.4.7 Pipeline from Plant to Wharf

The export pipeline that is proposed to run from the plant to wharf is a 24" diameter liquid line, with a length of approximately 6.5 km.

6.4.7.1 Release Events

The following release events are being considered for the plant to wharf pipeline:

- Pipeline failure due to material of construction or maintenance faults or external impacts.
- Leakage from the isolation valve at the wharf.

6.4.7.2 Basis for Modelling

The liquid line was assumed to have the following safety controls:

- Valves to be welded to pipework;
- Isolation valves at end of each pipeline which will automatically close on operation of ESD system; and



- Pressure monitoring of pipeline during operation for automatic monitoring of pipeline and activating ESD valves on sudden pressure drop.

The export line is considered to have two sets of conditions, one during exporting when the export pumps are applying pressure and the other during non-loading times when the pipe pressure is considered to be slightly above atmospheric pressure. Loading is to take place approximately every 10 days and will last approximately 20 hours. The pipe is considered to be loading 10% of the time, while during the remaining 90% of the time the pipe is left idle but the methanol is left within the pipe, thus the near atmospheric pressure during this period.

6.4.8 Marine Loading Arm

6.4.8.1 Release Events

A release from any of the valves or pipework in the Loading Arm.

The pressure and temperature in the Loading Arm will approach ambient, that is the atmospheric pressure and the surrounding temperature. This provides minimal driving force for the flow of methanol from a release. If a release occurs the low flowrate results in localised poolfires if the release is ignited. The poolfires modelled resulting from a loading arm release have 10% fatality probability levels within 40m of the release point.

6.4.8.2 Basis for Modelling

If a no-flow signal is received from flow switches installed on the discharge flow meter, the ESD system will be activated. In addition, isolation valves at each end of the liquid line will automatically close on operation of ESD system.

All other activity on the wharf ceases throughout tanker loading operations. Procedures to warn against and prevent non-approved activities during loading will be implemented.

An operator will be stationed at the wharf throughout the entire loading operation.

6.4.9 Shipping Hazards

The new Dampier Wharf will have a dedicated shipping channel. It will be dredged to accommodate up to 12m draft (generally 50-60,000 DWT) vessels. The new channel will head north west from the new wharf for 3.3 nautical miles.

There are 2 other channels in the harbour. One from the Hamersley Iron, Parker Point Jetty and one from the Woodside Offshore LNG and LPG Petroleum Jetties. However these will not be connected to the new channel.

Two vessels cannot be in the same channel at the same time. Vessels must wait outside the harbour unless a clear passage is available. All non local vessels require a local pilot. This would include the methanol tankers.

Dampier Port Authority monitors vessel movements and ensures that major vessels in the same area of port are in communication with each other.



6.5 Frequency Analysis

6.5.1 Introduction

With respect to the release events under consideration, these are defined according to the taxonomies of hole size (7mm, 22, 70 and rupture), and the release inventories set out in Table 6.2 where the lists of isolatable sections for the Methanol Plant are given.

Based on the process sectionalisation, the frequency of hydrocarbon releases associated with each section and each area has been determined. The leak frequency has been estimated on a "parts count" approach using generic component failure frequencies. The number of equipment items in each process section is estimated. Using generic failure frequencies, the leak frequency for the section is taken as the sum of frequencies of the individual components.

Overall leak frequencies are presented in Section 6.5.2.

6.5.2 Methodology for Estimation of Initiating Event frequency

In order that a facility-specific estimation of all fire and explosion initiating events (and corresponding release frequencies) be included in the frequency estimation, a traditional parts count approach has been used utilising P&IDs for a Methanol Plant of similar design. This involves counting and listing all pieces of equipment and associated fittings within the isolatable sections defined in Section 6.3.

All details are entered onto proforma sheets for each separate section, included in Appendix I, which incorporate the selected leak frequencies for each individual hole size in the distribution are as described in Section 6.3.2. The release frequencies derived from the parts counts from the generic leak frequencies in Table 6-8 are then determined. These final release frequencies are presented in Table 6-9. A sensitivity analysis of this study incorporating rupture of pipework was performed, the details of which are in Appendix L.

Table 6-8 : Generic Failure Frequencies Used In This Study

EQUIPMENT ITEM	HOLE SIZE FREQUENCIES				
	Small 7	Medium 22	Large 70	Rupture	Total
Tank	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	1.00E-06	6.00E-06	1.00E-06
Pump	2.49E-02	1.27E-03	1.11E-04		2.63E-02
Reciprocating Compressor	6.24E-01	3.17E-02	3.96E-03		6.60E-01
Centrifugal Compressor	1.65E-02	8.42E-04	1.03E-04		1.74E-02
Pressure Vessel	3.78E-05	3.78E-05	8.40E-06	1.31E-06	8.40E-05
Small Pipe <150mm	1.14E-05	2.82E-06	1.31E-06		1.55E-05
Large Pipe ≥150mm	1.14E-05	2.82E-06	1.31E-06		1.55E-05
Heat Exchanger (S&T)	7.82E-03	9.67E-04	0.00E+00		8.79E-03
Flange	1.03E-02	1.50E-03	7.50E-04		1.25E-02
Valve	3.96E-04	9.79E-05	3.26E-05		5.27E-04

**Table 6-9 : Total Release Frequencies**

Leak Point	7 mm release	22 mm release	70 mm release	Rupture	TOTAL
ISO1	7.64E-01	7.46E-02	2.04E-02	1.31E-06	8.59E-01
ISO2	6.71E-02	1.54E-02	6.13E-03	5.24E-06	8.87E-02
ISO3	7.89E-03	2.87E-03	1.19E-03	0.00E+00	1.20E-02
ISO4	1.96E-01	4.55E-02	1.21E-02	5.24E-06	2.54E-01
ISO5	1.21E-01	2.21E-02	6.11E-03	2.62E-06	1.50E-01
ISO6	1.33E-02	4.37E-03	2.06E-03	1.31E-06	1.97E-02
ISO7	3.25E-02	3.33E-03	1.22E-03	1.31E-06	3.71E-02
ISO8	3.80E-03	1.24E-03	5.95E-04	0.00E+00	5.64E-03
ISO9	2.62E-01	4.95E-02	1.34E-02	1.12E-05	3.25E-01
ISO10	3.07E-02	3.01E-03	8.76E-04	6.00E-06	3.46E-02
ISO11	3.41E-02	1.16E-02	5.01E-03	0.00E+00	5.08E-02
ISO12	3.70E-02	5.34E-03	1.89E-03	6.00E-06	4.43E-02
ISO13	2.08E-02	6.98E-03	2.86E-03	0.00E+00	3.07E-02
ISO14	3.01E-02	2.87E-03	7.67E-04	6.00E-06	3.38E-02
ISO15	3.11E-03	7.66E-04	4.40E-04	0.00E+00	4.31E-03
ISO16	5.31E-03	1.31E-03	8.02E-04	0.00E+00	7.42E-03
ISO17	5.40E-02	3.56E-03	8.11E-04	6.00E-06	5.83E-02
ISO18	6.01E-02	5.50E-03	2.74E-03	3.80E-04	6.87E-02

6.5.3 Event Tree Analysis

All leaks can be modelled using simple event trees to estimate the likelihood that a leak will develop into particular outcomes such as:

- Jet Fire;
- Explosion;
- Flash fire;
- Unignited toxic plume; and
- Liquid Pool.

6.5.3.1 Fire/Explosion/Toxic Release Events

In relation to event trees, leaks are firstly identified as either flammable or toxic. Automatic or manual shutdown is considered followed by the probability of blowdown (venting) occurring.

If the release is flammable, then the probability of ignition is considered. If ignition occurs, this may result in a vapour cloud explosion. A vapour cloud explosion then has the potential to escalate to adjacent areas on the site.

If the release is toxic, there are no escalation effects.

In order to derive the outcome frequencies from the initiating event frequencies, it is necessary to estimate ignition probabilities for each. This is described in Section 6.5.4.

All event trees will be provided on request.



For large leaks in particular, the magnitude of the release is dependent on the success of the ESD system closing the valves for each isolatable section, ie. if this fails open then the inventory of the section will be available for release.

Experience shows that in typical situations involving valves operated by ESD systems that the overall reliability of the system is dominated by the reliability of the valve itself, ie. whether the valve operates, and whether it blocks flow successfully.

Whilst in general the assumption is that all valves operated automatically will function according to the design intent, consideration is taken into account here that in the event the ESD fails open, personnel observing a release will have access to manual intervention (shutdown) from the control room.

6.5.4 Estimation of Ignition Probability

For leaks of flammable gas and liquid, it is assumed that the ignition model presented by Cox, Lees and Ang [12] can be used as a basis to estimate ignition probabilities for use in event tree analysis.

The ignition model of [12] is based on fire and explosion data and 'best-estimates' for both onshore and offshore installations. During the formulation of the model, ignitions were defined as being due to inter alia the following:

- welding/cutting/grinding ie. hot work (where the hot work is also the source of the leak);
- engines and exhausts;
- sparks;
- electrical (including static);
- hot surfaces;
- self-ignition;
- cigarette-lighter, match;
- hot particles;
- friction.

It should be noted that all ignited releases are assumed to occur in areas where sources of ignition should be subject to control, ie. classified hazardous areas. It is concluded that this situation is typical of GTL Methanol Plant conditions, and so the use of the model is justified.

The model predicts the probability of ignition P_i for a flammable release as a function of mass flow R as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Gas Releases (0.5 - 100 kg/s)} \\ \log_{10} P_i = 0.6403(\log_{10} R + 1) - 2.444 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Liquid Releases (0.5 - 100kg/s)} \\ \log_{10} P_i = 0.3929(\log_{10} R + 1) - 2.376 \end{array}$$

For the GTL Methanol Plant analysis, the model is applied as discussed below.

It is assumed that P_i is composed of the probability of immediate ignition P_i and the probability of delayed ignition P_d , where:

$$P_i = P_i + P_d$$



Further, it is assumed that delayed ignition can typically either result in a flash fire or an explosion. For any release, the relative likelihood of an explosion compared to flashfire is largely dependent on the level of confinement experienced by the release when ignited. Incident data from Lees [9] indicate that the ratio of flashfires to explosions is 60:40; this is construed here as saying that the likelihood of a flashfire is about the same as for an explosion, given a typical dataset.

Elsewhere, [12] conclude that the probability of explosion given ignition P_E varies between 0.025 and 0.25 depending on mass flow, based on explosion incident data and best estimates from both offshore and onshore applications.

From these two sources, it is therefore assumed that the overall probability of delayed ignition given ignition P_D varies from 0.05 to 0.5 depending on mass flow, ie. double the probabilities derived by [12]. This gives the following correlation:

$$\log_{10} P_D = 0.4346(\log_{10} R + 1) - 1.6048$$

where $P_D = P_E + P_F$, the sum of the probabilities of explosion and flashfire respectively, given ignition.

With respect to the estimation of the probability of explosion given ignition, it seems likely that, for a given release at the Methanol Plant, the probability of explosion given ignition is lower than average. This is concluded from considerations of the Methanol Plant layout which offer less chance of confinement in the event of a significant gas release, with correspondingly less chance of a gas cloud exploding.

Use of the [12] explosion probability correlation is not appropriate in this case, as this includes data from offshore applications where confined explosions are a higher possibility.

As a suitable alternative Kletz [12] has suggested that for onshore plants, P_E is of the order of 0.1 for releases greater than 10 tonnes, and a maximum of 0.01 for releases of 1 tonne or less.

These values are used in this Study as upper bound limits as the Methanol Plant flammable inventories are of this order of magnitude.

The consequence in this case is less than the toxic dispersion.

For all other releases, $P_E = 0.01$ is used as an upper bound limit to a revised explosion probability correlation for the Methanol Plant. The correlation follows the form:

$$\log_{10} P_E = y (\log_{10} R + 1) + x$$

where y and x are coefficients determined from the values of P_E at defined upper and lower limits.

Now, the ignition correlations listed above are calibrated against upper and lower bounds of 0.5 kg/s and 100 kg/s. If the upper bound limit of 100 kg/s is considered in terms of ignition delay time, the amount released in 20 seconds is $20 \times 100 \text{ kg} = 2$ tonnes. The value of 20 seconds is typical of the time require for a release of gas to



find an ignition source. This is felt to be sufficiently close to the Kletz limit of 1 tonne to enable the explosion probability of 0.01 to be used as an upper bound to an equivalent explosion probability correlation for Methanol Plant explosions.

For the lower bound mass flow limit, the observation is made that, typically, correlations of this format span two orders of magnitude, ie. here the 0.5 kg/s release may be considered to correspond to an explosion probability of 0.0001. Although in this study all flow rates were much greater than this, thus the frequency of 0.01 was used for all.

It should be emphasised that it is considered that the value of this low limit is not particularly critical so long as it is a suitably small number. Explosions are much less likely than flash fires for small releases in open areas. So, if the explosion probability is under-estimated at small release rates, this will only result in a corresponding over-estimate of the probability of flash fire, given that it is considered that the overall probability of delayed ignition is about right. The consequences of flash fires and explosions in open spaces are similar, giving another reason why the under or over estimation of explosion is acceptable as long as the overall delayed ignition probability is about right. If these limits are adopted, then the refined explosion probability correlation becomes:

$$\log_{10}P_E = 0.8692(\log_{10}R + 1) - 4.61$$

This is used in the analysis, such that above 100 kg/s $P_E = 0.01$, whilst for massive, ie. vessel rupture release cases, the use of $P_E = 0.1$ is retained.

6.5.5 Shipping Incident Frequency

A collision between the Methanol vessel, and other vessels on arrival, does not have any significant consequences, as there is very little methanol on board. This includes collisions with the jetty on arrival.

Collisions with the jetty on departure have no significant consequences, as the vessel would not be moving with sufficient speed to cause serious damage.

As the port is well monitored and controlled by the Dampier Port Authority, all the vessels will be under the control of a local pilot. The only reasonable scenario in which vessels could come in contact with each other would be due to engine or steering failure. Should any of the larger vessels lose steering or power they would be more likely to run aground prior to colliding with the methanol vessel since their draft precludes moving out of their channel.

The only scenario to be considered, in which the methanol tankers could collide with other vessels is if the steering or engines on a methanol tanker fails. The steering has redundancy and is therefore unlikely to fail. If it did fail it would most likely fail during manoeuvring when arriving at or departing the jetty. Steering failure will not therefore be considered further.

If the methanol tanker engines failed it could drift on a collision course with any of the vessels in the area although smaller vessels should be able to avoid the drifting tanker. If any of the smaller vessels' engines fail they could move out of their channel. However in most cases either tanker would have sufficient time and manoeuvrability to avoid each other. Also any small vessel that have lost their engines would be able to manoeuvre until they slowed sufficiently to be able to drop



anchor, preventing collision with other vessels. It is assumed these vessels fail to anchor to 1% of the time.

Assumptions

The number of methanol exports per year is: 36
The average vessel payload is: 30,000 tonne
The average length is: 220 m
The vessel arrives empty at the public jetty.
The departing vessels are in the harbour for 1 hour.

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{engine failure}} &= 0.25 \text{ pa [13]} \\ P_{\text{doesn't anchor}} &= 0.01 \end{aligned}$$

Given that the current proposed new wharf is to handle four main exporters, it is assumed that there will be approximately 280 vessels using the new channel each year [24]. It is assumed they will be in the harbour for a maximum period of 1 hour for arrival and departure. These vessels may be used for the export of ammonia, urea or DiMethylEther. There are 36 methanol vessels in the harbour for a maximum of 1 hour. Only departures are of concern.

Therefore the frequency of a methanol vessel exiting the harbour while a large vessel is travelling through the harbour is:

$$\begin{aligned} F_{\text{methanol vessel in harbour}} &= 26 \text{ pa} \\ P_{\text{I vessel in harbour}} &= 280 / 8760 = 0.032 \\ f_{\text{I vessel nearby}} &= 36 \times 0.032 = 1.15 \text{ pa.} \end{aligned}$$

Given the probability that the engine fails is 0.25 pa [13], the following scenarios were considered.

The probability that the methanol tanker engine fails during the 36 hours per year it is exiting the harbour is:

$$P_{\text{engine failure 1}} = 36 \times 0.25 / 8760 = 1.0 \times 10^{-3}$$

The probability that the other vessels' engine fails during the 280 hours per year it is exiting the harbour is:

$$P_{\text{engine failure 2}} = 280 \times 0.25 / 8760 = 8.0 \times 10^{-3}$$

Therefore, total probability of engine failure is:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{total engine failure}} &= 1.0 \times 10^{-3} + 8.0 \times 10^{-3} \\ &= 9.0 \times 10^{-3} \end{aligned}$$

This probability is brought forward to assist in determining the risk of methanol release due to ship collision.

If the steering fails, the vessel will most likely travel in the direction it was previously heading prior to the steering failure. It is assumed that the same is the case for a drifting vessel.



If the out of control methanol tanker drifts towards the other vessel the probability of striking a nearby vessel is the ratio of the combined length of the two vessels and the perimeter of a circle radius equal to the distance between them.

The vessel separation while in the harbour varies between 1 and 5 N miles. We will conservatively assume 2N miles is the average separation (ie. 3.7km).

The average length of a large vessel is assumed to be 270 m. The average length of an methanol vessel is assumed to be 220m, therefore their combined length is 490m.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{The perimeter length of a circle of radius 3.7km} &= 2\pi r \\ &= 23250\text{m}\end{aligned}$$

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned}P_{\text{collision}} &= 490 / 23250 \\ &= 0.02\end{aligned}$$

It is assumed that 20% of the collisions are severe enough to penetrate one of the tanks resulting in a significant release of methanol.

Therefore the risk of methanol release due to ship collision is:

$$\begin{aligned}f_{\text{methanol release}} &= f_{\text{vessel nearby}} \times P_{\text{total engine failure}} \times P_{\text{doesn't anchor}} \times P_{\text{collision}} \times P_{\text{methanol release}} \\ &= 2.1 \times 2.1 \times 10^{-2} \times 0.01 \times 0.02 \times 0.2 \\ &= 1.8 \times 10^{-6}\end{aligned}$$

This release frequency is very low, coupled with the fact that ignition is unlikely due to the high miscibility of methanol in water the IRPA will be less considerably less than 10^{-6} hence this event will not be considered further.

All methanol tankers would be under radar surveillance from the Dampier Port Authority.

Hazardous Events

A further event that may lead to tank rupture whilst a vessel is underway to and from the loading berth is a fire or explosion onboard.

Based on the data presented by Brennan and Peachey, it is stated that 18 fire/explosion events occurred over 19690 ship-years, which equates to 9.1×10^{-4} fire/explosion events per year per ship. The vessel is in the harbour only 36×24 hours per year, therefore the annual fire/explosion frequency is 9.0×10^{-5} . This value incorporates all fire and explosion events and not just the frequency for which the methanol cargo would be ignited as this would be a fraction of this value. This is conservative due to the number of safety systems onboard the vessel which would have to fail to work.

Thermal effects from a fire would be limited to the vessel and immediate surroundings. If the methanol cargo was to ignite it would burn itself out. If the vessel was to rupture, the methanol would rapidly diffuse into the water.

Considering the release frequency is very low, and the consequences very unlikely to impinge onto the wharf, this event is not carried forward.



6.5.6 Impacts from Internal Events

There is a risk of some events within the plant area providing knock-on effects from hazardous operations. These are included in the table below.

Table 6-10 : Internal Knock-on Effects

Internal Event	Comment
Natural gas feed line release	Releases due to pipeline failure because of material of construction or maintenance faults or external impacts. The ignited jet flame extends for approximately 212m for a full pipe rupture. Unit 200 Methanol Synthesis is within this 212m radius. The impingement on the Methanol Synthesis unit may result in fires and/or explosions in this unit.
Methanol Plant – Flammable (methane, hydrogen or methanol) release	Risks from knock on effects from fires and explosions are minimal, as the frequency for these events is relatively low. The knock on release would have minimal impact as the process would be isolated and blown down / vented away from the process area before vessels would fail.
Methanol Storage	The risk is minimal as the large-scale poolfires which could result from the methanol storage tanks would require a substantial external impact to initiate.
Export Pump	The likelihood of an event impacting beyond the boundary is very low due to the number of protection devices that would ensure any release was of short duration.
Pipeline from Plant to the Wharf	Risk is very low due to the low frequency at which fully welded pipelines leak.
Marine Loading Arm	Risk is very low due to the low frequency of the event (and minor consequences) due to the many protection devices that would have to fail for an ongoing release. Protection includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• ESD system automatically activated on no-flow signal.• All other activity on the wharf ceases throughout tanker loading operations.• An operator to be stationed at the wharf throughout the entire loading operation.
Shipping Hazards Collision, Grounding, Or Onboard Incident	Risk is very low due to the very low frequency of the event.

6.5.7 Impacts from External Events

The possible impact and knock on effects from other existing or potential hazardous operations in the surrounding area are given in the table below.

Table 6-11 : External Knock-on Effects on the Plant

External Event	Comment
LNG Plant and export jetties	The 1×10^{-6} contour for the Woodside LNG plant does not impinge on the GTL Methanol plant, thus a knock-on effect from these facilities is very unlikely.
Plenty River Ammonia Urea Plant	This plant is located approximately 3.3 km to the SSE and hence will be unaffected by any incidents.
Burrup Fertilisers Site	This plant is located approximately 3 km to the SSE and hence will be unaffected by any incidents.



6.6 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

6.6.1 Introduction

The objectives of the QRA are to demonstrate that:

- the frequency of each of the Hazardous Events and the associated consequences has been evaluated;
- individual risk and societal risk contours produced;
- the major risk contributors have been identified;
- the sensitivity of the results to key assumptions has been addressed and is understood; and
- the offsite risks have been assessed.

6.6.2 Risk Calculation Methodology

Risk Summation was completed using the Riskplot II calculation software package.

6.6.3 Riskplot II analysis of events

6.6.3.1 Summary of Consequence and Frequency Analysis

The risks are determined for each hazardous event by combining each event frequency with the event outcomes. The risk arising from these events is calculated using the risk calculation package Riskplot II. These are then summed for all events.

Riskplot II calculates Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) and the contours are plotted according to:

- release scenario frequency (including releases initiated by escalation from an adjacent event);
- location of release;
- magnitude of consequence;
- local meteorology;
- local topography.

6.6.3.2 Inputs to Riskplot II analysis

Weather Frequency Table

Riskplot II allows a wind rose of speeds and directions to be used to calculate the likelihood that the releases will be blown in a given direction.

Data Sources

The wind data used was provided by GTL [17]. It was analysed by Qest and the wind (speed, direction and stability) data was summarised for use in the consequence and risk modelling.

Processing the Data

In summarising the data, it was necessary to make a series of assumptions. These were based on Table 3.2 which shows the processed wind/weather probability data for the site used in the risk calculations.

**PRA for a Methanol Manufacturing Plant**

The states modelled are 2.5B, 4.2C, 6.3C, 1.8F, 3.0F and 5.1D, where the value represents speed in m/s and the letter is the stability coefficient.

The remaining meteorological conditions required are described in Section 3.1.3.

Population Distribution

In Riskplot II, the population at risk is defined in terms of location and numbers of persons.

In order to use Riskplot II, it is necessary to lay out a grid over the site plan in order to define the locations of the population of interest.

For the GTL Methanol Plant, the locations of populations was based on the National Grid. The nominated population groups are therefore located as listed in Table 6-12, where the coordinates are in metres.

Table 6-12 : Riskplot II Population Locations

Company	Population ¹	Northerly Coordinates	Easterly Coordinates
Woodside Onshore Treatment Plant (LNG) plant	100	7720700 7721500 7720550 7719750	474250 474650 476350 475800
Plenty River Ammonia Plant	40	7718600 7718600 7719500 7719600	476700 475950 476150 476700
Burru Fertiliser Plant	40	7719667 7719583 7718542 7718583	476458 477167 477250 476583

¹ daytime population only [20,21]

Location of Plant Facilities

In Riskplot II, the GTL Methanol Plant isolatable sections referred to are defined in terms of location based on the National Grid as listed in Table 6-13 below, where the coordinates are in metres.

**Table 6-13 : Riskplot II Facility Locations**

Area		Northerly Coordinates	Easterly Coordinates
ISO1	Unit 100	7722861	478056
ISO2	Unit 100	7722845	478085
ISO3	Unit 100	7722854	478074
ISO4	Unit 100 / Unit 200 / Unit 300	7722867	478088
ISO5	Unit 200	7722813	478012
ISO6	Unit 200 / Unit 300	7722835	478042
ISO7	Unit 300	7722785	478077
ISO8	Unit 300	7722786	478086
ISO9	Unit 300 / Unit 400	7722790	478110
ISO10	Unit 400	7722836	478135
ISO11	Unit 400	7722838	478155
ISO12	Unit 400	7722819	478200
ISO13	Unit 400	7722844	478225
ISO14	Unit 300 / Unit 400	7722764	478234
ISO15	Unit 300 / Unit 400	7722796	478204
ISO16	Unit 1100	7722856	478132
ISO17	Unit 1100	7722829	478143
ISO18	Unit 1100	7720400	473700

Riskplot II Analysis Outputs

The input described in Section 6.6.3.2 is used in the Riskplot II package to calculate risk under two headings:

- individual risk; and
- societal risk.

The application of this calculation to the Methanol Plant analysis is described below.

Calculation of Individual Risk

Section 6.6.3.2 describes how flammable inventories are located on the Methanol Plant site plans for the purposes of Riskplot II according to a system of Cartesian coordinates.

For individual risk, Riskplot II combines the effect distances for each event which correspond to specified fatality criteria and sums these for the site of interest. For each coordinate, the risk is summed according to the number of events whose effect distances overlap, the corresponding fatality criterion for each effect distance, and the estimated frequency of the event.

Contour lines are therefore produced which link to the cells on the grid where the risk is the same, ie. 'iso-risk' contours. In Riskplot II, contours can be generated for the entire site area, or for localised areas.

For the GTL Methanol Plant, risk contours are generated according to offsite fatality criteria. Inter alia, these are intended to show the distance around the plant to the risk level of 5×10^{-5} fatalities per year.

The quantified risk at these locations represents the level experienced by a person present for 24 hours a day.




The individual risks calculated for the Methanol Plant are presented in the form of risk contours on a map of the area in Figure 6-1.

The risks determined for the pipeline are wharf are below $0.5E-6$. The pipeline was modelled for the continuous use it will experience, 10% of the time methanol being pumped through it for export and the remaining time methanol is in the pipe at ambient conditions. The wharf was only modelled for the 10% of time it would be in use.

Non-annualised risk for the wharf, ie considering continuous export of methanol, with the current information would result in a 10 fold increase in risk, as it was considered only to be operable 10% of the time. Thus the risk would still be below $5E-6$.



Figure 6-1 Methanol Plant Risk Contours






Calculation of Societal Risk

Societal risk is measured by means of an F-N curve for offsite personnel, which is calculated in the Riskplot II package.

The principal difference between individual risk and societal risk is that, whilst individual risk is a measure of the risk to a defined individual moving around a number of locations (or of any individual in a defined location - ie. risk contours), societal risk is a measure of the risk to a defined number of persons. The F-N curve expresses societal risk by charting the number of fatalities against the frequency of accidents capable of inflicting that number, or greater.

For the Methanol Plant analysis, the criterion used to assess societal risk is presented in Figure 6-2 for ease of reference. In the Figure, societal risk levels between the lines are 'ALARP'; whilst risks above the upper line are unacceptable, and risks below the lower line are negligible.


Figure 6-2 : WA Societal Risk Criteria used on the GTL Methanol Plant



The societal risks calculated for the Methanol Plant are presented in Figure 6-3 below.



Figure 6-3 : GTL Methanol Plant FN Curve





6.7 Assessment of Results

6.7.1 Individual Risk

The IRPA criteria as stated in EPA Bulletin 611 [5] are:

- a A risk level in residential zones of one in a million per year (1×10^{-6}) or less, is so small as to be acceptable to the Environmental Protection Authority.
- b A risk level in "sensitive developments", such as hospitals, child care facilities and aged care housing developments of between one half and one in a million per year (5×10^{-7} to 1×10^{-6}) is so small as to be acceptable to the Environmental Protection Authority.
- c Risk levels from industrial sites should not exceed a target of fifty in a million per year (5×10^{-5}) at the site boundary for each individual industry, and the cumulative risk level imposed on an industry should not exceed a target of one hundred in a million per year (1×10^{-4}).
- d A risk level for any non-industrial activity located in buffer zones between industrial facilities and residential zones of ten in a million per year (10×10^{-6}) or lower, is so small as to be acceptable to the Environmental Protection Authority.

The Individual Risk contours are presented in Figure 6-1.

The events of concern were the catastrophic failure of one of the two largest inventory holders, the methanol storage tanks, and the release of carbon monoxide. The storage tanks provide the possibility for a large fire, which may be difficult to control, that could have off-site effects. The carbon monoxide releases are the only toxic releases that have the ability to affect areas outside the plant boundary, and this is only under certain circumstances.

6.7.2 Impact on Adjacent Facilities

The 5×10^{-5} risk contour from the GTL Methanol Plant does not extend beyond the site boundary. The 10×10^{-6} contour extends to north and south from the site boundary, but is within 400 m of this boundary. Currently (2001/2002) there are no proposed uses for the surrounding land. Therefore the plant is considered to comply with the EPA Criteria [5] for individual risk.

6.7.3 Cumulative Risks

The Woodside Onshore Treatment Plant (LNG) is located approximately 1 km west from the GTL site boundary. The risk contours for the LNG plant, Appendix A, show the 1×10^{-6} contour extends from the eastern boundary of the processing equipment by approximately 400 m, and does not enter into the Withnell East Industrial Area.

The 5×10^{-7} does not extend beyond the Withnell East Industrial Area boundary of the western side, as seen in figure 6-1.

The two sites pose negligible risk to each other.



6.7.4 Toxic Risks

The toxic risks from this plant are a result of the carbon monoxide produced in the reforming stages and consumed in the methanol synthesis section. This poses negligible risk offsite.

6.7.5 Offsite Flammable Risks

There are minimal offsite fatal impacts from methane, methanol or hydrogen releases.

The maximum risk at the wharf is below $0.5E-6$ per annum for the estimate operation of 10% of the time, equating to a maximum risk of $5E-6$ if exporting was to occur continuously. This is acceptable for the operation of an industrial activity, especially with the inclusion of an exclusion zone, which should be determined once the final wharf design is made available, so an accurate assessment can be made.

6.7.6 Societal Risks

The Societal Risk (FN Curve) from the Methanol Plant is given in Figure 6-3.

As seen in Figure 6-3, the societal risk from this plant lies below the maximum for new plants within Western Australia.

6.7.7 Risk Reduction Measures

Throughout this document, a number of risk reduction measures have been identified for the GTL Methanol Plant.

Overall, a total of seven (7) potential risk reduction measures have been identified. Of these, some may be able to be implemented without the need for any form of cost benefit analysis, either because they are already justified on other grounds or because there is minimal cost involved.

The risk reduction measures to be considered for this facility are in Table 6-14.

**Table 6-14 : Proposed Risk Reduction Measures**

Risk Reduction Measures	
1.	Develop a Safety Management Plan
2.	Put in place an Emergency Response Plan that provides a rapid response to identified releases that would facilitate early manual isolation of any leaking equipment
3.	Develop a Joint Industrial Integrated Emergency Management Plan with Woodside.
4.	Ensure fire fighting measures such as deluge systems are addressed and incorporated in the final design.
5.	Ensure the gas detection systems in the final design include sensors for the fuel gas and CO ₂ in areas that are both enclosed and open to increase likelihood of the detection of leaks.
6.	Ensure the final design of the offloading systems incorporate shutdown systems that can be controlled by the operator at the loading point.
7.	Designate an exclusion zone during loading of the export tankers at the wharf. This will be assessed when the final wharf and offloading system are designed.



7 CONCLUSIONS

Risks from the GTL Methanol Plant are considered acceptable for a PRA, provided risk reduction measures are undertaken.

That is, the 50E-6 risk contour from the plant does not extend beyond the site boundary. The 10E-6 contour extends no more than 200m from the north and south of the site boundary. The area north of the plant is within the Withnell East Industrial Estate and the road which the 10E-6 contours passes over is for private use to access a communications tower. Neither of these two aspects of the area to the north of the plant are considered open and active, thus the situation falls within the criteria. The area to the south of the plant is conservation land with elements that are significant to aboriginal heritage. However, there are no areas designated as “significant” heritage location within the 10E-6 contour. The infrequent use of the land means this level of risk is acceptable [25]. Therefore the plant is considered to comply with the EPA Criteria [5] for individual risk.

The risks associated with elements of this facility that are offsite, the export pipe line and wharf, are within acceptable risk levels. This is based on minimal information, however risk assessments of the final pipeline easement and wharf will be required when design is finalised.

The various risk contours considered for the GTL Methanol Plant are presented in Figure 1-1 in the Executive Summary. Also, as can be seen in Figure 1-2 (in the Executive Summary), the societal risk from the plant satisfies the societal risk criteria as the F-N curve lies beneath the limit of unacceptable risk for new plants.

The Risk Assessment of the GTL Methanol Plant was developed using generic failure frequencies. For these values to be valid the safety management must be of a standard at least equal to norm of the plants on which these frequencies are based.



8 RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure the plant is of acceptable standard, QEST Consulting Engineers recommend that a Safety Management System is developed and implemented. This Safety Management System should include the following elements as a minimum: Policy and Objectives, Organisation and Responsibility, Employee Selection, Competency and Training, Contractors and Support Services, Management of Change, and Performance Audit and Review.

In particular an Emergency Management Plan should be developed which would include interaction with Woodside.

It should be noted that the basis of this Study was conducted using preliminary drawings with limited access to information about the facility. It is therefore recommended that a thorough Quantitative Risk Assessment be completed prior to the commencement of construction and production operations.

The pipeline easements and wharf need to be accurately assessed when final designs are available so appropriate exclusion zones can be applied.

Appropriate warnings placed to the south of the plant within the conservation area to identify the risks associated being in the area should be put in place.



9 REFERENCES


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21. Woodside plants population data provided by telephone conversation between Woodside Energy Ltd representative and Philip Doray of Qest, 13th June 2001.
22. Telephone conversation between Mhairi Angus (Woodside) and Jason Muirhead (QEST), 20th December 2001.
23. Brennan, E. G, and Peachey, J. H., *Recent Research into Formal Safety Assessment for Shipping*, Lloyd's Register Technical Association
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10 APPENDICES

APPENDIX A Woodside Onshore LNG Plant Risk Contours

The following diagram is Figure 5.4 “Risk Contours of Existing Plant plus Liquids Expansion, 2nd Trunkline Onshore Terminal / Domgas Expansion and LNG Trains 4&5 LNG Expansion” from the “Onshore Gas Plant – Trains 4&5 Expansion Preliminary Risk Assessment” completed by DnV Technica. This is included as Appendix H in *North West Venture Additional LNG Facilities PER*, Woodside November 1998.





APPENDIX B Technical Diagrams

The process flow diagrams and other technical diagrams used are available on request;

P&ID	020150-001	Legend, Part 1
P&ID	020160-002	Legend, Part 2
P&ID	020160-003	Legend, Part 3
P&ID	020160-101	Unit 100 Reforming Desulphurization
P&ID	020160-102	Unit 100 Reforming Steam Reformer
P&ID	020160-103	Unit 100 Reforming HP-Steam Superheat I + II
P&ID	020160-104	Unit 100 Reforming Comb. Air Preheaters/Fans
P&ID	020160-105	Unit 100 Reforming Fuel Gas System
P&ID	020160-108	Unit 100 Reforming Autothermal Reformer
P&ID	020160-109	Unit 100 Reforming HP-Steam Drum/WHB
P&ID	020160-110	Unit 100 Reforming N.G. Compressor/Preheater
P&ID	020160-111	Unit 100 Reforming MP-Steamer Drum/Boiler
P&ID	020160-112	Unit 100 Reforming Reformed Gas Cooling
P&ID	020160-201	Unit 200 Methanol Synthesis Make Up and Recycle Gas Compressor
P&ID	020160-202	Unit 200 Methanol Synthesis Recycle Gas Cooling
P&ID	020160-203	Unit 200 Methanol Synthesis Methanol Reactors and ST. Drum
P&ID	020160-301	Unit 300 Methanol Distillation Prerun Column
P&ID	020160-302	Unit 300 Methanol Distillation Prerun Column Reflux
P&ID	020160-303	Unit 300 Methanol Distillation Pure Methanol Pressure Column
P&ID	020160-304	Unit 300 Methanol Distillation Pure Methanol Reflux Vessel
P&ID	020160-305	Unit 300 Methanol Distillation Pure Methanol Atm. Column
P&ID	020160-306	Unit 300 Methanol Distillation Atm Col. Ref. And Prod. Dischar.
P&ID	020160-307	Unit 300 Methanol Distillation Slop System



P&ID	020160-401	Unit 400 Intermediate Methanol Tanks
P&ID	020160-910	Unit 1000 Flare System
P&ID	020160-912	Unit 1100 Tank Farm
P&ID	020160-913	Unit 1100 Loading System
P&ID	020160-991	Unit 1900 Interconnecting Process System
PFD	011430-101	Plant Unit 100 Autoth. Reform. & Reformed Gas Waste Heat System
PFD	011430-102	Plant Unit 200 Steam Reformer and Flue Gas Waste Heat System
PFD	011430-201	Plant Unit 200 Methanol Synthesis
PFD	011430-301	Plant Unit 300 Methanol Distillation
PFD	011430-401	Plant Unit 400/1100 Methanol Tanks/Loading System



APPENDIX C Hazard Register

The Hazard Register may result in further risk reduction measures or actions which will requires the allocation of personnel for each action. This is included during the Hazard Identification workshop held during the detailed design.



Methanol Plant PRA HAZID 13th August 2001

NODE DESCRIPTION & NOTES	Review of major hazardous inventories
Aim: to review and agree what are the major hazards in terms of chemicals at the plant	

NODE STUDIED	Node 1 – Major process hazardous fluids			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION BY
1.1 Process liquids				
Condensate	Loss of containment	Equipment failure, Fire risk	Installation pressure testing, maintenance system, firefighting facilities, operational procedures.	
Methanol	Loss of containment	Equipment failure Fire risk or human contact risk	Installation pressure testing, maintenance system, operational procedures, COSH procedures, PPE, firefighting facilities, bunding of storage vessels.	
1.2 Process gases & vapours				



NODE STUDIED		Node 1 – Major process hazardous fluids				
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY	
Methane (natural gas)	Loss of containment	Equipment failure Fire, explosion	Firefighting facilities, ESD valves, blowdown, fire and gas detection in enclosed spaces.			
Methanol (vapour)	Loss of containment	Equipment failure Fire risk Occupational risk	Firefighting facilities, ESD valves, blowdown, fire and gas detection in enclosed spaces.			
Hydrogen	Loss of containment - Intermediate product	Equipment failure Fire, explosion risk	Plant design, detection procedures. Firefighting facilities			
Carbon monoxide	Loss of containment - Intermediate product	Equipment failure	Specifications			
Carbon dioxide	Loss of containment - Intermediate product	Equipment failure Corrosion	Specifications			
Nox	Loss of containment - Contaminants in feed gas	Equipment failure Environmental risk	Feed gas specification.			
Sox	Loss of containment - Contaminants in feed gas	Equipment failure	Feed gas specification.			
H ₂ S	Loss of containment - H ₂ S in the feed gas	Equipment failure Occupational risk	Small volume	Not envisaged as being an issue.		
Nitrogen	Loss of containment - Intermediate product (present at the reformer outlet).	Equipment failure Occupational risk	Small volume			
SynGas	Loss of containment - Intermediate product	Equipment failure Fire, explosion risk	Specifications Firefighting facilities			



NODE STUDIED	Node 1 – Major process hazardous fluids				
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Steam	Loss of containment	Equipment failure Occupational risk	Trained personnel. Hazard awareness.		
Flue gas	Loss of containment (Process product)	Equipment failure Fire, explosion risk	Specifications Firefighting facilities		
Oxygen	Loss of containment	Explosive, contamination	Plant design, detection procedures.		
1.3 Process solids					
Hazardous Catalysts	Loss of containment	Equipment failure	Handling procedures Training		
Catalysts	Loss of containment	Equipment failure	Handling procedures Training		

NODE DESCRIPTION & NOTES	Plant facilities and operations hazards
<i>Hazards associated with the plant and its operation, excluding the pipeline and tanker loading</i>	



NODE STUDIED		Node 2 – Plant facilities and operations hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Section 1 : External and Environmental Hazards					
1.1 Natural and Environmental Hazards					
Climate Extremes – wave & wind	Cyclones	Potential impact on storage tanks. Drains overflowing.	Plant designed to cyclone standards. Storm surges accommodated in design (caters for 100 year storm event).		
Lightning	Lightning strike.		Plant earthing design and compliance with design standards.		
Earthquakes	Not envisaged as being an issue.				
Erosion	Not envisaged as being an issue.				
Subsidence	Not envisaged as being an issue.				
1.2 Created (man-made) Hazards					
Security hazards	Not envisaged as being an issue.		Perimeter fence security.	+	
Terrorist activity	Not envisaged as being an issue.		Perimeter fence security.	+	



NODE STUDIED		Node 2 – Plant facilities and operations hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
1.3. Effect of facility on the surroundings & visa versa					
Geographical Infrastructure	- Not envisaged as being an issue.				
Proximity to population / Adjacent land use	Public recreation areas around site (Withnell Bay), Dampier & Karratha towns in vicinity.	No toxic impact - fire hazard only.			
Proximity to transport corridors	There are roads running close to the site. Development of area will lead to increased traffic load on local roads.		One public road to beach access in Withnell Bay. None near plant.		
1.4 Infrastructure					
Escape & Evacuation	Inability to escape from escalating event.	Only one sealed road for all to escape via (including Woodside personnel).	2 to 3 egress points from plant.		
Section 2 : Facility Hazards					
2.1 Facility Hazards - Control Methods / Philosophy					
Maintenance Philosophy			Asset management plan.		
Control philosophy	N/A for new plant		New design		



NODE STUDIED		Node 2 – Plant facilities and operations hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Manning Levels	Low due to plant mainly automated – mainly in admin area or control room.				
Emergency Response	Onsite ER team – security will be involved, local authorities, own fire team, staff trained accordingly.		Training Competency system There is a nursing post and ambulance at Woodside.		
Simultaneous Operations	Potential for personnel injuries/fatalities during SIMOPS	Lack of awareness Not following procedures	PTW, JSA, planning process, induction, communications, alarm systems.		
Start-up / Shutdown	Human error - failure to follow correct sequence of start-up / shutdown.	Infrequent events. Lack of familiarity with process / equipment.	Documented procedures. Trained personnel, quality procedures, competency system, communications, ergonomics, adequate manning and supervision.		



NODE STUDIED		Node 2 – Plant facilities and operations hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
2.2 Facility Hazards - Fire & Explosion Hazards					
Sources of Ignition	Electricity, Combustion, flare, Maintenance activities (eg welding, grinding etc)	Fire risk	No components that spontaneously combust. No smoking policy. PTW, JSA and maintenance procedures.		
Equipment Layout	Major equipment located too close to each other.	Modular construction	Design philosophy to maximize separation to minimize escalation. Risk assessment.		
Fire Protection & Response	Escalation of fire to neighbouring process equipment.	Failure of fire detection	Permanently installed fire water system – ringmain, deluge systems. Redundancy in fire detection systems. Fire team. VESDA or equivalent around site. Comply with NFPA standards. Testing program, fail safe system. Risk assessment.		



NODE STUDIED		Node 2 – Plant facilities and operations hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Operator Protection	Exposure of personnel to fire and toxic hazards from process inventory.		Operators operate remotely from control room – when doing visual inspections will wear appropriate PPE. COSH procedures, maintenance, hazard awareness. Risk assessment.		
2.3 Facility Hazards - Process Hazards					
Release of Inventory	Catastrophic loss of containment	Vessel burst, external corrosion.	PTW system in place. Regular inspection of equipment. Certified vessels.		
Over Pressure	Vessel rupture, pipeline or valve failure.	Pressure differences through the process. Explosion overpressure congestion	Pressure relief devices in place. Alarms, cooling, maintenance system, certification system. Risk assessment.		
Over / Under Temperature	Cryogenics	Over or under temperature.	Specifications and inventory control. Control systems and ESD in place. Hot Spot Management system. Annulus so no leaks direct to atmosphere.		



NODE STUDIED		Node 2 – Plant facilities and operations hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Excess / Zero Level	Overfill storage tanks	Instrumentation or equipment failure	Control systems, alarm and ESD in place. All equipment is redundant / fail safe. Bunding, water sprays, level control, automated local and external alarms.		
Corrosion	Loss of containment		Corrosion allowance in design. Protective coatings.		
Erosion	No solids				
Impacts	Dropped objects, vehicle collision		No vehicles on site. Forklift trucks only in stores – if on site then only during plant shutdown/maintenance . No lifting over live equipment. PTW, JSA, planning process, induction, communications		



NODE STUDIED		Node 2 – Plant facilities and operations hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
2.4 Facility Hazards - Utility Systems					
Firewater Systems	Escalation of fire to neighbouring process equipment.	Failure of fire detection	Permanently installed fire water system – ringmain, deluge systems. Fire team. VESDA or equivalent around site. Comply with NFPA standards. Testing program, fail safe system. Risk assessment.		
Fuel gas	Loss of containment	Fire, explosion	Firefighting facilities, ESD valves, blowdown, fire and gas detection in enclosed spaces.		
Diesel Fuel	Diesel Fuel for emergency generator.				
Power Supply	Not envisaged being an issue.				
Steam	Loss of containment	Fittings / Equipment failure	Trained personnel, Hazard awareness.		
Inert gas	Not envisaged being an issue.				
Flare system		Radiation	Location, wind conditions		



Node 3 –Pipeline (s)

NODE STUDIED		Node 3 –Pipeline			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Section 1 : External and Environmental Hazards					
1.1 Natural and Environmental Hazards					
Earthquakes	Pipeline damage		Site is low earthquake region, design in accordance with local standard.		
Erosion subsidence	/ Not envisaged to be an issue.		Buried to bedrock level		
1.2. Effect of facility on the surroundings					
Geographical Infrastructure	- Public recreation areas around site (popular beaches), Dampier & Karratha towns in vicinity.		Access road to recreation areas / neighbouring towns not within close proximity to pipeline location.		
Proximity to population / Adjacent land use	There are roads running close to the site. Development of area will lead to increased traffic load on local roads.	Close to Woodside facilities.			



NODE STUDIED		Node 3 – Pipeline			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
<u>1.3 Infrastructure</u>					
Emergency Response			Port authorities. Training, competency system, nursing post and ambulance at Woodside. ER team – security will be involved, local authorities, own fire team.		
Start-up / Shutdown	Not envisaged as being an issue.				
<u>2.1 Facility Hazards - Fire & Explosion Hazards</u>					
Sources of Ignition	N/A				
Fire Protection & Response	N/A				
<u>2.2 Facility Hazards - Process Hazards</u>					
Release of Inventory	Catastrophic loss of containment	Pipeline burst, external corrosion.	No internal corrosion or erosion. Regular inspection of pipelines.		
Over Pressure	Catastrophic loss of containment	Pipeline burst,	Pipeline integrity system (monitoring and measurement)		
Over / Under Temperature	Not envisaged as being an issue.				



NODE STUDIED		Node 3 – Pipeline			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Excess / Zero Level	Not envisaged as being an issue.				
Corrosion	Loss of containment		Corrosion allowance in design. Protective coatings. If appropriate, inject inhibitor. Hydrotest before commissioning.		
Erosion	Not envisaged as being an issue.				
Impacts	Not envisaged as being an issue.				

Node 4 – Product Off-loading at Jetty

NODE STUDIED		Node 4 – Tanker Loading hazards			
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY
Section 1 : External and Environmental Hazards					
1.1 Natural and Environmental Hazards					
Climate Extremes – wave & wind	Impact on loading of tankers.	Spills on land / sea	Ships not allowed in port during cyclones. Contingency plan in the event of a spill.		
Lightning	Not envisaged as being an issue.				



NODE STUDIED		Node 4 – Tanker Loading hazards				
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY	
Earthquakes	Not envisaged as being an issue.		Site is low earthquake region.			
1.2 Created (man-made) Hazards						
Security hazards	Not envisaged as being an issue.					
Terrorist activity	Not envisaged as being an issue.					
Section 2 : Facility Hazards						
2.1 Facility Hazards - Control Methods / Philosophy						
Control philosophy	N/A					
Manning Levels	N/A		Low manning level – one person to operate valve. Stevedores to perform offloading operations. Minimum manning level philosophy.			
Emergency Response			Port authorities.			
2.2 Facility Hazards - Fire & Explosion Hazards						
Sources of Ignition	N/A					
Equipment Layout	N/A					
Fire Protection & Response	N/A					



NODE STUDIED		Node 4 – Tanker Loading hazards				
GUIDEWORD	POTENTIAL HAZARDS AND EFFECTS	THREATS / RISK COMMENTS	CONTROLS	ACTION	BY	
Operator Protection	Hazard to personnel during offloading.		Use of appropriate PPE.			
2.3 Facility Hazards - Process Hazards						
Release of Inventory	Human error – incorrect offloading procedure.	Spill on sea / land	Documented procedures. Trained personnel.			
Over Pressure	N/A					
Over / Under Temperature	N/A					
Excess / Zero Level	Overfilling of tankers.		Control systems, alarm and ESD in place.			
Corrosion	N/A					
Erosion	N/A					
Impacts	N/A					



APPENDIX D EPA Guidelines

WESTERN AUSTRALIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AUTHORITY

GUIDELINES FOR A PRELIMINARY RISK ANALYSIS

Introduction:

The Environmental Protection Authority may, in accordance with the Environmental Protection Act, 1986, require a proposal which may have a significant impact on the environment, to undergo environmental impact assessment. If that proposal has associated hazards which present risks to life (hereinafter referred to as risk) the Authority may request that a 'Preliminary Risk Analysis' (PRA) be done as part of the environmental assessment process.

Proposals for which a PRA may be required include those which involve the manufacture, storage or transport of dangerous goods, rezoning of land which may result in the exposure of more people to higher risks, or for any other proposal which may increase risk.

These guidelines provide an overview of the issues to be addressed in a PRA. The guidelines primarily address the construction of new hazardous industry, however, the approach can be used for other types of proposals (rezoning of land etc). The guidelines are not prescriptive and it is the responsibility of the proponent to ensure that the PRA addresses all relevant issues.

The amount of detail required by the EPA for a particular proposal will vary with the nature and complexity of the proposal. A proposal for a small factory handling a highly toxic chemical may require a more detailed PRA than a large development in which materials of low hazard are involved. The proponent and the risk analyst should discuss and agree, with the EPA and its advisers, the details of the PRA both before and during the preparation of the PRA.

The analysis must be transparent to the extent that the EPA and its advisers can judge the adequacy of the analysis, and so they are also able to audit the analysis. This will often require the provision of commercially sensitive information, and arrangements will be made to ensure the confidentiality of that information is maintained.

In the PRA, the risk analyst is expected to make implementable and auditable recommendations regarding the safety design and operation of the proposed facility. The proponent is expected to make a commitment to implement these recommendations. The commitment will form part of the legally binding Environmental Conditions set by the Minister for the Environment on the proposal, should the Minister give approval for the proposal to proceed. The "as built" plant, operation or development is expected to achieve essentially the same or lower levels of risk than presented in the PRA.

The risk analyst must be independent of the proponent and have demonstrated experience with the type of plant being proposed. The risk analyst must demonstrate this autonomy and capability to the satisfaction of the EPA prior to accepting a



commission from the proponent. The risk analyst must formally certify the accuracy and veracity of work completed in the PRA. These requirements are outlined in more detail in EPA Bulletin 611, "Criteria for the Assessment of Risk from Industry".

All PRAs submitted to the EPA must as a minimum have the following contents in the order specified below. This will simplify the review of submissions and result in faster review times.

1. Summary

The document must contain a clear and concise summary of the PRA, and include a statement on whether the results of the analysis comply with the EPA risk criteria.

2. Introduction

- (i) Background
- (ii) Aims and objectives
- (iii) Description and analysis of the proposal
- (iv) Description of the risk analysis techniques used
- (v) Risk standards and criteria used

3. Proposal description

- (i) Location and environment of the proposed site, including:
 - Map of the location of the proposed site, detailing existing, actual and future planned land use of the site and surrounding area as defined by the District Town Planning Scheme of a Local Authority and/or the Metropolitan Region Scheme.
 - Susceptibility to natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, cyclones, sink holes etc);
 - Location with respect to other hazardous industry;
 - Location of required and existing transportation routes; and
 - Proposed route(s) of services to the site (including electricity lines, fuel pipelines and process liquid and gas pipelines). The extent of service supply route information should be commensurate with the development stage of the proposal. However the EPA consider that preliminary discussions with the supply agency and necessary easements should have been determined in principle prior to submission to the EPA.
- (ii) Process description including:
 - Brief description of the process;
 - General arrangements showing plant layout; and
 - Simplified process flow diagrams.
- (iii) Hazards associated with the proposal, including:
 - Hazardous materials (list of materials and their hazardous properties);
 - Hazards associated with the plant technology;
 - History of safety performance of similar facilities;
 - Statement listing the engineering codes and standards proposed by the proponent and used by the risk analyst to assess the likely reliability of the plant; and
 - Review and report on the safety standards incorporated into the conceptual engineering design.



- (iv) Any other activities in the potential impact zone of the proposed development shall be considered in the risk analysis and included in the report.

4. Hazard assessment

The techniques of a hazard assessment differ in detail from one proposal to another, however, the following approach must always be followed:

- Hazard identification (of a complete set of failure cases which could cause death);
- Consequence analysis (to determine the area which may result in death due to over pressure, radiation exposure or toxic gas exposure as a consequence of a failure);
- Frequency analysis (to estimate the probability of each failure case); and
- Quantified Risk Assessment (to cumulatively add the probabilities of failures which may result in death at varying distances and directions to produce contours of levels of imposed risk).

In the presentation of the hazard analysis the following information should be detailed in either the body of the report or as appendices:

(i) Hazard identification

- Failure cases of major process vessels (including details of operating temperature and pressure, inventory, storage and bunding details, types of failure considered, release rate, duration of the release, release mass etc);
- Failure cases of storage vessels (including details of operating temperature and pressure, inventory, storage and bunding details, types of failure considered, release rate, duration of the release, release mass etc); and
- Failure cases of piping, including service pipes (including details of operating temperature and pressure, inventories, types of failures considered, release rate, duration of the release, release mass etc).

Details shall be provided of the methods used for grouping of failure cases. Domino effects must be considered.

Potential sources of releases shall be identified, itemised (and grouped, if appropriate) and summarised.

(ii) Consequence analysis

- Description of methods/models used in calculating consequences of incidents, including input data and assumptions. The Appendices should contain a more comprehensive description of the methods including values of, and references for, all coefficients;
- Where the consequence analysis involves gas dispersion modelling, details are required on topography and meteorology (wind speed and direction, atmospheric stability, surface roughness length and any other parameter relevant to risk analysis). If the wind speed-direction-stability information has been condensed from more detailed information, the method of reduction should be described and justified in an Appendix; and
- Details are required on toxicity, radiation exposure or over pressure values (together with references) used in the consequence analysis. Probit equations (and references) are also to be presented.

Computer printouts of the results should be included in the Appendices.



(iii) Frequency analysis

- A table is to be provided of generic or unit failure frequencies used (fully referenced). The EPA may request that the proponent provides the relevant literature to verify the applicability of failure frequencies used; and
- If the PRA incorporates the use of safety devices the failure rate per demand must be included in the analysis.

(iv) Quantified Risk Assessment

- A table of incidents should be presented; and
- Individual risk contours should be presented for the following risk values: 10^{-4} , 10^{-5} , 10^{-6} , 10^{-7} and 10^{-8} deaths per person per year.

An error analysis should be included in the Appendix indicating the accuracy or range of all of the input variables and models used, including failure frequency data, impact or toxicity data, consequence models, and confidence limits on the risk contours.

5. Risk analysis

- (i) Incorporation of the risk levels from this proposal into any cumulative risk analysis for the local area is required. This applies particularly to the Kwinana Industrial Area, the Kemerton Industrial Park, and North Fremantle. The State government has assisted in this matter in some cases.
- (ii) Report the results of the risk values determined in the hazard assessment and compare them to the EPA risk criteria or other relevant criteria.
- (iii) Regardless of whether there is compliance with the EPA or other risk criteria, discuss how the incidents contributing most to risk, or having the most serious consequences, may be controlled. Relevant factors to consider may include the installation of safety devices, alternative methods and volumes of storage, modified layout, specific recommendations on aspects to be incorporated in emergency planning, etc. Any risk reduction measure which was incorporated as part of the analysis shall be fully documented.

6. Conclusions

Summary of the assumptions and results of the risk analysis, and conclusions as to site acceptability should be given. Implementable and auditable recommendations should be collated in this section.

May 1993



APPENDIX E Assumption Register

Number	Assumption
1.	The GTL Methanol plant is to operate 24 hours per day, for 365 days per year.
2.	Natural gas supply to the battery limits on site will be at 6.0 Mpag via a 219 mm diameter (OD) pipeline.
3.	For the calculation of IRPA due to toxic releases the person is to be present in the one position for 60 minutes.
4.	For the calculation of IRPA due to thermal events the person is to be present in the one position for 60 seconds.
5.	The Site was assumed to have the following properties: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The mean day time temperature is taken to be 302K;• Ground temperature for day time is assumed to be 302K;• The mean night time temperature is taken to be 288K;• Ground temperature for night time is assumed to be 288K;• Mean annual humidity is assumed to be 43%; and• Roughness length for dispersion calculations is assumed to be 0.03m (corresponding to "flat land with few trees").
6.	All leaks are assumed to originate 1.0 m above ground level.
7.	All jet leaks are assumed to be horizontal.
8.	Leaks are assumed to be through a sharp-edged orifice with a leak path of negligible length.
9.	Where 'rupture' leaks are modelled as initiating events, these are analysed as continuous leaks where the leak diameter is that of the largest connection attached to the vessel.
10.	Spills are assumed to take place on the Phast option of "concrete".
11.	Jet and pool fires are modelled using steady-state conditions given that Phast cannot model transient fires
12.	Initial release rates can be used to define effect distances for dispersing gas clouds and jet fires
13.	The export pump can be isolated within 60 seconds.
14.	The export line to the wharf was assumed to have the following safety controls: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Valves to be welded to pipework;• Isolation valves at end of each pipeline which will automatically close on operation of ESD system; and• Pressure monitoring of pipeline during operation for automatic monitoring of pipeline and activating ESD valves on sudden pressure drop.
15.	Shipping Incident Frequency assumptions: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The number of methanol exports per year is 36.• The average vessel payload is 30,000 tonne.• The average length is 220 m.• The vessel arrives empty at the public jetty.• The departing vessels are in the harbour for 1 hour.• There will be approximately 280 vessels using the new channel each year.• The average length of a large vessel is assumed to be 270 m.• 20% of the collisions are severe enough to penetrate one of the tanks resulting in a significant release of methanol.



APPENDIX F Material Safety Data Sheets

The Material Safety Data Sheets for the following are attached:

- Methane,
- Hydrogen,
- Carbon monoxide, and;
- Methanol.



International Chemical Safety Cards

METHANE

ICSC: 0291

METHANE
(cylinder)
CH₄

Molecular mass: 16.0

CAS # 74-82-8
RTECS # PA1490000
ICSC # 0291
UN # 1971;1972
EC # 601-001-00-4

TYPES OF HAZARD/ EXPOSURE

FIRE

EXPLOSION

ACUTE HAZARDS/ SYMPTOMS

Extremely flammable.

Gas/air mixtures are explosive.

PREVENTION

NO open flames, NO sparks, and NO smoking.

Closed system, ventilation, explosion-proof electrical equipment and lighting.

FIRST AID/ FIRE FIGHTING

Shut off supply; if not possible and no risk to surroundings, let the fire burn itself out; in other cases extinguish with water spray, powder, carbon dioxide
In case of fire: keep cylinder cool by spraying with water. Combat fire from a sheltered position.

EXPOSURE

INHALATION

SKIN

EYES INGESTION

Unconsciousness.

Serious frostbite.

Ventilation. Breathing protection if high concentration.

Cold-insulating gloves.

Fresh air, rest. Artificial respiration if indicated. Refer for medical attention.
ON FROSTBITE: rinse with plenty of water, do NOT remove clothes. Refer for medical attention.

SPILLAGE DISPOSAL

Evacuate danger area! Consult an expert! Fireproof. Cool. Ventilation along Ventilation (extra personal protection: self- the floor and ceiling. contained breathing apparatus).

STORAGE

PACKAGING & LABELLING

F symbol
R: 12
S: 9-16-33
UN Hazard Class: 2.1

SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON BACK

ICSC: 0291

Prepared in the context of cooperation between the International Programme on Chemical Safety & the Commission of the European Communities © IPCS CEC 1993



International Chemical Safety Cards

METHANE

ICSC: 0291

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PHYSICAL PROPERTIES

ENVIRONMENTAL DATA NOTES

Density of the liquid at boiling point: 0.42 kg/l. The substance may travel to a source of ignition and flash back. High concentrations in the air cause a deficiency of oxygen with the risk of unconsciousness or death. Check oxygen content before entering area. Turn leaking cylinder with the leak up to prevent escape of gas in liquid state. After use for welding, turn valve off; regularly check tubing, etc., and test for leaks with soap and water. The measures mentioned in section PREVENTION are applicable to production, filling of cylinders, and storage of the gas.

Transport Emergency Card: TEC (R)-622, 20G04

NFPA Code: H 1; F 4; R 0;

IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE:

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PHYSICAL STATE; APPEARANCE:

COLOURLESS, COMPRESSED OR LIQUEFIED GAS, WITH NO ODOUR.

PHYSICAL DANGERS:

The gas is lighter than air.

CHEMICAL DANGERS:

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS (OELs):

TLV: ppm; mg/m³ simple asphyxiant (ACGIH 1993-1994).

MAK not established.

Boiling point: -161°C

Melting point: -183°C

Solubility in water, ml/100 ml at 20°C: 3.3

Relative vapour density (air = 1): 0.6

ROUTES OF EXPOSURE:

The substance can be absorbed into the body by inhalation.

INHALATION RISK:

On loss of containment this gas can cause suffocation by lowering the oxygen content of the air in confined areas.

EFFECTS OF SHORT-TERM EXPOSURE:

Contact with compressed or liquid gas may cause frostbite.

EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM OR REPEATED EXPOSURE:

Flash point: Flammable Gas

Auto-ignition temperature: 537°C

Explosive limits, vol% in air: 5-15



International Chemical Safety Cards

HYDROGEN

ICSC: 0001

HYDROGEN

(cylinder)

 H_2

Molecular mass: 2.0

CAS # 1333-74-0
RTECS # MW8900000
ICSC # 0001
UN # 1049
EC # 001-001-00-9

TYPES OF HAZARD/ EXPOSURE

FIRE

ACUTE HAZARDS/ SYMPTOMS

Extremely flammable. Many reactions may cause fire or explosion.

PREVENTION

NO open flames, NO sparks, and NO smoking.

FIRST AID/ FIRE FIGHTING

Shut off supply; if not possible and no risk to surroundings, let the fire burn itself out; (see notes) water spray, powder, carbon dioxide.

EXPLOSION

Gas/air mixtures are explosive.

Closed system, ventilation, explosion-proof electrical equipment and lighting. Use non-sparking handtools. Do not handle cylinders with oily hands.

In case of fire: keep cylinder cool by spraying with water. Combat fire from a sheltered position.

EXPOSURE

INHALATION

Dizziness. Asphyxia. Laboured breathing. Unconsciousness.

Closed system and ventilation.

Fresh air, rest. Refer for medical attention.

SKIN

ON CONTACT WITH LIQUID: FROSTBITE.

Cold-insulating gloves. Protective clothing.

ON FROSTBITE: rinse with plenty of water, do NOT remove clothes. Refer for medical attention.

EYES

Safety goggles, or face shield.

INGESTION

SPILLAGE DISPOSAL

Evacuate danger area! Consult an expert! Fireproof. Cool. Ventilation. Remove vapour with fine water spray.

STORAGE

PACKAGING & LABELLING

F+ symbol
R: 12
S: 9-16-33
UN Hazard Class: 2.1

SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON BACK

ICSC: 0001

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International Chemical Safety Cards

HYDROGEN

ICSC: 0001

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A**PHYSICAL STATE; APPEARANCE:**

ODOURLESS, COLOURLESS COMPRESSED LIQUEFIED GAS

ROUTES OF EXPOSURE:

The substance can be absorbed into the body by inhalation.

PHYSICAL DANGERS:

The gas mixes well with air, explosive mixtures are easily formed. The gas is lighter than air.

INHALATION RISK:

On loss of containment this liquid evaporates very quickly causing supersaturation of the air with serious risk of suffocation when in confined areas.

CHEMICAL DANGERS:

Heating may cause violent combustion or explosion. Reacts violently with air, oxygen, chlorine, fluorine, strong oxidants causing fire and explosion hazard. Metal catalysts, such as platinum and nickel, greatly enhance these reactions.

EFFECTS OF SHORT-TERM EXPOSURE:

The liquid may cause frostbite. Exposure could cause dizziness, high voice. Exposure may result in suffocation.

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS (OELs):
TLV not established**EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM OR REPEATED EXPOSURE:****PHYSICAL PROPERTIES**Boiling point: - 253°C
Relative vapour density (air = 1): 0.07
Flash point: flammable gasAuto-ignition temperature: 500-571°C
Explosive limits, vol% in air: 4-76%**ENVIRONMENTAL DATA****NOTES**

Addition of small amounts of a flammable substance or an increase in the oxygen content of the air strongly enhances combustibility. High concentrations in the air cause a deficiency of oxygen with the risk of unconsciousness or death. Check oxygen content before entering area. No odour warning if toxic concentrations are present. Measure hydrogen concentrations with suitable gas detector (a normal flammable gas detector is not suited for the purpose). After use for welding, turn valve off; regularly check tubing, etc., and test for leaks with soap and water. The measures mentioned in section PREVENTION are applicable to production, filling of cylinders, and storage of the gas.

Transport Emergency Card: TEC (R)-20

NFPA Code: H0; F4; R0;

IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE:

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International Chemical Safety Cards

CARBON MONOXIDE

ICSC: 0023

CARBON MONOXIDE

Carbon oxide
Carbonic oxide
(cylinder)
CO

Molecular mass: 28.0

CAS # 630-08-0
RTECS # FG3500000
ICSC # 0023
UN # 1016
EC # 006-001-00-2

TYPES OF HAZARD/ EXPOSURE

FIRE

EXPLOSION

EXPOSURE

INHALATION

SKIN EYES INGESTION

ACUTE HAZARDS/ SYMPTOMS

Extremely flammable.

Gas/air mixtures are explosive.

Confusion. Dizziness.
Headache. Nausea.
Unconsciousness.
Weakness.

PREVENTION

NO open flames, NO sparks, and NO smoking.

Closed system, ventilation,
explosion-proof electrical
equipment and lighting. Use
non-sparking handtools.

AVOID EXPOSURE OF
(PREGNANT) WOMEN!
Ventilation, local exhaust, or
breathing protection.

FIRST AID/ FIRE FIGHTING

Shut off supply; if not possible and no risk to surroundings, let the fire burn itself out; in other cases extinguish with carbon dioxide, water spray, powder.
In case of fire: keep cylinder cool by spraying with water. Combat fire from a sheltered position.

IN ALL CASES
CONSULT A DOCTOR!
Fresh air, rest. Artificial respiration if indicated. Refer for medical attention.

SPILLAGE DISPOSAL

Evacuate danger area! Consult an expert! Fireproof. Cool.
Ventilation (extra personal protection: self-contained breathing apparatus).

STORAGE

PACKAGING & LABELLING

F+ symbol
T symbol
R: 61-12-23-48/23
S: 53-45
Note: E
UN Hazard Class: 2.3
UN Subsidiary Risks: 2.1

SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON BACK

ICSC: 0023

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International Chemical Safety Cards

CARBON MONOXIDE

ICSC: 0023

I M P O R T A N T D A T A	PHYSICAL STATE; APPEARANCE: ODOURLESS, TASTELESS, COLOURLESS COMPRESSED GAS.	ROUTES OF EXPOSURE: The substance can be absorbed into the body by inhalation.
	PHYSICAL DANGERS: The gas mixes well with air, explosive mixtures are easily formed. The gas penetrates easily through walls and ceilings.	INHALATION RISK: A harmful concentration of this gas in the air will be reached very quickly on loss of containment.
	CHEMICAL DANGERS: In the presence of finely dispersed metal powders the substance forms toxic and flammable carbonyls. May react vigorously with oxygen, acetylene, chlorine, fluorine, nitrous oxide.	EFFECTS OF SHORT-TERM EXPOSURE: The substance may cause effects on the blood, cardiovascular system and central nervous system. Exposure at high levels may result in lowering of consciousness and death. Medical observation is indicated.
	OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS (OELs): TLV: 25 ppm; 29 mg/m ³ (as TWA) (ACGIH 1994-1995). MAK: 30 ppm; 33 mg/m ³ ; Pregnancy: B (harmful effect probable in spite of observance of MAK) (1993).	EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM OR REPEATED EXPOSURE: The substance may have effects on the nervous system and the cardiovascular system, resulting in neurological and cardiac disorders). Suspected to cause reproductive effects such as neurological problems, low birth weight, increased still births, and congenital heart problems.
	PHYSICAL PROPERTIES ENVIRONMENTAL DATA	Flash point: Flammable Gas Auto-ignition temperature: 605°C Explosive limits, vol% in air: 12.5-74.2
NOTES		

Carbon monoxide is a product of incomplete combustion of coal, oil, wood. It is present in vehicle exhaust and tobacco smoke. Depending on the degree of exposure, periodic medical examination is indicated. No odour warning if toxic concentrations are present.

Transport Emergency Card: TEC (R)-827

NFPA Code: H3; F4; R0

IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE:

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International Chemical Safety Cards

METHANOL

ICSC: 0057

METHANOL
Methyl alcohol
Carbinol
Wood alcohol
CH₄O/CH₃OH
Molecular mass: 32.0

CAS # 67-56-1
RTECS # PC1400000
ICSC # 0057
UN # 1230
EC # 603-001-00-X

TYPES OF HAZARD/ EXPOSURE

ACUTE HAZARDS/ SYMPTOMS

PREVENTION

FIRST AID/ FIRE FIGHTING

FIRE

Highly flammable.

NO open flames, NO sparks, Powder, alcohol-resistant and NO smoking. NO contact foam, water in large amounts, carbon dioxide.

Vapour/air mixtures are explosive.

Closed system, ventilation, explosion-proof electrical equipment and lighting. Do NOT use compressed air for filling, discharging, or handling. Use non-sparking handtools.

In case of fire: keep drums, etc., cool by spraying with water.

EXPLOSION

AVOID EXPOSURE OF ADOLESCENTS AND CHILDREN!

EXPOSURE

INHALATION

Cough. Dizziness.
Headache. Nausea.
MAY BE ABSORBED! Dry skin. Redness.

Ventilation. Local exhaust or breathing protection.
Protective gloves. Protective clothing.

Fresh air, rest. Refer for medical attention.
Remove contaminated clothes. Rinse skin with plenty of water or shower. Refer for medical attention.

SKIN

Redness. Pain.

Safety goggles or eye protection in combination with breathing protection.

First rinse with plenty of water for several minutes (remove contact lenses if easily possible), then take to a doctor.

EYES

INGESTION

Abdominal pain. Shortness of breath. Unconsciousness. Vomiting (further see Inhalation).

Do not eat, drink, or smoke during work.

Induce vomiting (ONLY IN CONSCIOUS PERSONS!). Refer for medical attention.

SPILLAGE DISPOSAL

Evacuate danger area! Collect leaking liquid in sealable containers. Wash away spilled liquid with plenty of water. Remove vapour with fine water spray (extra personal protection: complete protective clothing including self-contained breathing

STORAGE

Fireproof. Separated from strong oxidants, food and feedstuffs. Cool.

PACKAGING & LABELLING

Do not transport with food and feedstuffs.

F symbol

T symbol

R: 11-23/25

S: (1/2-)7-16-24-25

apparatus).

UN Hazard Class: 3

UN Subsidiary Risks: 6.1

UN Packing Group: II

SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ON BACK

ICSC: 0057

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International Chemical Safety Cards

ICSC: 0057

METHANOL

IMPORTANT DATA

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES

ENVIRONMENTAL DATA

NOTES

Burns with nonluminous bluish flame. Depending on the degree of exposure, periodic medical examination is indicated.

Transport Emergency Card: TEC (R)-36

NFPA Code: H 1; F 3; R 0:

**IMPORTANT
LEGAL NOTICE:**

PHYSICAL STATE: APPEARANCE:

COLOURLESS LIQUID , WITH
CHARACTERISTIC ODOUR.

PHYSICAL DANGERS:

The vapour mixes well with air,
explosive mixtures are easily formed.

CHEMICAL DANGERS:

Reacts violently with oxidants causing fire and explosion hazard.

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE LIMITS (OELs):

TLV: 200 ppm; 262 mg/m³ as TWA (skin) (ACGIH 1991-1992).

TLV (as STEL): 250 ppm; 328 mg/m³
(skin) (ACGIH 1992-1993).

ROUTES OF EXPOSURE:

The substance can be absorbed into the body by inhalation and through the skin, and by ingestion.

INHALATION RISK:

A harmful contamination of the air can be reached rather quickly on evaporation of this substance at 20°C.

EFFECTS OF SHORT-TERM EXPOSURE:

The substance irritates the eyes, the skin and the respiratory tract. The substance may cause effects on the central nervous system, resulting in loss of consciousness. Exposure by ingestion may result in blindness and death. The effects may be delayed. Medical observation is indicated.

EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM OR REPEATED EXPOSURE:

Repeated or prolonged contact with skin may cause dermatitis. The substance may have effects on the central nervous system, resulting in persistent or recurring headaches and impaired vision.

Boiling point: 65°C
Melting point: -98°C
Relative density (water = 1): 0.79
Solubility in water: miscible
Vapour pressure, kPa at 20°C: 12.3
Relative vapour density (air = 1): 1.1

Relative density of the vapour/air-mixture at 20°C (air = 1): 1.01
Flash point: 12°C c.c.
Auto-ignition temperature: 385°C
Explosive limits, vol% in air: 6-35.6
Octanol/water partition coefficient as log Pow: -0.82/-0.66

Effects: The substance is of low toxicity to aquatic and terrestrial organisms.



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APPENDIX G Riskplot Output File

Due to the size of the output file from Risk Plot II, it is available upon request, if not included with this report.

Weather probabilities

Time period: Day

	1.8F	2.5B	3.0F	4.2C	5.1D	6.3C
N	0	.01678082	0	.02420091	0	.02922374
NE	0	.00616438	0	.01815068	0	.02842466
E	0	.02123288	0	.04292237	0	.03424658
SE	0	.03390411	0	.02888128	0	.0076484
S	0	.02020548	0	.00684932	0	.00136986
SW	0	.03413242	0	.00947489	0	.00216895
W	0	.0206621	0	.02956621	0	.0423516
NW	0	.01518265	0	.0130137	0	.01324201

Time period: Night

	1.8F	2.5B	3.0F	4.2C	5.1D	6.3C
N	.00707763	0	.00730594	0	.01883562	0
NE	.00833333	0	.01050228	0	.01221461	0
E	.01792237	0	.01267123	0	.00422374	0
SE	.02922374	0	.0336758	0	.01666667	0
S	.0336758	0	.01906393	0	.00810502	0
SW	.04611872	0	.04657534	0	.03013699	0
W	.0109589	0	.02363014	0	.06940639	0
NW	.00650685	0	.00856164	0	.01860731	0

Populations

Population: Burrup Fertiliser Site (Area, static)

Coordinates:

76458 19667
77167 19583
77250 18542
76583 18583

Day Night
40 10

Population: Plenty River Site (Area, static)

Coordinates:

76417 19447
76479 18625
75750 18604
75708 19125
75833 19458

Day Night
40 10

Population: Woodside OTP (Area, static)

Coordinates:

75416 23208
76458 23208
76600 22292
76292 22000
73042 22000
74917 22292
75416 23208

Day Night
100 15

Areas of significant topography

Consequences

Consequence: Iso 1 BLEVE Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	89	89	-89	0
.5	155	155	-155	0
.1	271	271	-271	0

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	86	86	-86	0
.5	150	150	-150	0
.1	259	259	-259	0

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	89	89	-89	0
.5	155	155	-155	0
.1	271	271	-271	0

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	86	86	-86	0
.5	150	150	-150	0
.1	259	259	-259	0

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	89	89	-89	0
.5	155	155	-155	0
.1	271	271	-271	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	86	86	-86	0
.5	150	150	-150	0
.1	259	259	-259	0

Consequence: Iso 1 BLEVE No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	63	63	-63	0
.5	110	110	-110	0

.1	192	192	-192	0
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Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	61	-61	0
.5	106	106	-106	0
.1	185	185	-185	0

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	63	63	-63	0
.5	110	110	-110	0
.1	192	192	-192	0

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	61	-61	0
.5	106	106	-106	0
.1	185	185	-185	0

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	63	63	-63	0
.5	110	110	-110	0
.1	192	192	-192	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	61	-61	0
.5	106	106	-106	0
.1	185	185	-185	0

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	26
.1	59	41	-3	27

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	27
.1	58	40	-3	27

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	26
.1	59	41	-3	27

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	27
.1	58	40	-3	27

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	26
.1	59	41	-3	27

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	27
.1	58	40	-3	27

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
.5		5	1	0	3
.1		6	4	0	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
.5		5	1	0	3
.1		6	4	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
.5		5	1	0	3
.1		6	4	0	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
.5		5	1	0	3
.1		6	4	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
.5		5	1	0	3
.1		6	4	0	3

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
.5		5	1	0	3
.1		6	4	0	3

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
1		145	8	2	73
.5		148	56	-1	73
.1		161	113	-9	75

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
1		145	8	2	74
.5		148	54	-1	73
.1		160	108	-8	76

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality		d	c	s	m
prob					
1		145	8	2	73
.5		148	56	-1	73
.1		161	113	-9	75

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	74
.5	148	54	-1	73
.1	160	108	-8	76

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	73
.5	148	56	-1	73
.1	161	113	-9	75

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	74
.5	148	54	-1	73
.1	160	108	-8	76

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	17	0	1	9
.5	18	6	0	9
.1	19	13	-1	9

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	26
.1	59	41	-3	27

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	27
.1	58	40	-3	27

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	26
.1	59	41	-3	27

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	27
.1	58	40	-3	27

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	26
.1	59	41	-3	27

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	2	27
.5	54	20	0	27
.1	58	40	-3	27

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	5	1	0	3
.1	6	4	0	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	5	1	0	3
.1	6	4	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	5	1	0	3
.1	6	4	0	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	5	1	0	3
.1	6	4	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	5	1	0	3
.1	6	4	0	3

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	5	1	0	3
.1	6	4	0	3

Consequence: Iso 1 jetfi No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	73
.5	148	56	-1	73
.1	161	113	-9	75

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	74
.5	148	54	-1	73
.1	160	108	-8	76

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	73
.5	148	56	-1	73
.1	161	113	-9	75

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	74
.5	148	54	-1	73
.1	160	108	-8	76

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	73
.5	148	56	-1	73
.1	161	113	-9	75

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	145	8	2	74
.5	148	54	-1	73
.1	160	108	-8	76

Consequence: Iso 1 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	6	53	59
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	6	53	59
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	6	53	59
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	6	53	59
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	6	53	59
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	6	53	59
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Consequence: Iso 1 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	172	22	128	150
.5	183	33	116	149
.1	196	46	104	150

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	190	20	150	170
.5	199	29	141	170
.1	211	41	129	170

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	172	22	128	150
.5	183	33	116	149
.1	196	46	104	150

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	200	19	161	180
.5	210	29	151	180
.1	220	40	140	180

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	190	20	150	170
.5	199	29	141	170
.1	211	41	129	170

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	200	19	161	180
.5	210	29	151	180
.1	220	40	140	180

Consequence: Iso 1 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	6	54	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	6	54	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	6	54	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	6	54	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	6	54	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	6	54	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Consequence: Iso 1 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	139	29	81	110
.1	151	41	69	110

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	138	18	102	120
.5	148	28	92	120
.1	158	38	82	120

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	139	29	81	110
.1	151	41	69	110

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	138	18	102	120
.5	148	28	92	120
.1	158	38	82	120

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	138	18	102	120
.5	148	28	92	120
.1	158	38	82	120

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	148	18	112	130
.5	165	31	103	134
.1	167	37	93	130

Consequence: Iso 10 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Consequence: Iso 10 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Consequence: Iso 10 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	207	17	173	190
.5	215	25	165	190
.1	225	35	155	190

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	10	110	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	10	110	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	110	10	90	100
.5	117	17	83	100
.1	123	23	77	100

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	100	10	80	90
.5	105	15	75	90
.1	110	20	70	90

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	101	11	79	90
.5	107	17	73	90
.1	113	23	67	90

Consequence: Iso 10 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Consequence: Iso 10 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	39	9	21	30

Consequence: Iso 10 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	207	17	173	190
.5	215	25	165	190
.1	225	35	155	190

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	10	110	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	10	110	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	110	10	90	100
.5	117	17	83	100
.1	123	23	77	100

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	100	10	80	90
.5	105	15	75	90
.1	110	20	70	90

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	101	11	79	90
.5	107	17	73	90
.1	113	23	67	90

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	24	-13	11
.5	53	40	-28	12
.1	79	66	-55	12

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	24	-12	12
.5	53	39	-26	13
.1	78	64	-52	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	24	-12	12
.5	53	39	-26	13
.1	78	64	-51	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	23	-11	13
.5	53	38	-24	14
.1	77	61	-47	14

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	23	-12	13
.5	52	37	-24	14
.1	74	60	-46	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	22	-10	15
.5	53	36	-21	15
.1	75	58	-44	15

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	24	-10	14
.5	56	40	-25	15
.1	81	66	-52	14

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	24	-8	16
.5	57	39	-22	17
.1	82	64	-48	16

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	24	-9	15
.5	56	39	-22	16
.1	80	64	-48	16

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	23	-8	16
.5	56	38	-21	17
.1	79	61	-44	17

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	23	-7	17
.5	56	37	-19	18
.1	79	60	-42	18

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	22	-8	16
.5	55	36	-20	17
.1	76	58	-42	17

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	29	21	-13	7
.1	43	35	-28	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	11	-3	7
.5	27	18	-10	8
.1	39	31	-22	8

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	12	-5	7
.5	29	20	-12	8
.1	42	33	-25	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	10	-3	8
.5	27	17	-8	9
.1	38	28	-19	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	22	11	-3	9
.5	29	18	-9	9
.1	41	30	-21	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	9	-1	9
.5	27	16	-7	10
.1	37	26	-17	10

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	289	254	-222	33
.5	409	375	-342	33
.1	614	579	-544	34

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	277	239	-205	36
.5	388	351	-317	35
.1	573	540	-508	32

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	292	252	-216	38
.5	411	369	-329	40
.1	608	570	-529	39

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	282	235	-196	43
.5	391	344	-301	44
.1	567	525	-483	42

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	298	246	-203	47
.5	409	357	-308	50
.1	598	547	-499	49

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	289	230	-185	52
.5	389	334	-282	53
.1	563	506	-452	55

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	24	-13	11
.5	53	40	-28	12
.1	79	66	-55	12

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	24	-12	12
.5	53	39	-26	13
.1	78	64	-52	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	24	-12	12
.5	53	39	-26	13
.1	78	64	-51	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	23	-11	13
.5	53	38	-24	14
.1	77	61	-47	14

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	23	-12	13
.5	52	37	-24	14
.1	74	60	-46	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	24	-12	12
.5	53	39	-26	13
.1	78	64	-52	13

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	24	-10	14
.5	56	40	-25	15
.1	81	66	-52	14

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	24	-8	16
.5	57	39	-22	17
.1	82	64	-48	16

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	24	-9	15
.5	56	39	-22	16
.1	80	64	-48	16

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	42	23	-8	16
.5	56	38	-21	17
.1	79	61	-44	17

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	23	-7	17
.5	56	37	-19	18
.1	79	60	-42	18

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	24	-8	16
.5	57	39	-22	17
.1	82	64	-48	16

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	29	21	-13	7
.1	43	35	-28	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	11	-3	7
.5	27	18	-10	8
.1	39	31	-22	8

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	12	-5	7
.5	29	20	-12	8
.1	42	33	-25	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	10	-3	8
.5	27	17	-8	9
.1	38	28	-19	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	11	-3	9
.5	29	18	-9	9
.1	41	30	-21	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	11	-3	7
.5	27	18	-10	8
.1	39	31	-22	8

Consequence: Iso 10 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	289	254	-222	33
.5	409	375	-341	33
.1	614	579	-544	34

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	277	239	-204	36
.5	388	351	-317	35
.1	572	540	-508	32

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	292	252	-215	38
.5	411	368	-329	40
.1	608	569	-528	39

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	282	235	-196	43
.5	390	344	-300	44
.1	567	525	-483	42

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	298	246	-202	47
.5	408	356	-308	50
.1	597	546	-498	49

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	277	239	-204	36
.5	388	351	-317	35
.1	572	540	-508	32

Consequence: Iso 11 BLEVE No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Consequence: Iso 11 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Consequence: Iso 11 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	7	33	40
.5	52	12	28	40
.1	55	15	25	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	66	16	34	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	7	33	40
.5	52	12	28	40
.1	55	15	25	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	66	16	34	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	66	16	34	50

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	8	52	60
.5	72	12	48	60
.1	77	17	43	60

Consequence: Iso 11 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Consequence: Iso 11 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	7	33	40
.5	52	12	28	40
.1	55	15	25	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	66	16	34	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	7	33	40
.5	52	12	28	40
.1	55	15	25	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	66	16	34	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	66	16	34	50

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	8	52	60
.5	72	12	48	60
.1	77	17	43	60

Consequence: Iso 11 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	36	24	-14	10
.5	52	40	-29	11
.1	77	66	-56	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	36	23	-12	12
.5	51	38	-26	12
.1	76	62	-50	12

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	24	-13	11
.5	52	39	-26	12
.1	76	64	-52	12

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	22	-11	13
.5	51	36	-23	14
.1	74	59	-45	14

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	23	-11	13
.5	52	37	-23	14
.1	74	60	-46	13

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	21	-10	14
.5	51	35	-21	14
.1	71	56	-42	14

Consequence: Iso 11 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	38	24	-12	12
.5	54	40	-27	13
.1	80	66	-53	13

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	24	-10	14
.5	55	39	-24	15
.1	80	64	-50	15

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	24	-11	14
.5	54	39	-24	15
.1	79	64	-49	14

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	23	-9	15
.5	54	38	-22	16
.1	78	61	-46	16

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	23	-9	16
.5	55	37	-21	16
.1	78	60	-43	17

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	22	-9	16
.5	54	36	-20	17
.1	76	58	-42	17

Consequence: Iso 11 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-4	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-19	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	39	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	9	-2	9
.5	26	15	-7	9
.1	35	25	-16	9

Consequence: Iso 11 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	26	-8	18
.5	62	43	-24	18
.1	90	71	-53	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	24	-6	18
.5	59	39	-20	19
.1	84	64	-46	18

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	24	-7	18
.5	58	39	-20	19
.1	83	64	-45	18

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	25	-6	21
.5	63	40	-19	22
.1	88	66	-44	21

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	25	-6	21
.5	63	40	-18	22
.1	87	65	-42	22

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	24	-3	23
.5	65	39	-15	24

.1	88	62	-38	24
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Consequence: Iso 11 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	14	-5	9
.5	34	24	-14	10
.1	50	40	-30	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	13	-4	10
.5	34	23	-12	11
.1	50	38	-27	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	14	-4	10
.5	34	23	-12	10
.1	49	38	-27	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	13	-3	11
.5	34	22	-10	12
.1	49	36	-24	12

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	13	-3	11
.5	34	22	-10	11
.1	48	35	-24	11

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	13	-4	10
.5	34	23	-12	11
.1	50	38	-27	11

Consequence: Iso 11 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	27	14	-3	11
.5	37	24	-12	12
.1	53	41	-29	12

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	14	-2	12
.5	38	24	-11	13
.1	53	40	-26	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	14	-2	12
.5	37	23	-11	13
.1	52	39	-26	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	14	-2	13
.5	38	23	-9	14
.1	52	37	-24	14

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	13	-1	14
.5	38	22	-8	14
.1	52	36	-22	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	14	-2	12
.5	38	24	-11	13
.1	53	40	-26	13

Consequence: Iso 11 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-4	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-19	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9

.1	39	29	-20	9
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Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Consequence: Iso 11 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	15	1	17
.5	42	25	-8	17
.1	59	42	-24	17

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	14	1	17
.5	43	24	-7	18
.1	59	40	-22	18

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	14	0	16
.5	41	24	-7	17
.1	57	40	-23	17

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	14	3	19
.5	43	23	-4	19
.1	58	38	-19	19

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	14	3	19
.5	43	23	-4	19
.1	57	37	-18	19

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	14	1	17
.5	43	24	-7	18
.1	59	40	-22	18

Consequence: Iso 12 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	33	3	26	29
.1	35	4	24	29

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	34	4	25	29
.1	36	4	24	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	13	3	6	17
1	12	5	7	15
.1	15	5	5	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.01	2	1	0	1

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	7	15
.5	13	3	6	17
.1	15	5	5	20

Consequence: Iso 12 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	54	4	46	50
.5	55	5	44	49
.1	58	8	42	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	31	40

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	45	5	35	40
.1	47	7	33	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	31	40

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	33	40
.1	49	9	31	40

Consequence: Iso 12 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	129	9	110	119
.5	134	13	107	120
.1	139	19	101	120

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	108	8	92	100
.5	112	12	87	99
.1	118	17	83	100

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	130	20	90	110

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	81	89
.5	103	13	77	90
.1	108	18	72	90

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	109	8	92	100
.5	114	13	87	100
.1	119	19	81	100

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	8	72	80
.5	93	13	67	80
.1	98	18	62	80

Consequence: Iso 12 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	54	4	46	50
.5	55	5	44	49
.1	58	8	42	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	31	40

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	45	5	35	40
.1	47	7	33	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	31	40

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	33	40
.1	49	9	31	40

Consequence: Iso 12 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	54	4	46	50
.5	55	5	44	49
.1	58	8	42	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	31	40

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	45	5	35	40
.1	47	7	33	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	31	40

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	33	40
.1	49	9	31	40

Consequence: Iso 12 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	129	9	110	119
.5	134	13	107	120
.1	139	19	101	120

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	108	8	92	100
.5	112	12	87	99
.1	118	17	83	100

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	130	20	90	110

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	81	89
.5	103	13	77	90
.1	108	18	72	90

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	109	8	92	100
.5	114	13	87	100
.1	119	19	81	100

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	88	8	72	80
.5	93	13	67	80
.1	98	18	62	80

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	35	-24	11
.5	69	57	-45	12
.1	106	94	-81	12

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	31	-20	12
.5	65	51	-38	13
.1	98	84	-71	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	34	-22	13
.5	69	55	-41	13
.1	103	89	-76	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	30	-18	14
.5	65	48	-34	15
.1	94	78	-64	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	50	32	-20	14
.5	68	51	-36	15
.1	99	82	-67	15

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	29	-16	15
.5	64	46	-31	16
.1	91	74	-58	16

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	121	103	-86	18
.5	176	159	-142	18
.1	271	253	-235	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	115	94	-75	20
.5	165	145	-125	20
.1	250	230	-209	21

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	124	101	-81	22
.5	177	155	-133	22
.1	268	246	-224	22

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	118	91	-71	24
.5	166	139	-115	25
.1	244	219	-196	24

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	127	98	-76	25
.5	175	147	-122	27
.1	259	231	-207	26

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	89	-66	27
.5	165	133	-106	30
.1	239	208	-180	29

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	12	-6	6
.5	27	20	-13	7
.1	41	34	-27	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	8
.1	37	29	-21	8

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	27	19	-12	8
.1	39	32	-24	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	26	16	-8	9
.1	36	27	-18	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	21	11	-4	9
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	38	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	9	-2	9
.5	25	15	-7	9
.1	34	25	-16	9

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	124	103	-83	21
.5	180	160	-138	21
.1	274	253	-233	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	126	100	-77	24
.5	179	154	-130	25
.1	268	244	-219	24

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	129	101	-77	26
.5	181	155	-131	25
.1	272	247	-222	25

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	99	-72	30
.5	183	150	-120	32
.1	267	235	-205	31

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	136	100	-70	33
.5	187	150	-117	35
.1	271	236	-204	33

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	134	97	-71	32
.5	182	146	-114	34
.1	262	227	-193	34

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	35	-24	11
.5	69	57	-45	12
.1	106	94	-81	12

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	31	-20	12
.5	65	51	-38	13
.1	98	84	-71	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	34	-22	13
.5	69	55	-41	13
.1	103	89	-76	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	30	-18	14
.5	65	48	-34	15
.1	94	78	-64	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	50	32	-20	14
.5	68	51	-36	15
.1	99	82	-67	15

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	29	-16	15
.5	64	46	-31	16
.1	91	74	-58	16

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	121	103	-86	18
.5	176	159	-142	18
.1	271	253	-235	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	115	94	-75	20
.5	165	145	-125	20
.1	250	230	-209	21

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	124	101	-81	22
.5	177	155	-133	22
.1	268	246	-224	22

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	118	91	-71	24
.5	166	139	-115	25
.1	244	219	-196	24

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	127	98	-76	25
.5	175	147	-122	27
.1	259	231	-207	26

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	89	-66	27
.5	165	133	-106	30
.1	239	208	-180	29

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	12	-6	6
.5	27	20	-13	7
.1	41	34	-27	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	8
.1	37	29	-21	8

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	27	19	-12	8
.1	39	32	-24	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	26	16	-8	9
.1	36	27	-18	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-4	9
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	38	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	9	-2	9
.5	25	15	-7	9
.1	34	25	-16	9

Consequence: Iso 12 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	124	103	-83	21
.5	180	160	-138	21
.1	274	253	-233	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	126	100	-77	24
.5	179	154	-130	25
.1	268	244	-219	24

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	129	101	-77	26
.5	181	155	-131	25
.1	272	247	-222	25

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	99	-72	30
.5	183	150	-120	32
.1	267	235	-205	31

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	136	100	-70	33
.5	187	150	-117	35
.1	271	236	-204	33

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	134	97	-71	32
.5	182	146	-114	34
.1	262	227	-193	34

Consequence: Iso 13 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Consequence: Iso 13 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	32	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	32	40

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Consequence: Iso 13 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	2	27	30
.5	34	4	26	30
.1	35	5	25	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Consequence: Iso 13 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Consequence: Iso 13 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	32	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	32	40

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Consequence: Iso 13 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	2	27	30
.5	34	4	26	30
.1	35	5	25	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Consequence: Iso 13 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	40	29	-18	11
.5	59	47	-35	11
.1	89	77	-66	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	46	-32	13
.1	89	75	-62	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	45	-32	13
.1	88	74	-61	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	27	-15	14
.5	60	44	-29	15
.1	87	71	-57	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	27	-15	14
.5	59	43	-29	15
.1	85	70	-56	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	26	-14	15
.5	60	42	-27	16
.1	85	68	-53	15

Consequence: Iso 13 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	29	-16	13
.5	61	47	-33	13
.1	91	77	-64	13

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	15
.5	62	46	-30	15
.1	91	75	-60	15

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	14
.5	61	45	-30	15
.1	90	74	-59	15

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	27	-13	16
.5	62	44	-28	17
.1	89	71	-54	17

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	27	-12	17
.5	62	43	-26	17
.1	88	70	-53	17

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	26	-12	17
.5	62	42	-25	18
.1	87	68	-51	17

Consequence: Iso 13 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-4	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-19	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	39	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	9	-2	9
.5	26	15	-7	9

.1	35	25	-16	9
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Consequence: Iso 13 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	29	-10	18
.5	66	47	-28	18
.1	96	77	-59	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	28	-10	19
.5	66	46	-26	19
.1	95	75	-56	19

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	28	-10	19
.5	65	45	-26	19
.1	94	74	-55	19

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	44	-22	22
.1	94	71	-49	22

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	43	-21	22
.1	93	70	-48	22

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	96	62	-35	30
.5	129	94	-63	32
.1	181	149	-118	31

Consequence: Iso 13 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	29	-18	11
.5	59	47	-35	11
.1	89	77	-66	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	46	-32	13
.1	89	75	-62	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	45	-32	13
.1	88	74	-61	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	27	-15	14
.5	60	44	-29	15
.1	87	71	-57	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	27	-15	14
.5	59	43	-29	15
.1	85	70	-56	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	46	-32	13
.1	89	75	-62	13

Consequence: Iso 13 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	29	-16	13
.5	61	47	-33	13
.1	91	77	-64	13

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	15
.5	62	46	-30	15
.1	91	75	-60	15

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	14
.5	61	45	-30	15
.1	90	74	-59	15

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	27	-13	16
.5	62	44	-28	17
.1	89	71	-54	17

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	27	-12	17
.5	62	43	-26	17

.1	88	70	-53	17
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Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	15
.5	62	46	-30	15
.1	91	75	-60	15

Consequence: Iso 13 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-4	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-19	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	39	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Consequence: Iso 13 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	29	-10	18
.5	66	47	-28	18
.1	96	77	-59	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	28	-10	19
.5	66	46	-26	19
.1	95	75	-56	19

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	28	-10	19
.5	65	45	-26	19
.1	94	74	-55	19

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	44	-22	22
.1	94	71	-49	22

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	43	-21	22
.1	93	70	-48	22

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	28	-10	19
.5	66	46	-26	19
.1	95	75	-56	19

Consequence: Iso 14 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20

.1	25	5	15	20
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Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	8	10
.5	13	3	7	10
.1	14	4	6	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	8	10
.5	13	3	7	10
.1	14	4	6	10

Consequence: Iso 14 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	3	36	40
.5	45	5	35	40
.1	47	7	33	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	26	6	13	20

Consequence: Iso 14 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	7	23	30
.5	40	10	20	30
.1	45	15	15	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	7	33	40
.5	50	10	30	40
.1	55	15	25	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	77	7	63	70
.5	80	10	60	70
.1	85	15	55	70

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	57	7	43	50
.5	60	10	40	50
.1	64	14	36	50

Consequence: Iso 14 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20

.1	25	5	15	20
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Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	18	20
.5	23	3	17	20
.1	25	5	15	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	8	10
.5	13	3	7	10
.1	14	4	6	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	8	10
.5	13	3	7	10
.1	14	4	6	10

Consequence: Iso 14 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	3	36	40
.5	45	5	35	40
.1	47	7	33	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	27	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	36	6	23	29

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	26	6	13	20

Consequence: Iso 14 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	7	23	30
.5	40	10	20	30
.1	45	15	15	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	7	33	40
.5	50	10	30	40
.1	55	15	25	40

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	77	7	63	70
.5	80	10	60	70
.1	85	15	55	70

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	57	7	43	50
.5	60	10	40	50
.1	64	14	36	50

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	36	27	-19	8
.5	53	44	-35	8
.1	82	73	-64	8

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	24	-16	9
.5	50	40	-30	9

.1	75	65	-56	9
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Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	26	-18	9
.5	53	42	-32	10
.1	81	69	-59	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	23	-15	10
.5	49	37	-27	11
.1	73	61	-50	11

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	25	-16	10
.5	52	39	-29	11
.1	76	64	-53	11

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	36	22	-14	11
.5	49	36	-25	11
.1	70	57	-46	11

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	29	-19	9
.5	57	47	-37	10
.1	88	77	-67	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	28	-18	10
.5	58	46	-34	11
.1	87	75	-64	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	28	-18	11
.5	58	45	-34	11
.1	87	74	-63	12

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	27	-17	12
.5	58	44	-32	13
.1	85	71	-59	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	27	-17	12
.5	57	43	-31	12
.1	83	70	-58	12

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	26	-17	12
.5	57	42	-30	13
.1	82	68	-55	13

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	9	-4	5
.5	21	15	-10	5
.1	31	26	-20	5

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	7	-3	5
.5	19	13	-7	5
.1	28	22	-16	6

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	15	8	-3	5
.5	21	14	-8	6
.1	30	24	-18	6

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	7	-1	6
.5	19	12	-6	6
.1	27	20	-13	7

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	16	8	-2	6
.5	21	13	-7	7
.1	29	22	-15	7

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	15	6	-1	6
.5	19	11	-5	6
.1	26	18	-12	6

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	29	-18	10
.5	58	47	-36	11

.1	88	77	-67	10
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Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	46	-32	13
.1	89	75	-62	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	28	-17	11
.5	58	45	-33	12
.1	87	74	-63	12

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	27	-16	13
.5	59	44	-30	14
.1	86	71	-57	14

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	27	-16	13
.5	58	43	-30	14
.1	85	70	-56	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	26	-16	13
.5	58	42	-29	14
.1	83	68	-54	14

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	36	27	-19	8
.5	53	44	-35	8
.1	82	73	-64	8

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	24	-16	9
.5	50	40	-30	9
.1	75	65	-56	9

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	26	-18	9
.5	53	42	-32	10
.1	81	69	-59	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	23	-15	10
.5	49	37	-27	11
.1	73	61	-50	11

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	25	-16	10
.5	52	39	-29	11
.1	76	64	-53	11

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	24	-16	9
.5	50	40	-30	9
.1	75	65	-56	9

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	29	-19	9
.5	57	47	-37	10
.1	88	77	-67	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	28	-18	10
.5	58	46	-34	11
.1	87	75	-64	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	28	-18	11
.5	58	45	-34	11
.1	87	74	-63	12

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	27	-17	12
.5	58	44	-32	13
.1	85	71	-59	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	27	-17	12
.5	57	43	-31	12
.1	83	70	-58	12

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	28	-18	10
.5	58	46	-34	11
.1	87	75	-64	11

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	9	-4	5
.5	21	15	-10	5
.1	31	26	-20	5

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	7	-3	5
.5	19	13	-7	5
.1	28	22	-16	6

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	15	8	-3	5
.5	21	14	-8	6
.1	30	24	-18	6

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	7	-1	6
.5	19	12	-6	6
.1	27	20	-13	7

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	16	8	-2	6
.5	21	13	-7	7
.1	29	22	-15	7

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	7	-3	5
.5	19	13	-7	5
.1	28	22	-16	6

Consequence: Iso 14 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	29	-18	10
.5	58	47	-36	11
.1	88	77	-67	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	46	-32	13
.1	89	75	-62	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	28	-17	11
.5	58	45	-33	12
.1	87	74	-63	12

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	27	-16	13
.5	59	44	-30	14
.1	86	71	-57	14

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	27	-16	13
.5	58	43	-30	14
.1	85	70	-56	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	46	-32	13
.1	89	75	-62	13

Consequence: Iso 15 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Consequence: Iso 15 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	7	9
.5	13	3	7	10
.1	15	5	5	10

Consequence: Iso 15 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	7	33	40
.5	49	9	31	40
.1	53	13	27	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	38	8	22	30
.1	41	11	19	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	6	44	50
.5	59	9	41	50
.1	63	13	37	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	38	8	22	30
.1	41	11	19	30

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	7	33	40
.5	49	9	31	40
.1	53	13	27	40

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	38	8	22	30
.1	41	11	19	30

Consequence: Iso 15 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	7	10
.1	13	3	6	10

Consequence: Iso 15 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	7	9
.5	13	3	7	10
.1	15	5	5	10

Consequence: Iso 15 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	7	33	40
.5	49	9	31	40
.1	53	13	27	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	38	8	22	30
.1	41	11	19	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	6	44	50
.5	59	9	41	50
.1	63	13	37	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	38	8	22	30
.1	41	11	19	30

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	7	33	40
.5	49	9	31	40
.1	53	13	27	40

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	5	25	30
.5	38	8	22	30
.1	41	11	19	30

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	18	-13	5
.5	36	30	-24	5
.1	56	50	-44	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	16	-11	5
.5	33	26	-20	6
.1	51	44	-38	6

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	17	-12	6
.5	36	29	-22	6
.1	54	47	-41	6

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	15	-10	6
.5	33	25	-18	7
.1	49	41	-34	7

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	16	-11	7
.5	35	26	-19	7
.1	51	43	-36	7

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	14	-9	7
.5	33	23	-17	8
.1	47	38	-31	7

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	22	-17	6
.5	44	37	-30	6
.1	67	61	-55	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	21	-15	6
.5	43	35	-28	7
.1	66	58	-51	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	30	22	-16	7
.5	44	35	-28	7
.1	66	58	-51	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	21	-14	8
.5	43	34	-26	8
.1	64	55	-46	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	21	-15	8
.5	43	33	-25	8
.1	64	54	-46	8

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	31	20	-14	8
.5	43	32	-24	9
.1	62	52	-44	9

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	3
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	14	-10	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	13	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	14	-10	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	30	23	-17	6
.5	45	38	-31	6
.1	69	62	-57	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	30	22	-16	7
.5	45	37	-29	7
.1	68	60	-53	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	22	-16	7
.5	45	36	-29	8
.1	68	60	-52	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	22	-15	8
.5	45	35	-27	9
.1	67	57	-48	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	22	-15	8
.5	45	34	-26	9
.1	66	56	-47	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	21	-15	8
.5	44	34	-25	9
.1	65	54	-46	9

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	18	-13	5
.5	36	30	-24	5
.1	56	50	-44	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	16	-11	5
.5	33	26	-20	6
.1	51	44	-38	6

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	17	-12	6
.5	36	29	-22	6
.1	54	47	-41	6

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	15	-10	6
.5	33	25	-18	7
.1	49	41	-34	7

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	25	16	-11	7
.5	35	26	-19	7
.1	51	43	-36	7

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	16	-11	5
.5	33	26	-20	6
.1	51	44	-38	6

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	27	21	-15	5
.5	41	34	-28	6
.1	64	57	-51	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	20	-14	6
.5	41	33	-26	7
.1	62	55	-48	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	20	-14	6
.5	41	33	-26	7
.1	62	54	-47	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	19	-13	7
.5	41	31	-24	8
.1	60	51	-43	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	19	-13	7
.5	40	31	-23	8
.1	60	51	-42	8

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	20	-14	6
.5	41	33	-26	7
.1	62	55	-48	7

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	3
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	14	-10	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	13	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	14	-10	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	14	-10	4

Consequence: Iso 15 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	21	-16	6
.5	42	35	-29	6
.1	65	59	-52	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	21	-15	6
.5	42	34	-27	7
.1	64	56	-49	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	21	-15	7
.5	42	34	-27	7
.1	64	56	-49	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	30	20	-14	8
.5	42	33	-25	8
.1	63	54	-45	9

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	30	20	-14	8
.5	42	32	-24	8
.1	62	52	-44	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	29	21	-15	6
.5	42	34	-27	7
.1	64	56	-49	7

Consequence: Iso 16 BLEVE Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Consequence: Iso 16 BLEVE No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	0	0	0	0
.5	0	0	0	0
.1	0	0	0	0

Consequence: Iso 16 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Consequence: Iso 16 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30

.1	38	8	21	29
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Consequence: Iso 16 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	61	12	37	49
.1	65	15	35	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	8	62	70
.5	82	12	58	70
.1	86	16	54	70

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	8	52	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	8	72	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	97	17	63	80

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	8	62	70
.5	82	12	58	70
.1	86	16	54	70

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	8	72	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	97	17	63	80

Consequence: Iso 16 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
0	0	0	0	0

Consequence: Iso 16 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	21	29

Consequence: Iso 16 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	61	12	37	49
.1	65	15	35	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	8	62	70
.5	82	12	58	70
.1	86	16	54	70

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	8	52	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	8	72	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	97	17	63	80

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	8	62	70
.5	82	12	58	70
.1	86	16	54	70

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	8	72	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	97	17	63	80

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	30	19	-10	10
.5	43	33	-22	10
.1	65	54	-44	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	19	-8	11
.5	43	31	-19	12

.1	63	51	-39	11
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Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	19	-9	11
.5	43	31	-20	11
.1	63	51	-40	11

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	18	-7	12
.5	43	29	-17	13
.1	62	48	-35	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	18	-8	12
.5	43	29	-17	12
.1	62	48	-35	13

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	17	-7	13
.5	43	28	-16	13
.1	60	46	-33	13

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	20	-8	12
.5	47	34	-21	13
.1	69	56	-43	12

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	20	-7	13
.5	47	33	-19	14
.1	68	54	-40	14

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	20	-7	13
.5	47	32	-18	14
.1	68	53	-39	14

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	19	-6	14
.5	47	31	-17	15
.1	67	51	-36	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	36	19	-6	15
.5	48	31	-16	16
.1	67	50	-34	16

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	19	-5	15
.5	47	30	-15	16
.1	65	49	-33	15

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-4	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-19	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	39	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	9	-2	9
.5	26	15	-7	9
.1	35	25	-16	9

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	21	-3	17
.5	52	34	-17	17

.1	75	57	-39	17
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Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	20	-3	18
.5	53	33	-15	19
.1	75	55	-36	19

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	20	-3	17
.5	52	33	-15	18
.1	73	54	-36	18

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	20	-1	20
.5	54	32	-12	20
.1	74	52	-31	21

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	20	-1	20
.5	53	31	-11	20
.1	73	51	-31	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	19	0	22
.5	55	31	-9	23
.1	74	50	-27	23

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	30	19	-10	10
.5	43	33	-22	10
.1	65	54	-44	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	19	-8	11
.5	43	31	-19	12
.1	63	51	-39	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	19	-9	11
.5	43	31	-20	11
.1	63	51	-40	11

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	18	-7	12
.5	43	29	-17	13
.1	62	48	-35	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	18	-8	12
.5	43	29	-17	12
.1	62	48	-35	13

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	19	-8	11
.5	43	31	-19	12
.1	63	51	-39	11

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	20	-8	12
.5	47	34	-21	13
.1	69	56	-43	12

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	20	-7	13
.5	47	33	-19	14
.1	68	54	-40	14

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	20	-7	13
.5	47	32	-18	14
.1	68	53	-39	14

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	19	-6	14
.5	47	31	-17	15
.1	67	51	-36	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	36	19	-6	15
.5	48	31	-16	16
.1	67	50	-34	16

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	35	20	-7	13
.5	47	33	-19	14
.1	68	54	-40	14

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-4	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-19	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	39	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Consequence: Iso 16 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	21	-3	17
.5	52	34	-17	17
.1	75	57	-39	17

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	20	-3	18
.5	53	33	-15	19
.1	75	55	-36	19

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	39	20	-3	17
.5	52	33	-15	18
.1	73	54	-36	18

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	20	-1	20
.5	54	32	-12	20
.1	74	52	-31	21

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	20	-1	20
.5	53	31	-11	20
.1	73	51	-31	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	20	-3	18
.5	53	33	-15	19
.1	75	55	-36	19

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 17 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	9	31	40
.5	53	13	27	40
.1	58	18	22	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	28	7	13	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	7	23	30
.5	40	10	20	30
.1	43	13	17	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	28	7	13	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	17	33	50
.5	75	25	25	50
.1	85	35	15	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	10	20	30
.5	45	15	15	30
.1	52	22	8	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	8	22	30
.5	42	12	18	30
.1	47	17	13	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	27	7	13	20
.5	30	10	10	20
.1	35	15	5	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	26	6	14	20
.5	29	9	11	20
.1	33	13	7	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	6	14	20
.5	29	9	11	20
.1	33	13	7	20

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	11	1	8	10
.5	12	2	8	10
.1	13	3	7	10

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	9	31	40
.5	53	13	27	40
.1	58	18	22	40

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	28	7	13	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	7	23	30
.5	40	10	20	30
.1	43	13	17	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	28	7	13	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	17	33	50
.5	75	25	25	50
.1	85	35	15	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	10	20	30
.5	45	15	15	30
.1	52	22	8	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	38	8	22	30
.5	42	12	18	30
.1	47	17	13	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	27	7	13	20
.5	30	10	10	20
.1	35	15	5	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	6	14	20
.5	29	9	11	20
.1	33	13	7	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	6	14	20
.5	29	9	11	20
.1	33	13	7	20

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	18	-13	5
.5	36	30	-24	5
.1	56	50	-44	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	16	-11	5
.5	33	26	-20	6
.1	50	44	-38	6

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	17	-12	6
.5	35	28	-22	6
.1	54	47	-41	6

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	15	-10	6
.5	33	25	-18	7
.1	48	41	-33	7

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	16	-11	7
.5	35	26	-19	7
.1	51	43	-35	7

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	14	-9	7
.5	32	23	-16	7
.1	46	38	-31	7

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	63	53	-45	8
.5	95	85	-76	9
.1	147	138	-130	8

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	59	48	-39	10
.5	88	77	-67	10
.1	136	125	-115	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	65	52	-42	11
.5	94	82	-71	11
.1	146	132	-122	12

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	62	47	-37	12
.5	88	73	-61	13
.1	132	118	-105	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	50	-39	13
.5	92	77	-64	14
.1	138	123	-110	13

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	62	45	-36	13
.5	87	70	-56	15
.1	127	111	-97	14

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	156	142	-130	12
.5	229	216	-203	13
.1	355	341	-328	13

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	147	130	-116	15
.5	217	197	-181	17
.1	327	312	-296	15

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	160	140	-123	18
.5	231	210	-193	19
.1	352	332	-312	19

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	153	127	-108	22
.5	215	190	-169	23
.1	320	299	-278	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	162	135	-115	23
.5	228	200	-176	26
.1	340	313	-290	25

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	154	124	-105	24
.5	214	184	-158	27
.1	313	285	-261	25

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	18	-13	5
.5	36	30	-24	5
.1	56	50	-44	6

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	16	-11	5
.5	33	26	-20	6
.1	50	44	-38	6

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	17	-12	6
.5	35	28	-22	6
.1	54	47	-41	6

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	15	-10	6
.5	33	25	-18	7
.1	48	41	-33	7

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	16	-11	7
.5	35	26	-19	7
.1	51	43	-35	7

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	14	-9	7
.5	32	23	-16	7
.1	46	38	-31	7

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	63	53	-45	8
.5	95	85	-76	9
.1	147	138	-130	8

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	59	48	-39	10
.5	88	77	-67	10
.1	136	125	-115	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	65	52	-42	11
.5	94	82	-71	11
.1	146	132	-122	12

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	62	47	-37	12
.5	88	73	-61	13
.1	132	118	-105	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	50	-39	13
.5	92	77	-64	14
.1	138	123	-110	13

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	62	45	-36	13
.5	87	70	-56	15
.1	127	111	-97	14

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-3	2
.5	13	10	-6	3
.1	20	17	-13	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	8	4	-1	3
.5	12	8	-4	3
.1	18	13	-9	4

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	5	-2	3
.5	13	9	-6	3
.1	19	15	-12	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	9	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-3	4
.1	17	12	-8	4

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	5	-1	4
.5	13	8	-4	4
.1	19	13	-9	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	10	4	0	4
.5	12	7	-2	5
.1	17	11	-7	5

Consequence: Iso 18 "idl poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	156	142	-130	12
.5	229	216	-203	13
.1	355	341	-328	13

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	147	130	-116	15
.5	217	197	-181	17
.1	327	312	-296	15

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	160	140	-123	18
.5	231	210	-193	19
.1	352	332	-312	19

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	153	127	-108	22
.5	215	190	-169	23
.1	320	299	-278	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	162	135	-115	23
.5	228	200	-176	26
.1	340	313	-290	25

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	154	124	-105	24
.5	214	184	-158	27
.1	313	285	-261	25

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	32	2	28	30
.5	33	3	26	30
.1	35	5	25	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	75	5	65	70
.1	81	6	69	75
.5	78	8	62	70

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	43	50
.1	59	9	41	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	47	50
.5	56	6	44	50
.1	58	8	42	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	43	50
.1	59	9	41	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	5	35	40
.5	47	7	33	40
.1	49	9	31	40

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	5	35	40
.5	47	7	33	40
.1	49	9	31	40

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	215	25	165	190
.5	227	37	153	190
.1	242	52	138	190

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	12	108	120
.5	140	20	100	120
.1	146	26	94	120

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	122	12	98	110
.5	128	18	92	110
.1	135	25	85	110

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	102	12	78	90
.5	108	18	72	90
.1	115	25	65	90

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	100	10	80	90
.5	106	16	74	90
.1	111	21	69	90

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	81	11	59	70
.5	88	18	52	70

.1	95	25	45	70
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Consequence: Iso 18 "op" late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	32	2	28	30
.5	33	3	26	30
.1	35	5	25	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	7	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	16	6	4	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	26	6	14	20

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	75	5	65	70
.1	81	6	69	75
.5	78	8	62	70

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	43	50
.1	59	9	41	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	53	3	47	50
.5	56	6	44	50
.1	58	8	42	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	43	50
.1	59	9	41	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	5	35	40
.5	47	7	33	40
.1	49	9	31	40

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	5	35	40
.5	47	7	33	40
.1	49	9	31	40

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	215	25	165	190
.5	227	37	153	190
.1	242	52	138	190

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	12	108	120
.5	140	20	100	120
.1	146	26	94	120

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	122	12	98	110
.5	128	18	92	110
.1	135	25	85	110

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	102	12	78	90
.5	108	18	72	90
.1	115	25	65	90

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	100	10	80	90
.5	106	16	74	90

.1	111	21	69	90
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Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	81	11	59	70
.5	88	18	52	70
.1	95	25	45	70

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	36	-24	11
.5	69	58	-46	11
.1	107	95	-84	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	32	-20	13
.5	66	52	-39	13
.1	99	85	-72	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	35	-22	13
.5	70	56	-42	14
.1	105	91	-77	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	31	-18	14
.5	66	49	-34	15
.1	96	80	-65	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	33	-20	15
.5	69	52	-36	16
.1	100	84	-68	16

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	29	-17	15
.5	65	47	-32	16
.1	93	75	-59	16

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	126	106	-87	19
.5	183	163	-144	19
.1	278	260	-242	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	97	-77	21
.5	173	150	-128	22
.1	259	237	-216	21

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	129	104	-82	23
.5	184	159	-136	24
.1	275	253	-230	22

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	123	95	-72	25
.5	173	144	-117	27
.1	253	226	-203	25

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	100	-76	28
.5	182	151	-123	29
.1	268	237	-210	28

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	125	92	-69	28
.5	170	139	-111	29
.1	245	215	-189	28

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-12	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-5	7
.5	27	19	-11	7
.1	40	32	-24	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8

.1	36	27	-19	8
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Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	10	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	38	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	9	-2	9
.5	26	15	-7	9
.1	35	25	-16	9

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	311	281	-254	28
.5	441	412	-384	28
.1	659	635	-608	25

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	295	259	-227	33
.5	416	380	-347	34
.1	616	581	-546	34

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	316	278	-243	36
.5	443	405	-370	36
.1	660	622	-585	37

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	302	254	-214	43
.5	417	371	-328	44
.1	611	564	-520	45

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	324	270	-225	49
.5	443	390	-341	50
.1	644	596	-548	47

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	307	249	-205	51
.5	415	359	-307	54
.1	594	545	-496	49

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	36	-24	11
.5	69	58	-46	11
.1	107	95	-84	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	32	-20	13
.5	66	52	-39	13
.1	99	85	-72	13

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	35	-22	13
.5	70	56	-42	14
.1	105	91	-77	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	31	-18	14
.5	66	49	-34	15
.1	96	80	-65	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	33	-20	15
.5	69	52	-36	16
.1	100	84	-68	16

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	29	-17	15
.5	65	47	-32	16
.1	93	75	-59	16

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	126	106	-87	19
.5	183	163	-144	19
.1	278	260	-242	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	97	-77	21
.5	173	150	-128	22
.1	259	237	-216	21

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	129	104	-82	23
.5	184	159	-136	24

.1	275	253	-230	22
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Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	123	95	-72	25
.5	173	144	-117	27
.1	253	226	-203	25

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	100	-76	28
.5	182	151	-123	29
.1	268	237	-210	28

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	125	92	-69	28
.5	170	139	-111	29
.1	245	215	-189	28

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-12	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	17	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-5	7
.5	27	19	-11	7
.1	40	32	-24	7

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-3	8
.5	25	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-19	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	10	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	38	29	-20	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	9	-2	9
.5	26	15	-7	9
.1	35	25	-16	9

Consequence: Iso 18 "op" poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	311	281	-254	28
.5	441	412	-384	28
.1	659	635	-608	25

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	295	259	-227	33
.5	416	380	-347	34
.1	616	581	-546	34

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	316	278	-243	36
.5	443	405	-370	36
.1	660	622	-585	37

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	302	254	-214	43
.5	417	371	-328	44
.1	611	564	-520	45

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	324	270	-225	49
.5	443	390	-341	50
.1	644	596	-548	47

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	307	249	-205	51
.5	415	359	-307	54
.1	594	545	-496	49

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10

.1	22	15	-1	10
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Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Consequence: Iso 2 jetfi No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Consequence: Iso 2 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Consequence: Iso 2 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	112	21	69	90
.5	122	32	57	89
.1	135	45	45	90

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	21	89	110
.5	141	31	79	110
.1	153	43	66	109

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	112	21	69	90
.5	122	32	57	89
.1	135	45	45	90

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	21	89	110
.5	141	31	79	110
.1	153	43	66	109

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	21	89	110
.5	141	31	79	110
.1	153	43	66	109

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	20	99	119
.5	149	29	90	119
.1	161	41	79	120

Consequence: Iso 2 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Consequence: Iso 2 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	111	21	68	89
.5	122	32	58	90
.1	135	45	44	89

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	140	30	80	110
.1	152	42	67	109

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	111	21	68	89
.5	122	32	58	90
.1	135	45	44	89

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	140	30	80	110
.1	152	42	67	109

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	140	30	80	110
.1	152	42	67	109

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	20	100	120
.5	149	29	90	119
.1	161	41	79	120

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	3	1	10
.5	21	7	0	10
.1	22	15	-1	10

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31

.1	68	46	-3	32
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Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	31
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	47	-3	32

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	10	2	32
.5	63	23	0	31
.1	68	46	-3	32

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	2	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	5	0	3

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	5	0	3	4
.5	6	2	0	3
.1	7	4	0	3

Consequence: Iso 3 jetfi No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	66	-1	85
.1	187	131	-9	89

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	172	63	-1	85
.1	186	125	-9	88

Consequence: Iso 3 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	41	49
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	67	17	33	50

Consequence: Iso 3 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	112	21	69	90
.5	122	32	57	89
.1	135	45	45	90

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	21	89	110
.5	141	31	79	110
.1	153	43	66	109

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	112	21	69	90
.5	122	32	57	89
.1	135	45	45	90

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	21	89	110
.5	141	31	79	110
.1	153	43	66	109

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	21	89	110
.5	141	31	79	110
.1	153	43	66	109

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	20	99	119
.5	149	29	90	119
.1	161	41	79	120

Consequence: Iso 3 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	58	8	42	50
.5	62	12	38	50
.1	73	20	33	53

Consequence: Iso 3 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	111	21	68	89
.5	122	32	58	90
.1	135	45	44	89

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	140	30	80	110
.1	152	42	67	109

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	111	21	68	89
.5	122	32	58	90
.1	135	45	44	89

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	140	30	80	110
.1	152	42	67	109

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	130	20	90	110
.5	140	30	80	110
.1	152	42	67	109

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	20	100	120
.5	149	29	90	119
.1	161	41	79	120

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	36
.5	71	27	0	35
.1	77	54	-4	36

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	35
.5	71	26	0	35
.1	76	52	-4	36

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	36
.5	71	27	0	35
.1	77	54	-4	36

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	35
.5	71	26	0	35
.1	76	52	-4	36

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	36
.5	71	27	0	35
.1	77	54	-4	36

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	35
.5	71	26	0	35
.1	76	52	-4	36

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	4

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	4

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	3

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	74	-1	96
.1	211	147	-12	99

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	71	-1	96
.1	210	141	-11	99

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	74	-1	96
.1	211	147	-12	99

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	71	-1	96
.1	210	141	-11	99

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	74	-1	96
.1	211	147	-12	99

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	71	-1	96
.1	210	141	-11	99

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	3	1	12
.5	23	8	0	11
.1	25	17	-1	11

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	36
.5	71	27	0	35
.1	77	54	-4	36

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	35
.5	71	26	0	35
.1	76	52	-4	36

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	36
.5	71	27	0	35
.1	77	54	-4	36

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	35
.5	71	26	0	35
.1	76	52	-4	36

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	36
.5	71	27	0	35
.1	77	54	-4	36

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	11	2	35
.5	71	26	0	35
.1	76	52	-4	36

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	4

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	3

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	4

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	3

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	4

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	6	0	2	4
.5	7	2	0	4
.1	8	5	0	3

Consequence: Iso 4 jetfi No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	74	-1	96
.1	211	147	-12	99

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	71	-1	96
.1	210	141	-11	99

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	74	-1	96
.1	211	147	-12	99

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	71	-1	96
.1	210	141	-11	99

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	74	-1	96
.1	211	147	-12	99

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	194	71	-1	96
.1	210	141	-11	99

Consequence: Iso 4 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	23	3	16	19
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	16	19
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	16	19
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	16	19
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	7	10
.5	13	3	6	9
.1	15	5	4	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	7	10
.5	13	3	6	9
.1	15	5	4	10

Consequence: Iso 4 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	11	38	49
.5	67	17	33	50
.1	74	24	26	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	83	23	37	60

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	11	38	49
.5	67	17	33	50
.1	74	24	26	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	83	23	37	60

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	83	23	37	60

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	83	23	37	60

Consequence: Iso 4 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	118	28	62	90
.5	131	41	49	90
.1	148	58	31	89

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	138	28	82	110
.5	151	41	68	109
.1	168	58	51	109

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	118	28	62	90
.5	131	41	49	90
.1	148	58	31	89

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	147	27	92	119
.5	168	45	78	123
.1	178	58	61	119

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	147	27	92	119
.5	168	45	78	123
.1	178	58	61	119

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	158	28	102	130
.5	171	41	88	129

.1	187	57	73	130
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Consequence: Iso 4 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	3	17	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	8	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	9

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	12	2	8	10
.5	14	4	6	10
.1	15	5	4	9

Consequence: Iso 4 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	11	38	50
.5	67	17	32	50
.1	74	24	25	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	82	22	38	60

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	61	11	38	50
.5	67	17	32	50
.1	74	24	25	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	82	22	38	60

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	82	22	38	60

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	71	11	49	60
.5	76	16	44	60
.1	82	22	38	60

Consequence: Iso 4 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	118	28	62	90
.5	130	40	49	89
.1	148	58	32	90

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	137	27	82	109
.5	151	41	68	109
.1	167	58	51	109

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	118	28	62	90
.5	130	40	49	89
.1	148	58	32	90

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	147	27	92	119
.5	162	42	78	120
.1	178	58	61	119

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	147	27	92	119
.5	162	42	78	120

.1	178	58	61	119
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Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	158	28	102	130
.5	171	41	89	130
.1	187	57	73	130

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	8	2	24
.5	47	18	0	23
.1	51	36	-3	24

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	7	2	24
.5	47	17	0	23
.1	51	35	-3	24

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	8	2	24
.5	47	18	0	23
.1	51	36	-3	24

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	7	2	24
.5	47	17	0	23
.1	51	35	-3	24

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	8	2	24
.5	47	18	0	23
.1	51	36	-3	24

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	7	2	24
.5	47	17	0	23
.1	51	35	-3	24

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	141	8	3	72
.5	144	56	-1	71
.1	157	111	-9	73

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	8	3	72
.5	144	53	-1	71
.1	155	106	-9	73

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	141	8	3	72
.5	144	56	-1	71
.1	157	111	-9	73

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	8	3	72
.5	144	53	-1	71
.1	155	106	-9	73

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	141	8	3	72
.5	144	56	-1	71
.1	157	111	-9	73

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	8	3	72
.5	144	53	-1	71
.1	155	106	-9	73

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	12	-1	8

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	11	-1	8

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	12	-1	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8

.1	17	11	-1	8
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Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	12	-1	8

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	11	-1	8

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	392	153	-5	193
.1	428	299	-24	201

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	393	144	-3	194
.1	427	285	-22	202

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	392	153	-5	193
.1	428	299	-24	201

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	393	144	-3	194
.1	427	285	-22	202

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	392	153	-5	193
.1	428	299	-24	201

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	393	144	-3	194
.1	427	285	-22	202

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	8	2	24
.5	47	18	0	23

.1	51	36	-3	24
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Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	7	2	24
.5	47	17	0	23
.1	51	35	-3	24

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	8	2	24
.5	47	18	0	23
.1	51	36	-3	24

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	7	2	24
.5	47	17	0	23
.1	51	35	-3	24

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	8	2	24
.5	47	18	0	23
.1	51	36	-3	24

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	7	2	24
.5	47	17	0	23
.1	51	35	-3	24

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	141	8	3	72
.5	144	56	-1	71
.1	157	111	-9	73

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	8	3	72
.5	144	53	-1	71
.1	155	106	-9	73

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	141	8	3	72
.5	144	56	-1	71
.1	157	111	-9	73

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	8	3	72
.5	144	53	-1	71
.1	155	106	-9	73

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	141	8	3	72
.5	144	56	-1	71
.1	157	111	-9	73

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	140	8	3	72
.5	144	53	-1	71
.1	155	106	-9	73

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	12	-1	8

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	11	-1	8

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	12	-1	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	11	-1	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	12	-1	8

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	14	2	1	8
.5	16	5	0	8
.1	17	11	-1	8

Consequence: Iso 5 jetfi No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	392	153	-5	193
.1	428	299	-24	201

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	393	144	-3	194
.1	427	285	-22	202

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	392	153	-5	193
.1	428	299	-24	201

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	393	144	-3	194
.1	427	285	-22	202

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	392	153	-5	193
.1	428	299	-24	201

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	393	144	-3	194
.1	427	285	-22	202

Consequence: Iso 5 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	42	49
.1	60	10	40	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	42	49
.1	60	10	40	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	42	49
.1	60	10	40	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	42	49
.1	60	10	40	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	35	39
.5	46	6	33	39
.1	49	9	31	40

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	35	39
.5	46	6	33	39
.1	49	9	31	40

Consequence: Iso 5 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	248	19	210	229
.5	258	28	201	229
.1	269	39	191	230

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
.5	255	25	205	230
1	267	26	214	240
.1	265	35	195	230

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	259	18	222	240
.5	269	29	211	240
.1	279	39	201	240

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	256	17	222	239
.5	265	25	215	240
.1	275	35	204	239

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	256	17	222	239
.5	265	25	215	240
.1	275	35	204	239

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	267	17	233	250
.5	275	25	225	250
.1	285	35	215	250

Consequence: Iso 5 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	535	57	421	478
.5	565	85	395	480
.1	599	119	361	480

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	541	50	440	490
.5	567	77	413	490
.1	597	107	382	489

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	556	52	452	504
.5	591	83	425	508
.1	628	118	392	510

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	601	50	500	550
.5	626	76	473	549
.1	654	105	443	548

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	631	51	528	579
.5	656	77	502	579
.1	687	106	474	580

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	651	50	551	601
.5	676	76	524	600
.1	705	104	496	600

Consequence: Iso 5 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	42	49
.1	60	10	40	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	56	6	43	49
.1	59	9	41	50

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	57	7	42	49
.1	60	10	40	50

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	55	5	45	50
.5	56	6	43	49
.1	59	9	41	50

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	33	39
.1	48	8	31	39

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	33	39
.1	48	8	31	39

Consequence: Iso 5 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	249	19	210	229
.5	258	28	201	229
.1	269	39	190	229

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	247	16	214	230
.5	254	24	205	229
.1	265	35	195	230

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	259	19	221	240
.5	268	28	211	239
.1	278	38	202	240

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	256	16	223	239
.5	265	25	215	240
.1	274	34	205	239

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	256	16	223	239
.5	265	25	215	240
.1	274	34	205	239

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	268	17	233	250
.5	276	25	225	250
.1	285	35	215	250

Consequence: Iso 5 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	497	57	382	439
.5	524	85	353	438
.1	555	115	325	440

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	502	51	400	451
.5	528	78	372	450
.1	555	106	342	448

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	518	56	405	461
.5	545	85	375	460
.1	575	115	345	460

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	559	49	460	509
.5	583	73	436	509
.1	610	100	409	509

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	571	50	471	521
.5	584	75	433	508
.1	625	106	413	519

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	591	51	488	539
.5	615	75	464	539
.1	642	103	435	538

Consequence: Iso 6 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Consequence: Iso 6 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	6	44	50
.5	58	8	42	50
.1	62	12	38	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	77	7	63	70
.5	80	10	60	70
.1	83	13	57	70

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	66	6	54	60
.5	68	8	52	60
.1	72	12	48	60

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	77	7	63	70
.5	80	10	60	70
.1	83	13	57	70

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	57	7	43	50
.5	60	10	40	50
.1	64	14	36	50

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	7	53	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Consequence: Iso 6 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	11	109	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	11	109	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Consequence: Iso 6 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	25	5	15	20
.1	27	7	13	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	10
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Consequence: Iso 6 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	6	44	50
.5	58	8	42	50
.1	62	12	38	50

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	77	7	63	70
.5	80	10	60	70
.1	83	13	57	70

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	66	6	54	60
.5	68	8	52	60
.1	72	12	48	60

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	77	7	63	70
.5	80	10	60	70
.1	83	13	57	70

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	57	7	43	50
.5	60	10	40	50
.1	64	14	36	50

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	67	7	53	60
.5	70	10	50	60
.1	74	14	46	60

Consequence: Iso 6 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	11	109	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	125	15	95	110
.1	132	22	88	110

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	131	11	109	120
.5	137	17	103	120
.1	143	23	97	120

Consequence: Iso 6 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	29	-13	15
.5	63	47	-31	16
.1	93	77	-62	15

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	28	-12	16
.5	63	46	-29	17
.1	93	75	-58	17

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	28	-12	16
.5	63	45	-28	17
.1	92	74	-57	17

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	27	-10	19
.5	65	44	-25	19
.1	92	71	-52	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	27	-10	19
.5	64	43	-24	20
.1	90	70	-51	19

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	50	26	-9	20
.5	65	42	-22	21
.1	90	68	-47	21

Consequence: Iso 6 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	97	70	-43	26
.5	138	110	-82	27
.1	204	176	-151	26

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	98	67	-39	29
.5	135	105	-76	29
.1	198	169	-140	28

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	101	69	-40	30
.5	138	107	-77	30
.1	201	172	-143	29

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	102	65	-34	33
.5	137	101	-67	34
.1	196	160	-128	34

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	104	66	-35	34
.5	138	102	-68	35
.1	197	162	-129	34

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	103	64	-33	34
.5	136	97	-62	36
.1	191	154	-117	37

Consequence: Iso 6 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	14	-5	9
.5	33	23	-14	9
.1	49	39	-29	9

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	11	-2	10
.5	31	19	-9	11
.1	44	32	-21	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	13	-4	10
.5	33	22	-11	10
.1	47	36	-26	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	10	0	11
.5	30	18	-6	12
.1	42	29	-17	12

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	11	0	12
.5	33	19	-7	13
.1	45	32	-19	13

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	9	2	14
.5	31	16	-2	14
.1	41	26	-12	14

Consequence: Iso 6 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	110	72	-36	36
.5	151	113	-76	37
.1	219	183	-146	36

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	111	71	-33	39
.5	152	111	-71	40
.1	217	178	-139	39

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	112	71	-33	39
.5	151	111	-71	40
.1	217	178	-139	39

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	118	69	-26	46
.5	156	107	-60	47
.1	217	169	-125	46

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	115	69	-30	42
.5	152	106	-63	44
.1	212	169	-127	42

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	68	-25	47
.5	155	103	-55	49
.1	213	162	-115	49

Consequence: Iso 6 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m

1	45	29	-13	15
.5	63	47	-31	16
.1	93	77	-62	15

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	28	-12	16
.5	63	46	-29	17
.1	93	75	-58	17

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	28	-12	16
.5	63	45	-28	17
.1	92	74	-57	17

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	27	-10	19
.5	65	44	-25	19
.1	92	71	-52	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	49	27	-10	19
.5	64	43	-24	20
.1	90	70	-51	19

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	28	-12	16
.5	63	46	-29	17
.1	93	75	-58	17

Consequence: Iso 6 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	96	69	-42	27
.5	135	108	-81	27
.1	201	174	-148	26

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	96	66	-38	29
.5	134	103	-74	30
.1	195	166	-138	28

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	99	67	-39	29
.5	137	105	-75	30
.1	200	169	-139	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	100	64	-34	33
.5	136	99	-65	35
.1	195	158	-124	35

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	103	65	-34	34
.5	137	100	-66	35
.1	196	159	-125	35

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	96	66	-38	29
.5	134	103	-74	30
.1	195	166	-138	28

Consequence: Iso 6 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	14	-5	9
.5	33	23	-14	9
.1	49	39	-29	9

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	11	-2	10
.5	31	19	-9	11
.1	44	32	-21	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	13	-4	10
.5	33	22	-11	10
.1	47	36	-26	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	10	0	11
.5	30	18	-6	12
.1	42	29	-17	12

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	11	0	12
.5	33	19	-7	13
.1	45	32	-19	13

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	11	-2	10
.5	31	19	-9	11

.1	44	32	-21	11
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Consequence: Iso 6 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	108	71	-35	36
.5	149	112	-75	36
.1	216	178	-144	36

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	110	69	-32	39
.5	149	109	-70	39
.1	213	175	-136	38

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	111	70	-32	39
.5	149	109	-70	39
.1	213	175	-136	38

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	116	68	-25	45
.5	153	105	-59	46
.1	215	167	-121	47

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	114	68	-29	42
.5	149	104	-62	43
.1	210	166	-123	43

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	110	69	-32	39
.5	149	109	-70	39
.1	213	175	-136	38

Consequence: Iso 7 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Consequence: Iso 7 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	32	40

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	32	40

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30

.1	38	8	22	30
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Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Consequence: Iso 7 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	82	90
.5	102	12	78	90
.1	107	17	73	90

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	7	63	70
.5	81	11	59	70
.1	85	15	55	70

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	82	90
.5	102	12	78	90
.1	107	17	73	90

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	82	90
.5	102	12	78	90
.1	107	17	73	90

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	7	73	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	96	16	64	80

Consequence: Iso 7 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	22	2	17	20
.5	24	4	16	20
.1	25	5	14	20

Consequence: Iso 7 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40
.1	48	8	32	40

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	33	3	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	4	36	40
.5	46	6	34	40

.1	48	8	32	40
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Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	36	6	24	30
.1	38	8	22	30

Consequence: Iso 7 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	82	90
.5	102	12	78	90
.1	107	17	73	90

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	7	63	70
.5	81	11	59	70
.1	85	15	55	70

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	82	90
.5	102	12	78	90
.1	107	17	73	90

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	98	8	82	90
.5	102	12	78	90
.1	107	17	73	90

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	7	73	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	96	16	64	80

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	29	-18	11
.5	59	47	-35	11
.1	89	77	-66	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	28	-17	12
.5	59	46	-33	13
.1	88	75	-63	12

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	45	-32	13
.1	88	74	-61	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	27	-15	14
.5	60	44	-30	14
.1	87	71	-57	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	27	-15	14
.5	59	43	-29	14
.1	85	70	-56	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	26	-15	15
.5	59	42	-28	15
.1	85	68	-53	15

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	29	-15	14
.5	62	47	-32	14
.1	91	77	-63	14

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	15
.5	62	46	-30	15
.1	91	75	-60	15

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	28	-14	15
.5	62	45	-29	16

.1	90	74	-59	15
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Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	27	-13	16
.5	62	44	-28	17
.1	89	71	-54	17

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	27	-12	17
.5	62	43	-26	17
.1	88	70	-53	17

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	26	-12	17
.5	62	42	-25	18
.1	87	68	-51	17

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	18	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-5	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-2	8
.5	26	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-18	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	38	29	-20	8

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	9	-2	9
.5	26	15	-7	9
.1	35	25	-16	9

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	29	-12	17
.5	65	47	-29	18
.1	95	77	-60	17

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	28	-11	17
.5	65	46	-27	18
.1	94	75	-57	18

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	28	-11	18
.5	65	45	-27	18
.1	93	74	-56	18

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	44	-22	22
.1	94	71	-49	22

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	43	-21	22
.1	93	70	-48	22

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	26	-8	21
.5	66	42	-21	22
.1	91	68	-46	22

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	40	29	-18	11
.5	59	47	-35	11
.1	89	77	-66	11

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	28	-17	12
.5	59	46	-33	13

.1	88	75	-63	12
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Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	42	28	-16	12
.5	59	45	-32	13
.1	88	74	-61	13

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	27	-15	14
.5	60	44	-30	14
.1	87	71	-57	15

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	27	-15	14
.5	59	43	-29	14
.1	85	70	-56	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	41	28	-17	12
.5	59	46	-33	13
.1	88	75	-63	12

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	29	-15	14
.5	62	47	-32	14
.1	91	77	-63	14

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	15
.5	62	46	-30	15
.1	91	75	-60	15

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	28	-14	15
.5	62	45	-29	16
.1	90	74	-59	15

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	27	-13	16
.5	62	44	-28	17
.1	89	71	-54	17

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	46	27	-12	17
.5	62	43	-26	17
.1	88	70	-53	17

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	44	28	-14	15
.5	62	46	-30	15
.1	91	75	-60	15

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	12	-5	7
.5	28	20	-13	7
.1	42	34	-26	7

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	18	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	20	11	-5	7
.5	28	19	-11	8
.1	40	32	-24	8

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	19	10	-2	8
.5	26	16	-8	8
.1	36	27	-18	8

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	21	11	-3	8
.5	27	18	-9	9
.1	38	29	-20	8

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	18	10	-4	7
.5	25	18	-10	7
.1	37	29	-22	7

Consequence: Iso 7 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	29	-12	17
.5	65	47	-29	18

.1	95	77	-60	17
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Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	28	-11	17
.5	65	46	-27	18
.1	94	75	-57	18

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	48	28	-11	18
.5	65	45	-27	18
.1	93	74	-56	18

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	44	-22	22
.1	94	71	-49	22

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	43	-21	22
.1	93	70	-48	22

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	28	-11	17
.5	65	46	-27	18
.1	94	75	-57	18

Consequence: Iso 8 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Consequence: Iso 8 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	82	12	58	70
.5	88	18	52	70
.1	95	25	45	70

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	122	12	97	109
.5	127	17	92	109
.1	135	25	85	110

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	92	12	68	80
.5	98	18	62	80
.1	105	25	55	80

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	12	107	119
.5	138	18	102	120
.1	145	25	95	120

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	92	12	68	80
.5	98	18	62	80
.1	105	25	55	80

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	12	107	119
.5	138	18	102	120
.1	145	25	95	120

Consequence: Iso 8 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	195	-15	225	210
1	183	23	137	160
.1	210	50	110	160

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	203	23	157	180
.5	215	35	145	180
.1	228	48	132	180

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	195	-15	225	210
1	183	23	137	160
.1	210	50	110	160

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	225	25	175	200
.5	236	36	164	200
.1	250	50	150	200

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	193	23	147	170
.5	207	37	133	170
.1	220	50	120	170

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	244	24	196	220
.5	257	47	163	210
.1	270	50	170	220

Consequence: Iso 8 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	34	4	26	30
.5	35	5	25	30
.1	37	7	23	30

Consequence: Iso 8 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	82	12	58	70
.5	88	18	52	70
.1	95	25	45	70

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	122	12	97	109
.5	127	17	92	109
.1	135	25	85	110

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	92	12	68	80
.5	98	18	62	80
.1	105	25	55	80

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	12	107	119
.5	138	18	102	120
.1	145	25	95	120

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	92	12	68	80
.5	98	18	62	80
.1	105	25	55	80

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	132	12	107	119
.5	138	18	102	120
.1	145	25	95	120

Consequence: Iso 8 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
.5	195	-15	225	210
1	183	23	137	160
.1	210	50	110	160

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	203	23	157	180
.5	215	35	145	180
.1	228	48	132	180

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
.5	195	-15	225	210
1	183	23	137	160
.1	210	50	110	160

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	225	25	175	200
.5	236	36	164	200
.1	250	50	150	200

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	193	23	147	170
.5	207	37	133	170
.1	220	50	120	170

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	244	24	196	220
.5	257	47	163	210
.1	270	50	170	220

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	72	38	-5	33
.5	95	61	-28	33
.1	134	101	-67	33

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	28	9	39
.5	87	46	-7	40
.1	117	76	-37	40

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	74	36	-2	35
.5	95	58	-22	36
.1	132	95	-59	36

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	73	25	17	45
.5	87	40	4	46
.1	113	66	-20	46

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	80	31	12	46
.5	97	49	-3	47
.1	126	79	-33	46

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	73	21	25	49
.5	85	34	15	50
.1	106	55	-5	50

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	175	114	-53	60
.5	236	175	-113	61
.1	338	277	-216	61

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	167	97	-31	67
.5	219	151	-83	68
.1	308	239	-169	69

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	173	111	-53	60
.5	232	170	-109	61
.1	329	270	-210	59

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	171	94	-23	73
.5	221	142	-67	76
.1	301	224	-151	74

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	188	104	-28	80
.5	239	157	-77	80
.1	329	246	-166	81

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	174	89	-14	80
.5	218	134	-54	81
.1	293	209	-128	82

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	9	7	17
.5	35	16	1	18
.1	46	28	-9	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	3	18	22
.5	29	6	16	23
.1	33	10	12	23

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	9	8	18
.5	34	15	3	19
.1	44	25	-6	19

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	1	26	28
.5	32	3	25	28
.1	34	5	23	29

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	4	27	32
.5	40	7	24	32
.1	45	12	19	32

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	43	0	41	42
.5	45	1	41	43
.1	46	2	41	43

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	204	123	-44	79
.5	270	189	-107	81
.1	380	299	-218	80

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	216	118	-24	96
.5	278	181	-85	96
.1	382	285	-188	97

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	215	122	-32	91
.5	277	185	-95	91
.1	384	292	-202	91

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	223	116	-15	103
.5	282	174	-70	105
.1	379	274	-170	104

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	228	118	-15	106
.5	285	177	-71	107
.1	383	278	-172	105

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	226	113	-11	107
.5	279	168	-61	109
.1	371	262	-155	108

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	72	38	-5	33
.5	95	61	-28	33
.1	134	101	-67	33

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	28	9	39
.5	87	46	-7	40
.1	117	76	-37	40

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	74	36	-2	35
.5	95	58	-22	36
.1	132	95	-59	36

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	73	25	17	45
.5	87	40	4	46
.1	113	66	-20	46

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	80	31	12	46
.5	97	49	-3	47
.1	126	79	-33	46

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	69	28	9	39
.5	87	46	-7	40
.1	117	76	-37	40

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	174	113	-53	60
.5	235	174	-113	61
.1	337	276	-215	60

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	166	97	-31	67
.5	219	150	-83	68
.1	307	238	-169	69

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	174	111	-52	61
.5	232	169	-109	61
.1	328	269	-209	59

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	171	93	-22	74
.5	220	142	-67	76
.1	300	224	-151	74

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	187	103	-28	79
.5	240	156	-75	82
.1	328	245	-165	81

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	166	97	-31	67
.5	219	150	-83	68
.1	307	238	-169	69

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	9	7	17
.5	35	16	1	18
.1	46	28	-9	18

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	3	18	22
.5	29	6	16	23
.1	33	10	12	23

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	28	9	8	18
.5	34	15	3	19
.1	44	25	-6	19

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	31	1	26	28
.5	32	3	25	28
.1	34	5	23	29

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	37	4	27	32
.5	40	7	24	32
.1	45	12	19	32

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	3	18	22
.5	29	6	16	23
.1	33	10	12	23

Consequence: Iso 8 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	204	123	-43	80
.5	269	188	-107	81
.1	378	298	-217	80

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	215	117	-23	95
.5	277	180	-85	96
.1	381	284	-187	96

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	214	121	-32	91
.5	276	184	-94	90
.1	383	290	-201	90

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	223	115	-14	104
.5	281	174	-70	105
.1	377	273	-169	103

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	227	117	-15	105
.5	284	176	-71	106
.1	382	276	-171	105

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	215	117	-23	95
.5	277	180	-85	96
.1	381	284	-187	96

Consequence: Iso 9 late Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Consequence: Iso 9 late Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	97	7	83	90
.5	100	10	80	90
.1	105	15	75	90

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	124	14	96	110
.1	130	20	90	110

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	97	7	83	90
.5	100	10	80	90
.1	105	15	75	90

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	8	72	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	97	17	63	80

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	8	62	70
.5	82	12	58	70
.1	86	16	54	70

Consequence: Iso 9 late Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	288	18	252	270
.5	298	28	242	270
.1	310	40	230	270

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	244	24	196	220
.5	257	37	183	220
.1	270	50	170	220

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	205	15	175	190
.5	212	22	168	190
.1	220	30	160	190

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	195	15	165	180
.5	200	20	160	180
.1	210	30	150	180

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	150	11	128	139
.5	158	18	122	140
.1	165	25	115	140

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	152	12	128	140
.5	160	20	120	140
.1	168	28	112	140

Consequence: Iso 9 late No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	24	4	16	20
.5	26	6	14	20
.1	28	8	12	20

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	13	3	6	9
.5	15	5	5	10
.1	17	7	3	10

Consequence: Iso 9 late No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	97	7	83	90
.5	100	10	80	90
.1	105	15	75	90

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	120	10	100	110
.5	124	14	96	110
.1	130	20	90	110

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	97	7	83	90
.5	100	10	80	90
.1	105	15	75	90

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	88	8	72	80
.5	92	12	68	80
.1	97	17	63	80

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	68	7	53	60
.5	71	11	49	60
.1	75	15	45	60

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	78	8	62	70
.5	82	12	58	70
.1	86	16	54	70

Consequence: Iso 9 late No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	288	18	252	270
.5	298	28	242	270
.1	310	40	230	270

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	244	24	196	220
.5	257	37	183	220
.1	270	50	170	220

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	205	15	175	190
.5	212	22	168	190
.1	220	30	160	190

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	195	15	165	180
.5	200	20	160	180
.1	210	30	150	180

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	150	11	128	139
.5	158	18	122	140
.1	165	25	115	140

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	152	12	128	140
.5	160	20	120	140
.1	168	28	112	140

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf Man 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	29	-13	15
.5	64	47	-30	16
.1	94	77	-61	16

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	28	-11	17
.5	65	46	-27	18
.1	94	75	-56	19

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	47	28	-11	17
.5	64	45	-27	18
.1	93	74	-56	18

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	44	-22	22
.1	94	71	-49	22

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	43	-21	22
.1	93	70	-48	22

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	52	26	-7	22
.5	67	42	-20	23
.1	92	68	-45	23

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf Man 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	161	130	-100	30
.5	228	198	-168	29
.1	344	313	-282	31

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	156	118	-84	36
.5	218	181	-145	36
.1	322	285	-248	37

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	164	128	-94	35
.5	229	193	-159	35
.1	339	304	-272	33

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	159	115	-78	40
.5	218	174	-133	42
.1	315	274	-233	41

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	170	123	-83	43
.5	230	184	-141	44
.1	331	288	-245	43

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	161	112	-75	42
.5	214	168	-125	44
.1	307	261	-218	44

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf Man 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	14	-4	10
.5	34	23	-13	10
.1	50	39	-28	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	11	-1	11
.5	31	19	-8	11
.1	44	32	-21	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	13	-3	10
.5	33	22	-11	11
.1	48	36	-25	11

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	10	0	12
.5	31	17	-5	13
.1	42	29	-16	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	27	11	0	14
.5	34	19	-5	14
.1	47	31	-17	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	26	9	4	15
.5	32	15	0	15
.1	41	25	-10	15

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf Man ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	393	346	-302	45
.5	548	502	-457	45
.1	814	766	-722	46

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	377	320	-267	54
.5	520	463	-409	55
.1	761	704	-648	56

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	400	343	-290	55
.5	550	494	-441	54
.1	807	754	-701	52

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	388	314	-248	70
.5	525	450	-380	72
.1	758	683	-608	75

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	410	334	-267	71
.5	553	479	-408	72
.1	799	725	-653	72

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	388	309	-243	72
.5	518	441	-367	75
.1	737	662	-591	73

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf No 22 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	45	29	-13	15
.5	64	47	-30	16
.1	94	77	-61	16

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	28	-11	17
.5	65	46	-27	18
.1	94	75	-56	19

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	28	-11	17
.5	64	45	-27	18
.1	93	74	-56	18

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	44	-22	22
.1	94	71	-49	22

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	51	27	-8	21
.5	67	43	-21	22
.1	93	70	-48	22

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	47	28	-11	17
.5	65	46	-27	18
.1	94	75	-56	19

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf No 70 (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	161	130	-100	30
.5	228	198	-168	29
.1	344	313	-282	31

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	156	118	-84	36
.5	218	181	-145	36
.1	322	285	-248	37

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	164	128	-94	35
.5	229	193	-159	35
.1	339	304	-272	33

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	159	115	-78	40
.5	218	174	-133	42
.1	315	274	-233	41

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	170	123	-83	43
.5	230	184	-141	44
.1	331	288	-245	43

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
1	156	118	-84	36
.5	218	181	-145	36
.1	322	285	-248	37

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf No 7m (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality prob	d	c	s	m
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1	25	14	-4	10
.5	34	23	-13	10
.1	50	39	-28	10

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	11	-1	11
.5	31	19	-8	11
.1	44	32	-21	11

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	25	13	-3	10
.5	33	22	-11	11
.1	48	36	-25	11

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	24	10	0	12
.5	31	17	-5	13
.1	42	29	-16	13

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	27	11	0	14
.5	34	19	-5	14
.1	47	31	-17	14

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	23	11	-1	11
.5	31	19	-8	11
.1	44	32	-21	11

Consequence: Iso 9 poolf No ru (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	393	346	-302	45
.5	548	502	-457	45
.1	814	766	-722	46

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	377	320	-267	54
.5	520	463	-409	55
.1	761	704	-648	56

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	400	343	-290	55
.5	550	494	-441	54
.1	807	754	-701	52

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	388	314	-248	70
.5	525	450	-380	72
.1	758	683	-608	75

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	410	334	-267	71
.5	553	479	-408	72
.1	799	725	-653	72

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	377	320	-267	54
.5	520	463	-409	55
.1	761	704	-648	56

Consequence: Tox i4 70mm (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	65	6	0	60
.1	75	9	0	60

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	65	6	0	60
.1	75	9	0	60

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	65	6	0	60
.1	75	9	0	60

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	65	6	0	60
.1	75	9	0	60

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	65	6	0	60
.1	75	9	0	60

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
.5	65	6	0	60
.1	75	9	0	60

Consequence: Tox i4 rup (unaffected by topography)

Weather state: 1.8F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	3	0	35
.5	135	12	0	110
.1	155	21	0	130

Weather state: 2.5B

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	3	0	35
.5	135	12	0	10
.1	155	21	0	130

Weather state: 3.0F

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	3	0	35
.5	135	12	0	110
.1	155	21	0	130

Weather state: 4.2C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	3	0	35
.5	135	12	0	110
.1	155	21	0	130

Weather state: 5.1D

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	3	0	35
.5	135	12	0	110
.1	155	21	0	130

Weather state: 6.3C

Fatality				
prob	d	c	s	m
1	56	3	0	35
.5	135	12	0	110
.1	155	21	0	130

Hazards

Hazard: iso 1

Coordinates:

78046	22866
78067	22868
78068	22858
78047	22855

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 1 BLEVE Man ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 1 BLEVE No ru	.000000000000228	.000000000000228
Iso 1 jetfi Man 22	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 1 jetfi Man 70	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 1 jetfi Man 7m	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 1 jetfi Man ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 1 jetfi No 22	.00000003	.00000003
Iso 1 jetfi No 70	.0000000321	.0000000321

Iso 1 jetfi No 7m	.000000044	.000000044
Iso 1 jetfi No ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 1 late Man 70	.00000176	.00000176
Iso 1 late Man ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 1 late No 70	.0000000356	.0000000356
Iso 1 late No ru	.00000000000228	.00000000000228

Hazard: iso 10 N

Coordinates:

78129 22841
78140 22842
78141 22832
78131 22831

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 10 late Man 22	.0000000121	.0000000121
Iso 10 late Man 70	.0000000151	.0000000151
Iso 10 late No 22	.000000000123	.000000000123
Iso 10 late No 70	.000000000153	.000000000153
Iso 10 poolf Man 22	.00000012	.00000012
Iso 10 poolf Man 70	.00000015	.00000015
Iso 10 poolf Man 7m	.000000175	.000000175
Iso 10 poolf No 22	.0000000121	.0000000121
Iso 10 poolf No 70	.0000000151	.0000000151
Iso 10 poolf No 7m	.0000000177	.0000000177

Hazard: iso 10 S

Coordinates:

78150 22843
78160 22844
78161 22834
78151 22833

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 10 late Man 22	.0000000121	.0000000121
Iso 10 late Man 70	.0000000151	.0000000151
Iso 10 late No 22	.000000000123	.000000000123
Iso 10 late No 70	.000000000153	.000000000153
Iso 10 poolf Man 22	.00000012	.00000012
Iso 10 poolf Man 70	.00000015	.00000015
Iso 10 poolf Man 7m	.000000175	.000000175
Iso 10 poolf No 22	.0000000121	.0000000121
Iso 10 poolf No 70	.0000000151	.0000000151
Iso 10 poolf No 7m	.0000000177	.0000000177

Hazard: iso 11

Coordinates:

78170 22845
78176 22846
78181 22799
78230 22805
78230 22800
78176 22794

Consequences:

	Day	Night
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Iso 11 BLEVE No ru	.00000000000419	.00000000000419
Iso 11 late Man 70	.000000000414	.000000000414
Iso 11 late Man ru	.000000000414	.000000000414
Iso 11 late No 70	.000000000875	.000000000875
Iso 11 late No ru	.00000000000419	.00000000000419
Iso 11 poolf Man 22	.00000464	.00000464
Iso 11 poolf Man 70	.00000857	.00000857
Iso 11 poolf Man 7m	.00000194	.00000194
Iso 11 poolf Man ru	.000000041	.000000041
Iso 11 poolf No 22	.0000000469	.0000000469
Iso 11 poolf No 70	.0000000866	.0000000866
Iso 11 poolf No 7m	.0000000196	.0000000196
Iso 11 poolf No ru	.000000000414	.000000000414

Hazard: iso 12 N

Coordinates:

78212 22868
78236 22870
78250 22856
78252 22836
78241 22822
78218 22819
78201 22830
78199 22851

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 12 late Man 22	.0000000388	.0000000388
Iso 12 late Man 70	.0000000496	.0000000496
Iso 12 late No 22	.000000000392	.000000000392
Iso 12 late No 70	.000000000501	.000000000501
Iso 12 poolf Man 22	.00000384	.00000384
Iso 12 poolf Man 70	.00000491	.00000491
Iso 12 poolf Man 7m	.00000528	.00000528
Iso 12 poolf No 22	.0000000388	.0000000388
Iso 12 poolf No 70	.0000000496	.0000000496
Iso 12 poolf No 7m	.0000000533	.0000000533

Hazard: iso 12 S

Coordinates:

78221 22788
78244 22791
78259 22777
78261 22756
78249 22742
78226 22739
78209 22750
78207 22771

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 12 late Man 22	.0000000388	.0000000388
Iso 12 late Man 70	.0000000496	.0000000496
Iso 12 late No 22	.000000000392	.000000000392
Iso 12 late No 70	.000000000501	.000000000501
Iso 12 poolf Man 22	.00000384	.00000384
Iso 12 poolf Man 70	.00000491	.00000491
Iso 12 poolf Man 7m	.00000528	.00000528
Iso 12 poolf No 22	.0000000388	.0000000388
Iso 12 poolf No 70	.0000000496	.0000000496
Iso 12 poolf No 7m	.0000000533	.0000000533

Hazard: iso 13

Coordinates:

78230 22802
78178 22797
78179 22791

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 13 late Man 22	.00000000281	.00000000281
Iso 13 late Man 70	.00000000495	.00000000495
Iso 13 late Man ru	.000000000104	.000000000104
Iso 13 late No 22	.000000000284	.000000000284
Iso 13 late No 70	.00000000005	.00000000005
Iso 13 late No ru	.0000000000105	.0000000000105
Iso 13 poolf Man 22	.00000278	.00000278
Iso 13 poolf Man 70	.0000049	.0000049
Iso 13 poolf Man 7m	.00000119	.00000119
Iso 13 poolf Man ru	.0000000103	.0000000103
Iso 13 poolf No 22	.0000000281	.0000000281
Iso 13 poolf No 70	.0000000495	.0000000495
Iso 13 poolf No 7m	.000000012	.000000012
Iso 13 poolf No ru	.000000000104	.000000000104

Hazard: iso 14

Coordinates:

78127 22861
78137 22863
78138 22852
78128 22851

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 14 late Man 22	.00000000439	.00000000439
Iso 14 late Man 70	.00000000834	.00000000834
Iso 14 late No 22	.0000000000444	.0000000000444
Iso 14 late No 70	.0000000000843	.0000000000843
Iso 14 poolf Man 22	.000000435	.000000435
Iso 14 poolf Man 70	.000000826	.000000826
Iso 14 poolf Man 7m	.000000181	.000000181
Iso 14 poolf No 22	.00000000439	.00000000439
Iso 14 poolf No 70	.00000000834	.00000000834
Iso 14 poolf No 7m	.00000000183	.00000000183

Hazard: iso 15

Coordinates:

78113 22803
78174 22809
78169 22856

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 15 late Man 22	.00000000309	.00000000309
Iso 15 late Man 70	.0000000076	.0000000076
Iso 15 late No 22	.0000000000312	.0000000000312
Iso 15 late No 70	.0000000000767	.0000000000767
Iso 15 poolf Man 22	.000000306	.000000306
Iso 15 poolf Man 70	.000000752	.000000752
Iso 15 poolf Man 7m	.000000177	.000000177
Iso 15 poolf No 22	.00000000309	.00000000309
Iso 15 poolf No 70	.0000000076	.0000000076
Iso 15 poolf No 7m	.00000000179	.00000000179

Hazard: iso 16

Coordinates:
73700 20400

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 16 late Man 22	.000000000527	.000000000527
Iso 16 late Man 70	.00000000138	.00000000138
Iso 16 late No 22	.0000000000533	.0000000000533
Iso 16 late No 70	.000000000014	.000000000014
Iso 16 poolf Man 22	.0000000522	.0000000522
Iso 16 poolf Man 70	.000000137	.000000137
Iso 16 poolf Man 7m	.0000000302	.0000000302
Iso 16 poolf No 22	.000000000527	.000000000527
Iso 16 poolf No 70	.00000000138	.00000000138
Iso 16 poolf No 7m	.000000000305	.000000000305

Hazard: iso 17

Coordinates:
73200 20200

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 17 poolf Man 22	.00000142	.00000142
Iso 17 poolf Man 70	.00000139	.00000139
Iso 17 poolf Man 7m	.00000307	.00000307
Iso 17 poolf Man ru	.0000000103	.0000000103
Iso 17 poolf No 22	.0000000144	.0000000144
Iso 17 poolf No 70	.000000014	.000000014
Iso 17 poolf No 7m	.000000031	.000000031
Iso 17 poolf No ru	.00000000104	.00000000104

Hazard: iso 18

Coordinates:
77042 23167
76400 21206
76500 20958
75958 20125
75750 19333
73900 20250
73500 20166
73709 20333

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 18 "idl late Man 22	.00000002	.00000002
Iso 18 "idl late Man 70	.0000000425	.0000000425
Iso 18 "idl late Man ru	.00000000591	.00000000591
Iso 18 "idl late No 22	.000000000202	.000000000202
Iso 18 "idl late No 70	.000000000429	.000000000429
Iso 18 "idl late No ru	.0000000000597	.0000000000597
Iso 18 "idl poolf Man 22	.00000198	.00000198
Iso 18 "idl poolf Man 70	.00000421	.00000421
Iso 18 "idl poolf Man 7m	.00000308	.00000308
Iso 18 "idl poolf Man ru	.000000585	.000000585
Iso 18 "idl poolf No 22	.00000002	.00000002
Iso 18 "idl poolf No 70	.0000000425	.0000000425
Iso 18 "idl poolf No 7m	.0000000311	.0000000311
Iso 18 "idl poolf No ru	.00000000591	.00000000591
Iso 18 "op" late Man 22	.00000000222	.00000000222

Iso 18 "op" late Man 70	.00000000472	.00000000472
Iso 18 "op" late Man ru	.000000000657	.000000000657
Iso 18 "op" late No 22	.000000000224	.000000000224
Iso 18 "op" late No 70	.000000000477	.000000000477
Iso 18 "op" late No ru	.0000000000663	.0000000000663
Iso 18 "op" poolf Man 22	.00000022	.00000022
Iso 18 "op" poolf Man 70	.000000468	.000000468
Iso 18 "op" poolf Man 7m	.000000342	.000000342
Iso 18 "op" poolf Man ru	.000000065	.000000065
Iso 18 "op" poolf No 22	.0000000222	.0000000222
Iso 18 "op" poolf No 70	.0000000472	.0000000472
Iso 18 "op" poolf No 7m	.0000000346	.0000000346
Iso 18 "op" poolf No ru	.00000000657	.00000000657

Hazard: iso 2

Coordinates:

78068 22853
78102 22856
78103 22838
78070 22834

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 2 jetfi Man 22	.00000616	.00000616
Iso 2 jetfi Man 70	.0000105	.0000105
Iso 2 jetfi Man 7m	.00000382	.00000382
Iso 2 jetfi Man ru	.000000085	.000000085
Iso 2 jetfi No 22	.0000000622	.0000000622
Iso 2 jetfi No 70	.000000104	.000000104
Iso 2 jetfi No 7m	.0000000386	.0000000386
Iso 2 jetfi No ru	.000000000822	.000000000822
Iso 2 late Man 70	.000000106	.000000106
Iso 2 late Man ru	.00000000543	.00000000543
Iso 2 late No 70	.00000000321	.00000000321
Iso 2 late No ru	.000000000914	.000000000914

Hazard: iso 3

Coordinates:

78068 22855
78081 22856
78081 22845
78068 22853

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 3 jetfi Man 22	.00000114	.00000114
Iso 3 jetfi Man 70	.00000204	.00000204
Iso 3 jetfi Man 7m	.00000045	.00000045
Iso 3 jetfi No 22	.0000000116	.0000000116
Iso 3 jetfi No 70	.0000000202	.0000000202
Iso 3 jetfi No 7m	.0000000454	.0000000454
Iso 3 late Man 70	.0000000206	.0000000206
Iso 3 late No 70	.00000000624	.00000000624

Hazard: iso 4

Coordinates:

78069 22873
78107 22878
78109 22862
78068 22858

Consequences :

	Day	Night
Iso 4 jetfi Man 22	.0000182	.0000182
Iso 4 jetfi Man 70	.0000206	.0000206
Iso 4 jetfi Man 7m	.0000112	.0000112
Iso 4 jetfi Man ru	.00000000893	.00000000893
Iso 4 jetfi No 22	.000000183	.000000183
Iso 4 jetfi No 70	.000000208	.000000208
Iso 4 jetfi No 7m	.000000113	.000000113
Iso 4 jetfi No ru	.0000000000855	.0000000000855
Iso 4 late Man 22	.000000183	.000000183
Iso 4 late Man 70	.000000208	.000000208
Iso 4 late Man ru	.000000000118	.000000000118
Iso 4 late No 22	.0000000185	.0000000185
Iso 4 late No 70	.0000000021	.0000000021
Iso 4 late No ru	.0000000000585	.0000000000585

Hazard: iso 5

Coordinates:

78001 22822
78022 22824
78024 22806
78003 22804

Consequences :

	Day	Night
Iso 5 jetfi Man 22	.00000883	.00000883
Iso 5 jetfi Man 70	.0000103	.0000103
Iso 5 jetfi Man 7m	.00000691	.00000691
Iso 5 jetfi Man ru	.00000000407	.00000000407
Iso 5 jetfi No 22	.0000000891	.0000000891
Iso 5 jetfi No 70	.0000000959	.0000000959
Iso 5 jetfi No 7m	.0000000698	.0000000698
Iso 5 jetfi No ru	.0000000000411	.0000000000411
Iso 5 late Man 22	.0000000891	.0000000891
Iso 5 late Man 70	.000000211	.000000211
Iso 5 late Man ru	.000000000452	.000000000452
Iso 5 late No 22	.0000000009	.0000000009
Iso 5 late No 70	.0000000107	.0000000107
Iso 5 late No ru	.0000000000457	.0000000000457

Hazard: iso 6

Coordinates:

78032 22846
78050 22848
78053 22825
78035 22823

Consequences :

	Day	Night
Iso 6 late Man 22	.0000000176	.0000000176
Iso 6 late Man 70	.0000000355	.0000000355
Iso 6 late Man ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 6 late No 22	.000000000178	.000000000178
Iso 6 late No 70	.000000000359	.000000000359
Iso 6 late No ru	.00000000000228	.00000000000228
Iso 6 poolf Man 22	.00000174	.00000174
Iso 6 poolf Man 70	.00000351	.00000351
Iso 6 poolf Man 7m	.000000755	.000000755
Iso 6 poolf Man ru	.00000000224	.00000000224
Iso 6 poolf No 22	.0000000176	.0000000176
Iso 6 poolf No 70	.0000000355	.0000000355
Iso 6 poolf No 7m	.00000000763	.00000000763
Iso 6 poolf No ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226

Hazard: iso 7

Coordinates:

78075 22788
78080 22789
78081 22784
78076 22783

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 7 late Man 22	.00000000134	.00000000134
Iso 7 late Man 70	.00000000211	.00000000211
Iso 7 late Man ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226
Iso 7 late No 22	.0000000000136	.0000000000136
Iso 7 late No 70	.0000000000213	.0000000000213
Iso 7 late No ru	.000000000000228	.000000000000228
Iso 7 poolf Man 22	.000000133	.000000133
Iso 7 poolf Man 70	.000000209	.000000209
Iso 7 poolf Man 7m	.000000185	.000000185
Iso 7 poolf Man ru	.000000000224	.000000000224
Iso 7 poolf No 22	.00000000134	.00000000134
Iso 7 poolf No 70	.00000000211	.00000000211
Iso 7 poolf No 7m	.00000000187	.00000000187
Iso 7 poolf No ru	.0000000000226	.0000000000226

Hazard: iso 8

Coordinates:

78080 22789
78093 22790
78094 22785
78081 22784

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 8 late Man 22	.000000000501	.000000000501
Iso 8 late Man 70	.00000000103	.00000000103
Iso 8 late No 22	.00000000000506	.00000000000506
Iso 8 late No 70	.0000000000104	.0000000000104
Iso 8 poolf Man 22	.0000000496	.0000000496
Iso 8 poolf Man 70	.000000102	.000000102
Iso 8 poolf Man 7m	.0000000216	.0000000216
Iso 8 poolf No 22	.000000000501	.000000000501
Iso 8 poolf No 70	.00000000103	.00000000103
Iso 8 poolf No 7m	.00000000219	.00000000219

Hazard: iso 9

Coordinates:

78095 22795
78123 22799
78125 22786
78096 22783

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Iso 9 late Man 22	.0000000199	.0000000199
Iso 9 late Man 70	.0000000231	.0000000231
Iso 9 late Man ru	.000000000298	.000000000298
Iso 9 late No 22	.000000000201	.000000000201
Iso 9 late No 70	.000000000233	.000000000233

Iso 9 late No ru	.00000000000301	.00000000000301
Iso 9 poolf Man 22	.0000197	.0000197
Iso 9 poolf Man 70	.0000229	.0000229
Iso 9 poolf Man 7m	.0000149	.0000149
Iso 9 poolf Man ru	.0000000295	.0000000295
Iso 9 poolf No 22	.000000199	.000000199
Iso 9 poolf No 70	.000000231	.000000231
Iso 9 poolf No 7m	.000000151	.000000151
Iso 9 poolf No ru	.00000000298	.00000000298

Hazard: tox i4

Coordinates:

78069	22873
78107	22878
78109	22862
78068	22856

Consequences:

	Day	Night
Tox i4 70mm	.0000004905	.0000004905
Tox i4 rup	.000000000213	.000000000213



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APPENDIX H Parts Count

Due to the size of the Part Count record, it is available upon request, if not included with this report.

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location

N

E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO1
----------	------

Release Stream	
----------------	--

Description	Reforming
-------------	-----------

Operating Pressure	2300.0 kPa
--------------------	------------

Operating Temperature	40 - 380 °C
-----------------------	-------------

Tank	
------	--

Pump	
------	--

Reciprocating Comp.	1
---------------------	---

Centrifugal Comp.	1
-------------------	---

Pressure Vessel	1
-----------------	---

S&T Heat Exchanger	1
--------------------	---

Plate Exchanger	0.5
-----------------	-----

Cover	
-------	--

Flexible Hose	
---------------	--

Flanges	46
---------	----

Valves	128
--------	-----

Pipes	208
-------	-----

Press Connection	
------------------	--

Misc Press Connection	
-----------------------	--

Level Bridle	
--------------	--

Level Gauge	85
-------------	----

Calculated Release Frequencies

7 mm	7.64E-01
------	----------

22 mm	7.46E-02
-------	----------

70 mm	2.04E-02
-------	----------

Rupture	1.31E-06
---------	----------

TOTAL	8.59E-01
-------	----------

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO2
Release Stream	
Description	Reforming

Operating Pressure	4000.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	210 - 380	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	6.71E-02
22 mm	1.54E-02
70 mm	6.13E-03
Rupture	5.24E-06
TOTAL	8.87E-02

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	4
S&T Heat Exchanger	3.5
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	17
Valves	49
Pipes	81
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	14

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO3
Release Stream	
Description	Reforming

Operating Pressure	4000.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	210	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	7.89E-03
22 mm	2.87E-03
70 mm	1.19E-03
Rupture	0.00E+00
TOTAL	1.20E-02

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	2
Valves	10
Pipes	14
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	6

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location

N

E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO4
----------	------

Release Stream	
----------------	--

Description	Reforming
-------------	-----------

Operating Pressure	3000.0 kPa
--------------------	------------

Operating Temperature	560 °C
-----------------------	--------

Tank	
------	--

Pump	
------	--

Reciprocating Comp.	
---------------------	--

Centrifugal Comp.	1
-------------------	---

Pressure Vessel	4
-----------------	---

S&T Heat Exchanger	11.5
--------------------	------

Plate Exchanger	0.5
-----------------	-----

Cover	
-------	--

Flexible Hose	
---------------	--

Flanges	45
---------	----

Valves	89
--------	----

Pipes	149
-------	-----

Press Connection	
------------------	--

Misc Press Connection	
-----------------------	--

Level Bridle	
--------------	--

Level Gauge	77
-------------	----

Calculated Release Frequencies

7 mm	1.96E-01
------	----------

22 mm	4.55E-02
-------	----------

70 mm	1.21E-02
-------	----------

Rupture	5.24E-06
---------	----------

TOTAL	2.54E-01
-------	----------

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location

N

E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO5
----------	------

Release Stream	
----------------	--

Description	Methanol Synthesis
-------------	--------------------

Operating Pressure	8000.0 kPa
--------------------	------------

Operating Temperature	225 °C
-----------------------	--------

Tank	
------	--

Pump	
------	--

Reciprocating Comp.	
---------------------	--

Centrifugal Comp.	3
-------------------	---

Pressure Vessel	2
-----------------	---

S&T Heat Exchanger	4
--------------------	---

Plate Exchanger	
-----------------	--

Cover	
-------	--

Flexible Hose	
---------------	--

Flanges	15
---------	----

Valves	47
--------	----

Pipes	62
-------	----

Press Connection	
------------------	--

Misc Press Connection	
-----------------------	--

Level Bridle	
--------------	--

Level Gauge	37
-------------	----

Calculated Release Frequencies

7 mm	1.21E-01
------	----------

22 mm	2.21E-02
-------	----------

70 mm	6.11E-03
-------	----------

Rupture	2.62E-06
---------	----------

TOTAL	1.50E-01
-------	----------

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO6
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol Synthesis

Operating Pressure	550.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	40	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	1.33E-02
22 mm	4.37E-03
70 mm	2.06E-03
Rupture	1.31E-06
TOTAL	1.97E-02

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	1
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	4
Valves	17
Pipes	23
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	7

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO7
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol Distillation

Operating Pressure	3.0 kPa
Operating Temperature	38 - 92 °C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	3.25E-02
22 mm	3.33E-03
70 mm	1.22E-03
Rupture	1.31E-06
TOTAL	3.71E-02

Tank	
Pump	1
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	1
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	6
Valves	8
Pipes	15
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	1

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location N
 E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO8
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol Distillation

Operating Pressure	860.0 kPa
Operating Temperature	92 °C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	3.80E-03
22 mm	1.24E-03
70 mm	5.95E-04
Rupture	0.00E+00
TOTAL	5.64E-03

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	1
Valves	5
Pipes	6
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	2

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO9	
Release Stream		
Description	Methanol Distillation	

Operating Pressure	6.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	40 - 137	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	2.62E-01
22 mm	4.95E-02
70 mm	1.34E-02
Rupture	1.12E-05
TOTAL	3.25E-01

Tank	1
Pump	4
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	4
S&T Heat Exchanger	8
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	82
Valves	90
Pipes	173
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	77

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO10
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol tanks

Operating Pressure	300.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	40	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	3.07E-02
22 mm	3.01E-03
70 mm	8.76E-04
Rupture	6.00E-06
TOTAL	3.46E-02

Tank	1
Pump	1
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	6
Valves	5
Pipes	10
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	2

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO11
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol tanks

Operating Pressure	300.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	40	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	3.41E-02
22 mm	1.16E-02
70 mm	5.01E-03
Rupture	0.00E+00
TOTAL	5.08E-02

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	16
Valves	40
Pipes	38
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	21

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO12
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol tanks

Operating Pressure	300.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	40	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	3.70E-02
22 mm	5.34E-03
70 mm	1.89E-03
Rupture	6.00E-06
TOTAL	4.43E-02

Tank	1
Pump	1
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	6
Valves	14
Pipes	20
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	7

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO13
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol tanks

Operating Pressure	300.0	kPa
Operating Temperature	40	°C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	2.08E-02
22 mm	6.98E-03
70 mm	2.86E-03
Rupture	0.00E+00
TOTAL	3.07E-02

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	15
Valves	21
Pipes	34
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	12

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location		N
		E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO14
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol tanks

Operating Pressure	101.3 kPa
Operating Temperature	25 °C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	3.01E-02
22 mm	2.87E-03
70 mm	7.67E-04
Rupture	6.00E-06
TOTAL	3.38E-02

Tank	1
Pump	1
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	6
Valves	4
Pipes	12
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	2

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location N
 E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO15
Release Stream	
Description	Methanol tanks

Operating Pressure	101.3 kPa
Operating Temperature	25 °C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	3.11E-03
22 mm	7.66E-04
70 mm	4.40E-04
Rupture	0.00E+00
TOTAL	4.31E-03

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	3
Valves	3
Pipes	7
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location N
 E

Location ISO16
 Release Stream
 Description Loading System

Operating Pressure 300.0 kPa
 Operating Temperature 25 °C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	5.31E-03
22 mm	1.31E-03
70 mm	8.02E-04
Rupture	0.00E+00
TOTAL	7.42E-03

Tank	
Pump	
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	4
Valves	6
Pipes	4
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location N
 E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location	ISO17
Release Stream	
Description	Slops tanks

Operating Pressure	101.3 kPa
Operating Temperature	25 °C

Calculated Release Frequencies	
7 mm	5.40E-02
22 mm	3.56E-03
70 mm	8.11E-04
Rupture	6.00E-06
TOTAL	5.83E-02

Tank	1
Pump	2
Reciprocating Comp.	
Centrifugal Comp.	
Pressure Vessel	
S&T Heat Exchanger	
Plate Exchanger	
Cover	
Flexible Hose	
Flanges	4
Valves	4
Pipes	10
Press Connection	
Misc Press Connection	
Level Bridle	
Level Gauge	

CLIENT: URS
 JOB DESCRIPTION: GTL Methanol Plant Preliminary Risk Assessment

Location N
 E

EQUIPMENT HOLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION WORKSHEET

Location ISO18

Release Stream

Description Export Pipeline

Operating Pressure 101.3 kPa

Operating Temperature 25 °C

Calculated Release Frequencies

7 mm 6.01E-02

22 mm 5.50E-03

70 mm 2.74E-03

Rupture 3.80E-04

TOTAL 6.87E-02

Tank

Pump 2

Reciprocating Comp.

Centrifugal Comp.

Pressure Vessel

S&T Heat Exchanger

Plate Exchanger

Cover

Flexible Hose

Flanges 6

Valves 12

Pipes 1

Press Connection

Misc Press Connection

Level Bridle

Level Gauge



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APPENDIX I Sample Event Tree

The sample event tree is for a 22 mm leak within the first isolatable section within Unit 100.

Release Frequency (Hole Size)	Flammable	Toxic	Auto Shutdown (10seconds)	Manual Shutdown (60 seconds)	Ignition	Vapor Cloud Explosion	Escalation	Event Outcome Frequency	Description
7.46E-02 22 mm	1.00 Yes		0.988 Yes		0.07 Yes	0.01 Yes	1.00 Yes	5.16E-05	flammable, auto shutdown, ignited with explosion, escalation impact
							0.00 No	0.00E+00	flammable, auto shutdown, ignited with explosion, no escalation impact
					0.99 No			5.11E-03	flammable, auto shutdown, ignited with no explosion
								6.86E-02	flammable, auto shutdown, unignited
			0.012 No	0.99 Yes	0.07 Yes	0.01 Yes	1.00 Yes	6.01E-07	flammable, manual shutdown, ignited with explosion, escalation impact
							0.00 No	0.00E+00	flammable, manual shutdown, ignited with explosion, no escalation impact
					0.99 No			5.95E-05	flammable, manual shutdown, ignited with no explosion
								7.98E-04	flammable, manual shutdown, unignited
	0.00 No		0.988 Yes		0.07 Yes	0.01 Yes	1.00 Yes	6.07E-09	flammable, ignited with explosion, escalation impact
							0.00 No	0.00E+00	flammable, ignited with explosion, no escalation impact
					0.99 No			6.01E-07	flammable, ignited with no explosion
								8.06E-06	flammable, unignited
			0.012 No	0.99 Yes	0.07 Yes	0.01 Yes		0.00E+00	toxic, auto shutdown
								0.00E+00	toxic, manual shutdown
					0.99 No			0.00E+00	toxic, no shutdown
								0.00E+00	non flammable and toxic
7.46E-02									
Total ignited frequency with explosion resulting in escalation impact								5.22E-05	
Total toxic concentration frequency resulting in escalation impact								0.00E+00	



APPENDIX J Consequence Modelling Using PHAST

Details of Calculations

The calculations can be divided into four stages:

- Discharge,
- Immediate Fire and Explosion,
- Cloud Dispersion,
- Delayed Fire, Explosion, and
- Toxic Effects

Discharge Conditions

You define the Case by describing the storage conditions, and the type and size of release (e.g. hole size), and the program determines the state of the material after it has been released from confinement, and has expanded down to atmospheric pressure.

Discharge Calculations


For all Cases, the program predicts the condition of the material once it has been discharged and has expanded down to atmospheric pressure. There are two main types of discharge calculation:

- Continuous Release, and
- Instantaneous Release

Continuous Release

This describes the discharge calculations for all scenarios except Catastrophic Ruptures (see: Setting the Scenario for a Case).


The stages in the calculations are shown in the flowchart below.



Instantaneous Release

The instantaneous modeling is used if the Case is set as a Catastrophic Rupture in the Scenario tab section.

The stages in the calculations are shown in the flowchart below.



Immediate Flammable Effects

If the material is flammable, then the material may ignite immediately upon release, giving either a fire or an explosion which is centered around the release location. The program calculates the size and intensity of the effects, and the details of the



calculations depend on the type of release, and the state of the material immediately after discharge:

Type of Release	State after Discharge	Effect modeled
Instantaneous	All	BLEVE or Fireball
Instantaneous	Contains vapor	Explosion
Continuous	Contains vapor, has high momentum	Jet Fire
Both	Contains liquid	Pool Fire

For some types of release, more than one effect will be modeled. For instance, a two-phase instantaneous release can produce a pool fire, a BLEVE, and an explosion, and the program will perform calculations for all three effects.

See further details for:

- Pool Fire
- Jet Fire
- BLEVE
- Explosion

Cloud Dispersion

The program next models the scenario in which the release does not ignite immediately, but forms a cloud which moves away from the release location, entraining air until it is eventually diluted to a harmless concentration.

The hazard posed by the cloud depends on its size, location and concentration-profile. These all change with time, and the program must calculate and record these changes in order to describe the cloud and its hazards properly. The calculations are performed by the Unified Dispersion Model (or UDM), which produces a table giving the essential cloud data at various time steps from the start of the release. This table is then used by the various models which calculate the longer-term flammable and toxic effects, described below.

Delayed Hazardous Effects

The delayed hazardous effects are those that occur after the cloud has started to develop.

- Late Pool Fire
- Explosion
- Toxic Effects
- Flash Fire A flash fire is a low-intensity fire whose effect zone is given by the flammable region of the cloud, and the program simply calculates the dimensions and location of this region at the time of ignition.

Pool Fire Modeling


There are three main parts of the calculations:

- Flame Shape,
- Flame Emissive Power, and
- Radiation.



Calculating the Flame Shape

The flame is modeled as a cylinder sheared in the direction of the wind, with diameter D , height H and tilt angle q (measured from the vertical), as shown in the illustration. The flame is described by three circles (c_1 , c_2 , c_3) arranged along the centerline of the flame, each defined by the downwind coordinate x and elevation z of the center of the circle, and by the radius r . These flame-circle coordinates are the main input to the radiation calculations.



Diameter

- Instantaneous Release

If the release is banded, the diameter is given by the size of the bund. If there is no bund, then the diameter is that which corresponds with a minimum pool thickness, set by the type of surface on which the pool is spreading.

- Continuous Release: Early Pool Fire

An early pool fire is one that occurs immediately after rainout, before the cloud has started to disperse away from the pool.

As the first stage in calculating the diameter, the program calculates the pool fire burn rate. This is a function of the properties of the released material, and of the surface on which the pool is burning.

If there is a value set for the maximum burn rate in the properties data, the program will use this value. Otherwise, the maximum burn rate, m_{max} , is taken from Burgess and Hertzberg (1974) as:

$$m_{max} = 10^{-3} \frac{\Delta H_c}{\Delta H_v^*}$$

where m_{max} is in kg/s/m², and



$$\begin{aligned}\Delta H_v^* &= \Delta H_v + C_{pL}(T_b - T_a) & T_b > T_a \\ \Delta H_v^* &= \Delta H_v & T_a > T_b\end{aligned}$$

where ΔH_c is the heat of combustion, ΔH_v^* is the modified heat of vaporization, ΔH_v is the heat of vaporization, C_{pL} is the liquid specific heat (a function of the material's boiling point), T_b is the boiling point temperature and T_a is the atmospheric temperature.

If the spill occurs on water, the maximum burn rate is then adjusted by multiplying it by a value of 2.5 (Cook et al., 1990). This accounts for the considerable heat transfer which occurs between a large body of water and the pool of liquefied gas due mainly to the fact that the boiling point is lower than the ambient temperature.

The actual pool fire burn rate is then given by:

$$m = m_{max} \left[1 - e^{-\frac{D}{L_b}} \right]$$

where m_{max} is the maximum burn rate, D is the flame diameter and L_b is the burn rate characteristic scale length, which is taken from the materials property data.

The program calculates the diameter which gives a burning rate that equals the continuous release rate, and then sets the diameter of the pool fire to be the minimum of this diameter and the diameter of the bund (if any).

- Continuous Release: Late Pool Fire

A late pool fire is one that occurs after the cloud has started dispersing away from the pool.

The diameter used for the pool fire calculations is the maximum diameter achieved by the pool during the process of spreading and evaporation.

Length

The flame length is given by the Thomas correlation (Mudan, 1984, equation 12) as:

$$H = 42D \left[\frac{m}{\rho_a \sqrt{gD}} \right]^{0.61}$$

where D is the flame diameter, m is the pool fire burn rate, ρ_a is the density of air and g is the acceleration due to gravity.

Tilt Angle

The tilt angle, θ , can be approximated by the following equation (Johnson, 1992, equation 4):

$$\frac{\tan \theta}{\cos \theta} = 0.7 Re^{0.109} Fr^{0.428}$$

where Re is a Reynolds number given by:



$$Re = \frac{U_w D}{\nu_a}$$

and Fr is a Froude number given by:

$$Fr = \frac{U_w^2}{gD}$$

where U_w is the wind velocity, D is the flame diameter, ν_a is the kinematic viscosity of air and g is the acceleration due to gravity.

Multiplying the equation for θ by $1 - \sin^2 \theta$ (which is equal to $\cos^2 \theta$) and re-arranging, gives the below quadratic in $\sin \theta$:

$$A \sin^2 \theta + \sin \theta - A = 0$$

where:

$$A = 0.7 Re^{0.109} Fr^{0.428}$$

The standard quadratic formula is used to solve this equation for θ , taking only the positive root.

$$\theta = \arcsin \left(\frac{-1 + \sqrt{1 + 4A^2}}{2A} \right)$$

Flame Shape Circles

The pool fire is defined by three circles, where the third circle, c_3 , has zero radius, and is added in order to complete the top surface of the flame, since the radiation calculations treat the flame as a set of conical surfaces, where each conical surface is bounded by two circles.

With the three circles shown in the illustration above, the radiation calculations will model radiation from two surfaces: from the side of the flame between c_1 and c_2 , and from the top of the flame between c_2 and c_3 . This approach ensures that the bottom of the pool fire is not treated as a radiating surface.

The flame length H , flame diameter D and tilt angle θ are used to calculate three co-ordinates of the flame, as follows:

$x_1 = 0.0$	$x_2 = H \sin \theta$	$x_3 = H \sin \theta$
$z_1 = d_{elev}$	$z_2 = H \cos \theta + d_{elev}$	$z_3 = H \cos \theta + d_{elev}$
$r_1 = D/2$	$r_2 = D/2$	$r_3 = 0.0$
$\phi_1 = 0.0$	$\phi_2 = 0.0$	$\phi_3 = 0.0$



ϕ is the inclination of the circle with respect to the horizontal. For pool fires, this is set to zero for all three circles, but for jet flames each circle may have a different, non-zero inclination.

Calculating the Emissive Power

The emissive power or emissivity E_f can be calculated for both luminous and smoky flames; the type of flame is defined in the property data for each material.

Luminous flames

For luminous flames the emissivity is given by:

$$E_f = E_m \left[1 - e^{-\frac{D}{L_s}} \right]$$

where E_m is the maximum surface emissive power, D is the flame diameter and L_s is the emissive power characteristic scale length. The emissivity, E_f , is then multiplied by 1000.0 to convert from kW/m² to W/m².

Smoky flames

For smoky flames the emissivity is given by:

$$E_f = E_m \left[e^{-\frac{D}{L_s}} \right] + E_s \left[1 - e^{-\frac{D}{L_s}} \right]$$

where E_m is the maximum surface emissive power, D is the flame diameter and L_s is the emissive power characteristic scale length. E_s is the smoke surface emissive power and is hardwired in the code as 20.0 kW/m². The emissivity, E_f , is then multiplied by 1000.0 to convert from kW/m² to W/m².

Radiation Ellipse Calculations

These are covered for all fire events later.

API Jet Fire Modeling

There are five main parts of the calculations:

- Mass in Jet
- Jet Velocity
- Flame Shape
- Flame Emissive Power
- Radiation

Mass Involved in Jet

In calculating the mass, the program uses an average release rate, which is the average over the time set for the Duration for Jet Fire Averaging in the Parameters.

The fraction f_{flam} of this average release rate involved in the jet fire is calculated as follows:

$$f_{flam} = \min \left\{ 1, R_{fire} \left(1 - f_{rainout} \right) \right\}$$



where R_{fire} is the Jet fire Correction Factor, set in the Jet Fire tab section for the Model, and $f_{rainout}$ is the rainout fraction calculated in the discharge modelling.

Calculating the Jet Velocity

The program calculates either the jet velocity or the expanded radius, depending on which items are supplied in the input data:

- Jet Velocity

The jet velocity, U_0 , is calculated as:

$$U_0 = \frac{Q}{\rho_{vapour} \pi R_{exp}^2}$$

where Q is the mass discharge rate, ρ_{vapour} is the vapor density at one atmosphere (calculated using the Properties Library) and R_{exp} is the expanded radius.


- Expanded Radius

The expanded radius is calculated as:

$$R_{exp} = \left(\frac{Q}{\rho_{vapour} \pi U_0} \right)^{1/2}$$

Calculating the Flame Shape

The flame is a jet that may be bent by the wind or by the effects of gravity, and it is described by ten circles (c_1 to c_{10}) equally spaced along the flame length. Each circle is defined by the downwind coordinate x and elevation z of the center of the circle, by the radius r , and by the inclination of the circle from the horizontal ϕ , the illustration below shows a portion of the middle of a flame, with four circles:



- Flame Length

The flame length, L , is calculated as:



$$L = 0.003271918 \times (Q \Delta H_{\text{Comb}})^{0.478}$$

where Q is the mass discharge rate and ΔH_{comb} is the heat of combustion (obtained from the Properties Library).

- Maximum Flame Radius

The maximum radius of the flame is given by:

$$R_{\text{max}} = \frac{0.1244L}{2}$$

where L is the flame length.

- Radii of Flame Circles

The radius of the flame as a function of distance along the length is set according to Baron (1954).

The radius of the first circle, r_1 , is set equal to the expanded radius of the jet.

For the other circles, the radius, r_i , is given by:

$$r_i = \frac{0.29s_i}{2} \sqrt{\ln \left(\frac{L}{s_i} \right)}$$

where:

$$s_i = \frac{(i-1)}{(N-1)} L$$

and L is the flame length.

- Deflection of a Vertical Flame by the Wind

If the flame is horizontal, then it is assumed not to be deflected by the wind. For a vertical flame, the program first calculates the velocity ratio, U_{ratio} , as a measure of the power of the wind to deflect the jet:

$$U_{\text{ratio}} = \frac{U_w}{U_0}$$

where U_w is the wind speed and U_0 is the jet velocity.

If the velocity ratio is less than 0.0001, then the flame is treated as being perfectly vertical. For larger values of the velocity ratio, the program calculates the increase in x and z between each circle. For each circle, the gradient dz/dx is given by Cook et al. (1990) as:

$$\frac{dz}{dx} = 3.2 \pi \frac{R_{\text{exp}}}{U_{\text{ratio}}} \left(\frac{1}{s} - \frac{1}{L} \right)$$



where R_{exp} is the expanded radius, U_{ratio} is the velocity ratio, s is the distance of the circle along the centerline of the flame, and L is the flame length.

- Coordinates of Flame Circles

The circles are equally spaced along the length of the flame, and the length of each segment, $L_{segment}$, is given by $L/N_{segment}$.

Horizontal Flame

The z coordinate of the center of each circle is set to zero and the x co-ordinate is given by the segment number multiplied by $L_{segment}$.

Unbent Vertical Flame

The x co-ordinate of the center of each circle is set to zero and the z co-ordinate is given by the segment number multiplied by $L_{segment}$.

Bent Vertical Flame

The initial x and z co-ordinates, x_1 and z_1 are given by:

$$x_1 = 0.0 \quad z_1 = d_{\text{elevation}}$$

and the subsequent x and z co-ordinates are given by:

$$x_i = x_i + x_{\text{increment}} \quad z_i = z_i + z_{\text{increment}}$$

where i is the number of the circle, from 2 to N , and where $x_{\text{increment}}$ and $z_{\text{increment}}$ are given by:

$$x_{\text{increment}} = \frac{L_{\text{segment}}}{\sqrt{1 + \left(\frac{dz}{dx}\right)^2}} \quad z_{\text{increment}} = \frac{L_{\text{segment}}}{\sqrt{1 + \left(\frac{dz}{dx}\right)^{-2}}}$$

- Radii of Flame Circles

The radius of the flame as a function of distance along the length is set according to Baron (1954).

The radius of the first circle, r_1 , is set equal to the expanded radius of the jet.

For the other circles, the radius, r_i , is given by:

$$r_i = \frac{0.29s_i}{2} \sqrt{\ln\left(\frac{L}{s_i}\right)}$$

where:

$$s_i = \frac{(i-1)}{(N-1)} L$$

and L is the flame length.



- Inclination of Flame Circles to Horizontal

The orientation of each circle is set to be perpendicular to the line joining together the circles lying either side of it:

$$\mu_i^{\circ} = \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{x_{i+1} - x_{i-1}}{z_{i+1} - z_{i-1}} \right)$$

Since this method cannot be used for the the first circle, it is set to be perpendicular to the line from its center to the center of the second circle, i.e.

$$\mu_1^{\circ} = \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{x_2 - x_1}{z_2 - z_1} \right)$$

Similarly, the last segment is set to be perpendicular to the line from its center to the penultimate circle, i.e:

$$\mu_N^{\circ} = \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{x_N - x_{N-1}}{z_N - z_{N-1}} \right)$$

Calculating the Emissive Power

If the emissive power was not specified in the input data, the program calculates it as described below. The calculations involve several stages.

- Fraction of Heat Emitted from Surface of Flame

The fraction, F_s , is given by Cook et al. (1990) as:

$$F_s = \{0.21 \exp(-0.00323U_0) + 0.11\} f_{MW}$$

where:

$$f_{MW} = \begin{cases} 1 & M_w < 21 \\ \sqrt{\frac{M_w}{21}} & 21 \leq M_w \leq 60 \\ 1.69 & 60 < M_w \end{cases}$$

U_0 is the jet velocity and M_w is the molecular weight of the substance released.

If the value calculated is greater than the maximum allowed (set as 0.5), then F_s is set to 0.5.

- Surface Area of the Flame

The equation for the emissive power includes the surface area of the flame, which is calculated by considering each segment (or frustum) in turn, dividing it into sectors, and calculating the area for each sector.




There are three main stages in the calculations for each sector:

- 1: Defining Coordinates
- 2: Height and Width
- 3: Surface Area

1: The Defining Coordinates for the Sector

Each sector is described by ten co-ordinates:



Location of Lower and Upper Circles (4 coordinates)

These are given in polar co-ordinates in the x-z plane, and are stored as δ_1 and χ_1 for the lower circle, and δ_2 and χ_2 for the upper circle:

$$d_i = \sqrt{x_i^2 + z_i^2}$$

$$\cos(\chi_i) = \frac{z_i}{d_i}$$



where i is the index number of a given circle.

Radii of the Circles (2 coordinates)

These are stored as r_1 and r_2 .

Tilt Angles of the Circles (2 coordinates)

These are stored as ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 .

Sector Angles (2 coordinates)

These are measured clockwise from the y axis and are stored as δ_a and δ_b :

$$\delta_k = 2\pi \frac{k}{N_s}$$

where k is the index number of a given sector within the current frustum.

2: Height and Width of Sector

The co-ordinates of the four corners of the sector are obtained in Cartesian co-ordinates:

$$\mathbf{a}_{im} = \begin{pmatrix} d_i \sin \alpha_i - r_i \cos \delta_m \cos \mu_i \\ r_i \sin \delta_m \\ d_i \cos \alpha_i - r_i \cos \delta_m \sin \mu_i \end{pmatrix}, \quad i, m = 1, 2$$

From the coordinates, the height h_k and the width w_k are given by:

$$h_k = \frac{1}{2} (|a_{11} - a_{21}| + |a_{12} - a_{22}|)$$

$$w_k = \frac{1}{2} (|a_{22} - a_{21}| + |a_{12} - a_{11}|)$$

3: Surface Area of Sector

The surface area of the sector is given by:

$$A_k = h_k w_k$$

- Emissive Power of the Flame

The surface emissive power of the flame, E_m , is calculated from Cook et al. (1990) as:

$$E_m = \frac{F_s Q H_{comb}}{A_{Total}}$$

where F_s the fraction of heat radiated, Q is the mass discharge rate, H_{comb} is the heat of combustion (obtained from the Properties Library), and A_{Total} is the total surface area of the flame.

If the calculated value of E_m is greater than the maximum surface emissive power set as a parameter, then the maximum value from the parameters is used instead.



Radiation

Calculations for all radiation scenarios given later.

BLEVE Modeling

There are five main parts of the calculations:

- Flammable Mass
- Flame Shape
- Duration
- Flame Emissive Power
- Radiation

Calculating the Flammable Mass

The flammable mass involved in the BLEVE is calculated as:

$$M_{BLEVE} = M_{Release} \cdot f_{flam}$$


$$f_{flam} = \min\left\{1, R_{fire} \left(1 - f_{rainout}\right)\right\}$$

where $M_{Release}$ is the mass released, R_{fire} is the BLEVE Mass Modification Factor, set in the BLEVE tab section for the Model, and $f_{rainout}$ is the rainout fraction calculated in the discharge modeling.

If the Model is for a continuous release and the total duration is less than the value set for the Time to BLEVE in the Parameters, then the flammable mass is given by: Release Rate x Duration

Calculating the Flame Shape

The flame is modeled as a sphere, and its shape is described by ten circles (c1 to c10) equally spaced along the flame length (i.e. along the diameter of the flame). Each circle is defined by the downwind coordinate x and elevation z of the centre of the circle, by the radius r , and by the inclination of the circle from the horizontal ϕ , as shown in the illustration below:



- Flame Radius

The flame radius, r_{Flame} , is calculated from Crossthwaite et al. (1982) as:

$$r_{Flame} = 2.9 M_{Bleve}^{\frac{1}{3}}$$

- Flame Shape Circles

The pool fire is defined by ten circles; this method of describing flames shapes is also used for Pool Fires and Jet Flames.

For each of the N (i.e. 10) circles, the co-ordinates are calculated as:

$$x_i = 0 \quad z_i = r_{Flame} (1 - \cos \alpha_i^{\theta}) \quad r_i = r_{Flame} \sin \alpha_i^{\theta} \quad \alpha_i^{\theta} = 0$$

where:

$$\alpha_i^{\theta} = \frac{\pi(i-1)}{N-1}$$

The bottom and the top circles have zero radius, and are added to complete the surface of the flame. The radiation calculations treat the flame as a set of conical surfaces, where each conical surface is bounded by two circles, and these two circles ensure that the entire flame is treated as a radiating surface.

Calculating the Duration

The flame duration, t_{Flame} , is calculated from Crossthwaite et al. (1982) as:

$$t_{Flame} = \begin{cases} 0.45 M_{Bleve}^{\frac{1}{3}} & M_{Bleve} < 37000 \\ 2.59 M_{Bleve}^{\frac{1}{6}} & 37000 \leq M_{Bleve} \end{cases}$$

**Calculating the Emissive Power**

The fraction of heat radiated from the surface of the flame, f_s , is calculated from Roberts (1982) as:

$$f_s = 0.27 \left(\frac{P_{\text{sat}}}{10P_{\text{atm}}} \right)^{0.32}$$

$$P_{\text{sat}} = \begin{cases} P_{\text{atm}} & P_{\text{atm}} > P_{\text{svp}} \\ P_{\text{svp}} & P_{\text{atm}} < P_{\text{svp}} \end{cases}$$

where P_{svp} (the saturation vapor pressure of the substance) is calculated using the Properties Library at the lower of the atmospheric temperature and the critical temperature.

The emissivity or emissive power, E_f , is then calculated from DNV (1992) as:

$$E_f = \frac{f_s M_{\text{BLEVE}} H_{\text{Comb}}}{4 \pi r_{\text{Flame}}^2 t_{\text{Flame}}}$$

If the calculated emissivity is greater than E_{max} , the maximum emissive power for BLEVEs set in the Parameters, then E_f is set to E_{max} .

Radiation

Calculations for all radiation scenarios given later.

TNT Explosion Modelling

There are four main parts to the calculations:

- Equivalent Mass of TNT
- Overpressure at Distances of Interest
- Radius to Overpressures of Interest
- Graph of Overpressure vs. Distance

Equivalent Mass of TNT

If the flammable mass in the cloud is less than the Minimum Explosive Mass set in the Parameters, then no explosion will occur, and the modeling is not performed.

The program calculates the mass of TNT that is equivalent to the effective flammable mass in the cloud:

$$m_{\text{TNT}} = \left(\frac{H_{\text{Combustion}}}{H_{\text{TNT}}} \right) m_{\text{eff}}$$

$$m_{\text{eff}} = \min \{ f_{\text{vapor}} F_{\text{mod}}, 1 \} M_{\text{flam}} X'$$

where H_{TNT} is the heat of combustion of TNT without air (4.7×10^6 J kg⁻¹), f_{vapor} is the post-flash vapor fraction, F_{mod} is the Early Explosion Mass Modification Factor, taken from the Flammable tab section, M_{flam} is the total flammable mass in the release, X' is



the explosion efficiency, taken from the Properties Library if a value has been set for the release material, or from the input data if there is no value in the Properties Library, and f_e is the ground reflection factor, set to 1 for an air burst, and 2 for a ground burst.

Overpressure at Distances of Interest

In the Location tab section, you can set up to three distances of interest. For each distance, the program performs the following calculations:

Explosion Radius

The explosion radius, R' , is the distance from the explosion center to the distance of interest:

$$R' = d_i^{\text{Input}} - d_{\text{Explosion}}$$

Overpressure

If $mX'H_{\text{combustion}}$ is less than 103 J then the overpressure is set to zero. Otherwise, the overpressure P_o is calculated using an approximation of the Kingery and Bulmash curves as published in Lees (1996):

$$\log_{10} P_o = a(\log_{10} z)^2 + b \log_{10} z + c$$

where:

$$a = 0.2518, b = -2.20225, c = 5.8095$$

$$z = \frac{R'}{m_{\text{TNT}}^{1/3}}$$

Distance to Overpressures of Interest

There are three overpressures of interest set in the Parameters. For each overpressure of interest, the program performs the following calculations:

Explosion Radius

The explosion radius R' is calculated from:

$$R' = z m_{\text{TNT}}^{1/3}$$

where:

$$\log_{10} z = \left(\frac{-b - \sqrt{b^2 - 4a(c - \log_{10} P_o)}}{2a} \right)$$

and $a = 0.2518$, $b = -2.20225$ and $c = 5.8095$.

Distance from Release Source

The distance to the overpressure from the release source is then calculated as:



$$d_i^{\text{Output}} = R' + d_{\text{Explosion}}$$

Overpressures for Graph versus Distance

The program considers up to 50 steps from the release location to a maximum distance d_{max} , where the explosion radius for a given step is calculated as:

$$R' = d_{\text{Start}} + (i - 1)d_{\text{Step}} - d_{\text{Explosion}}$$

The overpressures for the graph versus distance are then calculated in the same way as the overpressures for the distances of interest.

Late Pool Fire

The program takes the state of the evaporating pool at the time when it reaches its largest diameter, and uses the Pool Fire modeling to calculate the size, shape and intensity of the flame, and then calculates the size of the contours to the three radiation levels that are set in the Pool Fire tab section for the Case.

Late Explosion

The program calculates the effects of explosion at different times during the course of the release and dispersion. These times are chosen to give particular values for the Explosion Center, placing it at regular intervals set by the Results Grid Step in the Parameters. For an instantaneous release, the Cloud Location is chosen so that the sum of the Location and the Cloud Width to the flammable limit gives the appropriate Explosion Center.

For each time, the program calculates the mass in the flammable region of the cloud, where the definition of the flammable region is set in the Parameters. It then uses this mass in the appropriate Explosion Model (selected for the Source Model in the Flammable tab section), to calculate the distance from the center of the explosion to each of the three explosion overpressures set in the Parameters.

Finally, the program calculates the maximum downwind distance to each of the three overpressures, using the Explosion Location Criterion (set in the Parameters) to obtain the center of the explosion in relation to the dimensions and concentration profile of the cloud.

Toxic Effects

The program calculates the toxic effects at a range of distances downwind. For each distance, the program considers the full time-history of the concentration at that location over the course of the release and dispersion, and calculates the Toxic Dose received at that location, where the Dose is cNt in the probit equation:

$$Pr = A + B \ln(c^N t)$$

where c is the concentration in ppm, t is the duration in minutes, and A , B and N are toxic properties for the material.

Given the Total Dose, the program calculates the Probit value for the location, and from this the Lethality at the location. It also calculates the Equivalent Concentration for the location, which is the concentration that would give the same dose as the calculated Total Dose, if the duration of the exposure was equal to the Averaging



Time for the Concentration of Interest (set in the Location tab section), instead of the actual exposure time.

Calculating a Radiation Ellipse

This considers a horizontal plane at ground level, and calculates the dimensions of the ellipse that connects points that have a given view factor, radiation level, or lethality level. In reality, the contour that connects these points might not be perfectly elliptical, but the ellipse is a common and useful approximation.

The calculations can be divided into four main stages:

- 1: Convert Radiation to View Factor
- 2: Is View Factor within Limits?
- 3: Find Flame Boundary
- 4: Search for Locations with Required View Factor

Stage 1: Convert Radiation to View Factor

The program first calculates the view factor that corresponds to the radiation level for the ellipse. If the flame emissive power is greater than one, then the view factor is defined as below, else the view factor is made equal to the flame emissive power:

$$V_f = \frac{R_i}{E_e}$$

Stage 2: Check View Factor Against Limits

The program has a maximum value for the view factor, currently set as 0.9. If the view factor is above this maximum value, the program sets the ellipse to be extent of the flame itself, or an elliptical approximation. The form of the ellipse which describes the flame depends on the type of the flame:

For Pool Fire

- Length of major semi-axis (a) r_1
- Length of minor semi-axis (b) r_1
- Fractional displacement (d) 0.0

where r_1 is the radius of the lower disk which describes the flame shape.

For Jet Fire

- Length of major semi-axis (a) Half flame length
- Length of minor semi-axis (b) Radius of largest flame shape circle
- Fractional displacement (d) 1.0

For BLEVE

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Length of major semi-axis (a) | 0 | $1 \leq V_f$ |
| | $r_{Flame} \sqrt{\frac{1}{V_f} - 1}$ | $10^{-6} \leq V_f < 1$ |
| | r_{Flame} | $V_f < 10^{-6}$ |
| Length of minor semi-axis (b) | a | |
| Fractional displacement (d) | 0.0 | |



If the view factor is below 10^{-6} then the three ellipse parameters are set to zero.

If the view factor is within the limits, then the program proceeds to the next stage.

Stage 3: Locate Flame Boundary at Ground Level

The program finds the length of the downwind axis of the ellipse by considering the line pointing directly downwind (i.e. $y = 0$) through the flame centre at $z = 0$, and searching for the two points along the line which have a view factor equal to the desired value. To make the search more efficient, the program first identifies the points where the line crosses the flame boundary, since the view factor is bound to be above the desired value as these points, and the search can ignore locations inside the flame boundary.

To determine where the line crosses the flame boundary, the program first loops over all the circles that define the flame shape. The upwind and downwind extents of each circle are calculated as:

$$x_i^{(\text{Downwind})} = x_i + (r_i + 0.2) \cos \theta_i$$

$$x_i^{(\text{Upwind})} = x_i - (r_i + 0.2) \cos \theta_i$$

The program stores the maximum value of $x_i^{(\text{Downwind})}$ and the minimum value of $x_i^{(\text{Upwind})}$ for circles that have zero elevation, and also stores the maximum value of $x_i^{(\text{Downwind})}$ for any circle in case no circle has zero elevation.

The program also searches for the maximum extent of the flame in the cross-wind direction, which is the maximum value of $(r_i + 0.2)$ for circles with zero height.

The program then loops over the flame-defining circles in pairs, and constructs a quadrangle which is the cross-section of the flame (as defined by the two circles) along the plane $y = 0$. If any of the four sides of this quadrangle cross the $z = 0$ plane, then the x value at this crossing is calculated. If $(x_{\text{crossing}} - 0.2)$ is less than the current minimum value of $x_i^{(\text{Upwind})}$ then the program updates $x_i^{(\text{Upwind})}$. If $(x_{\text{crossing}} + 0.2)$ is greater than the current maximum value of $x_i^{(\text{Downwind})}$ then the program updates $x_i^{(\text{Downwind})}$.

If the flame does not cross the ground, then the program performs an iterative search for the upwind and downwind points along the line ($y = 0, z = 0$) where the view factor is maximum, and these are used as the inward limits for the search for the required view factor.

Stage 4: Search for Required View Factor and Calculate Ellipse Parameters

The program now has inward limits for the upwind, downwind and crosswind directions, and can start to search outward for the locations where the view factor reaches the required value.

It performs the search for each direction in turn:

Downwind Direction

A successful search will return a value for x_{Downwind} . If the search fails because the required view factor was greater than the maximum view factor for the flame, then the program sets x_{Downwind} as follows:



Flame Type	$x_{Downwind}$
Jet Fire	0
Pool Fire	Downwind extent of flame

If the flame model is BLEVE, then the ellipse reduces to a circle, with the length of the major and minor semi-axes both set equal to $x_{Downwind}$, and the fractional displacement d set to zero. For the other types of flame, the program proceeds to the next direction.

Upwind Direction

A successful search will return a value for x_{Upwind} . If the search fails because the required view factor was greater than the maximum view factor for the flame, then the program sets x_{Upwind} as follows:

Flame Type	x_{Upwind}
Jet Fire	0
Pool Fire	Upwind extent of flame

Given $x_{Downwind}$ and x_{Upwind} , the program can calculate the ellipse parameters as follows:

$$a = \begin{cases} 0 & x^{(Downwind)} - x^{(Upwind)} \leq 0 \\ \frac{x^{(Downwind)} - x^{(Upwind)}}{2} & 0 < x^{(Downwind)} - x^{(Upwind)} \end{cases}$$

$$d = \begin{cases} 0 & a \leq 0 \\ \frac{x^{(Downwind)} + x^{(Upwind)}}{2a} & 0 < a \end{cases}$$

where d is the fractional displacement.

Crosswind Direction

For the crosswind direction, the program searches along the line through the flame center with x fixed at the center of the ellipse defined above. The value returned, $x_{Crosswind}$, is the length of the minor semi-axis, b .

PHAST References

For Discharge Calculations

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APPENDIX K Risk Summation Using Riskplot II

Summary of Consequence and Frequency Analysis

In order to introduce the Riskplot II analysis, it is necessary to briefly summarise the Consequence and Frequency Analysis Sections. This describes the calculation of fire and explosion and toxic event frequencies and magnitudes. In this section, release frequencies from each isolatable section of the process were quantified. Firstly, each isolatable section was examined and the number of potential leak sources were summed; then, generic leak frequencies were applied to arrive at an overall leak frequency.


A leak size distribution was applied to each leak frequency in order to estimate the relative numbers of small, medium and large leaks.

Event outcomes were identified during the course of modelling the consequences of the leak sizes, using the DNV consequence modelling package Phast. These were as follows:

- jet fires;
- flash fires / fireballs;
- vapour cloud explosions; and
- toxic cloud dispersion.

Ignition probabilities for immediate and delayed ignition were used on the basis of predicted mass flow by using empirical relationships. For instances of delayed ignition, other empirical relationships were used to estimate the relative likelihood of explosion compared to vapour cloud fire / fireball.

Figure B2.1: Riskplot II Consequence Effect Dimensions



The magnitude of each event is quantified in terms of effect distances to specified intensities of either fire radiation or blast overpressure. These intensities are defined in terms of fatality criteria, which are in turn defined in terms of a probability of fatality



for an exposed individual: for example, an individual exposed to 37.5 kW/m² is 78% likely to become an immediate fatality; exposure to 20 kW/m² is 14% likely; and so on.

For each event, four effect parameters are calculated: d, c, s and m. These correspond to effect distances as shown in Figure B2.1.

These dimensions are used to calculate on site and offsite risk in the package Riskplot II as described below.


Riskplot II analysis overview

Riskplot II is basically a risk summation tool which locates the site giving rise to flammable and toxic risk on a grid. The location of each source of release is defined by coordinates on the grid, and likewise the population at risk. Site-specific factors are then accounted for. Finally, the risk is calculated in terms of individuals and the defined population groups.

A schematic diagram of the Riskplot II methodology is shown in Figure B2.2. This is the diagram that is supplied as part of the user documentation: only a certain number of the facilities that Riskplot II offers are used for this study.



Figure B2.2 : Riskplot II Schematic Flowsheet





APPENDIX L Sensitivity Analysis

WA-DMPR have requested that pipe ruptures (within the plant) be considered in the PRA. Due to this late change a sensitivity study was conducted to determine the affect of including pipe ruptures would have on the risk results.

This study assumed each isolatable section has 200m of 200mm diameter piping, with the exception of the export pipeline (which has already been modelled as a rupture).

The frequency for the pipe ruptures was derived from the release frequency for 4" to 11" oil and gas pipework given in E&P Forum [7]. The resulting total release frequencies are summarised in the table below.

The resulting risk contours are illustrated in Appendix N and can be compared to the original contours in Appendix M. The societal risk curves are included in Section 6 of the report.

The risk contours did increase marginally, but did not introduce any new concerns in relation to the offsite risk. The 50E-6 contour still lies within the plant boundary and the 10E-6 contour exceeds the plant boundary to the north and south of the plant marginally more than the last given contours.

The societal risk curve did not change for this sensitivity analysis.



Therefore the plant is still considered to comply with the EPA Criteria [5].

Total Release Frequencies

Leak Point	7mm release	22mm release	70mm release	Rupture	TOTAL
ISO1	7.64E-01	7.46E-02	2.01E-02	3.61E-04	8.59E-01
ISO2	6.71E-02	1.54E-02	5.77E-03	3.65E-04	8.87E-02
ISO3	7.89E-03	2.87E-03	8.34E-04	3.60E-04	1.20E-02
ISO4	1.96E-01	4.55E-02	1.17E-02	3.65E-04	2.54E-01
ISO5	1.21E-01	2.21E-02	5.75E-03	3.63E-04	1.50E-01
ISO6	1.33E-02	4.37E-03	1.70E-03	3.61E-04	1.97E-02
ISO7	3.25E-02	3.33E-03	8.63E-04	3.61E-04	3.71E-02
ISO8	3.80E-03	1.24E-03	2.35E-04	3.60E-04	5.64E-03
ISO9	2.62E-01	4.95E-02	1.30E-02	3.71E-04	3.25E-01
ISO10	3.07E-02	3.01E-03	5.16E-04	3.66E-04	3.46E-02
ISO11	3.41E-02	1.16E-02	4.65E-03	3.60E-04	5.08E-02
ISO12	3.70E-02	5.34E-03	1.89E-03	6.00E-06	4.43E-02
ISO13	2.08E-02	6.98E-03	2.50E-03	3.60E-04	3.07E-02
ISO14	3.01E-02	2.87E-03	7.67E-04	6.00E-06	3.38E-02
ISO15	3.11E-03	7.66E-04	8.00E-05	3.60E-04	4.31E-03
ISO16	5.31E-03	1.31E-03	4.42E-04	3.60E-04	7.42E-03
ISO17	5.40E-02	3.56E-03	4.51E-04	3.66E-04	5.83E-02
ISO18	6.01E-02	5.50E-03	2.74E-03	3.80E-04	6.87E-02



APPENDIX M Risk Contours



Job No. :	48616-003-562
Report No. :	R862
Date :	Nov 2001

GTL Resources PLC
BURRUP PENINSULA METHANOL PLANT
Site Boundary and Risk Contours







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APPENDIX N Risk Contours for the Sensitivity Analysis



Job No. :	48616-003-562
Report No. :	R862
Date :	Nov 2001

GTL Resources PLC
BURRUP PENINSULA METHANOL PLANT
**Sensitivity Analysis: Site
Boundary & Risk Contours**





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APPENDIX O Table of Consequences

Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
01	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	3.527E-06	3.464E-06
01	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	7.124E-08	6.999E-08
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Large release	3.527E-06	3.464E-06
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Large release	6.412E-07	6.299E-07
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Medium release	6.010E-07	6.010E-07
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Medium release	6.010E-07	6.010E-07
01	BLEVE from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
01	BLEVE from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.569E-13	1.260E-10
01	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
01	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.569E-13	1.260E-10
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Small release	8.798E-07	8.798E-07
01	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Small release	8.798E-07	8.798E-07
02	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.118E-07	1.993E-07
02	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	6.417E-09	6.041E-09
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.097E-05	1.973E-05
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Large release	2.075E-07	1.953E-07
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Medium release	1.232E-05	1.232E-05
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Medium release	1.244E-07	1.244E-07
02	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	1.086E-09	7.567E-08
02	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.828E-11	1.274E-09
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Rupture	1.701E-08	1.185E-06
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.645E-10	1.147E-08
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Small release	7.648E-06	7.648E-06
02	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Small release	7.725E-08	7.725E-08
03	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.121E-08	2.878E-08
03	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.249E-09	8.722E-10
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.080E-06	2.849E-06



PRA for a Methanol Manufacturing Plant

Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Large release	4.038E-08	2.820E-08
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Medium release	2.287E-06	2.287E-06
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Medium release	2.310E-08	2.310E-08
03	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	7.458E-08
03	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.256E-09
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.168E-06
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.130E-08
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Small release	8.992E-07	8.992E-07
03	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Small release	9.083E-09	9.083E-09
04	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.162E-07	4.038E-07
04	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	4.204E-09	4.078E-09
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.120E-05	3.997E-05
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Large release	4.162E-07	4.038E-07
04	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	3.668E-07	3.668E-07
04	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	3.705E-09	3.705E-09
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Medium release	3.631E-05	3.631E-05
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Medium release	3.668E-07	3.668E-07
04	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	2.352E-10	1.640E-08
04	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.170E-11	8.153E-10
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Rupture	1.786E-08	1.245E-06
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.711E-10	1.192E-08
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Small release	2.236E-05	2.236E-05
04	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Small release	2.258E-07	2.258E-07
05	Toxic gas release (CO)	Manual shutdown	Rupture	9.810E-07	9.810E-07
05	Toxic gas release (CO)	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.260E-10	4.260E-10
05	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.222E-07	3.973E-07
05	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	2.132E-08	2.007E-08
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.069E-05	1.947E-05
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.919E-07	1.806E-07
05	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	1.783E-07	1.783E-07



PRA for a Methanol Manufacturing Plant

Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
05	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	1.801E-09	1.801E-09
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Medium release	1.765E-05	1.765E-05
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Medium release	1.783E-07	1.783E-07
05	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	9.047E-10	1.252E-07
05	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	9.138E-12	1.265E-09
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Rupture	8.142E-09	1.127E-06
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Rupture	8.224E-11	1.138E-08
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Manual shutdown	Small release	1.382E-05	1.382E-05
05	Jet fire from release of flammable gas	Shutdown failure	Small release	1.396E-07	1.396E-07
06	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	7.099E-08	5.856E-08
06	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	7.171E-10	5.915E-10
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	7.028E-06	5.797E-06
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	7.099E-08	5.856E-08
06	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	3.521E-08	3.521E-08
06	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	3.557E-10	3.557E-10
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	3.486E-06	3.486E-06
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	3.521E-08	3.521E-08
06	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
06	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.569E-13	1.260E-10
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	4.478E-09	1.235E-06
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	1.510E-06	1.510E-06
06	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	1.525E-08	1.525E-08
07	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.222E-08	2.979E-08
07	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	4.264E-10	3.009E-10
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.180E-06	2.949E-06
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	4.222E-08	2.979E-08
07	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	2.685E-08	2.685E-08
07	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	2.712E-10	2.712E-10
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	2.658E-06	2.658E-06



PRA for a Methanol Manufacturing Plant

Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	2.685E-08	2.685E-08
07	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
07	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.569E-13	1.260E-10
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	4.478E-09	1.235E-06
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	4.523E-11	1.248E-08
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	3.706E-06	3.706E-06
07	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	3.743E-08	3.743E-08
08	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.056E-08	8.130E-09
08	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	2.077E-10	8.213E-11
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.036E-06	8.049E-07
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	2.056E-08	8.130E-09
08	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	1.002E-08	1.002E-08
08	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	1.012E-10	1.012E-10
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	9.921E-07	9.921E-07
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	1.002E-08	1.002E-08
08	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.243E-08
08	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.256E-10
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.231E-06
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.243E-08
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	4.329E-07	4.329E-07
08	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	4.373E-09	4.373E-09
09	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.616E-07	4.492E-07
09	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	4.663E-09	4.537E-09
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	4.570E-05	4.447E-05
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	4.616E-07	4.492E-07
09	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	3.986E-07	3.986E-07
09	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	4.026E-09	4.026E-09
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	3.946E-05	3.946E-05
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	3.986E-07	3.986E-07
09	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	5.953E-10	1.282E-08



PRA for a Methanol Manufacturing Plant

Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
09	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	6.013E-12	1.295E-10
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	5.893E-08	1.269E-06
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	5.953E-10	1.282E-08
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	2.989E-05	2.989E-05
09	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	3.020E-07	3.020E-07
10	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	3.020E-08	1.781E-08
10	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	3.051E-10	1.799E-10
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.990E-06	1.763E-06
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	3.020E-08	1.781E-08
10	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	2.429E-08	2.429E-08
10	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	2.453E-10	2.453E-10
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	2.405E-06	2.405E-06
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	2.429E-08	2.429E-08
10	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.264E-08
10	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.277E-10
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.251E-06
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.264E-08
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	3.501E-06	3.501E-06
10	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	3.536E-08	3.536E-08
11	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	1.732E-07	1.606E-07
11	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.749E-09	1.622E-09
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	1.714E-05	1.590E-05
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.732E-07	1.606E-07
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	9.285E-06	9.285E-06
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	9.379E-08	9.379E-08
11	BLEVE from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	8.371E-12	1.256E-10
11	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	8.287E-10	1.243E-08
11	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	8.371E-12	1.256E-10
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	8.204E-08	1.231E-06
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	8.287E-10	1.243E-08



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Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	3.888E-06	3.888E-06
11	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	3.928E-08	3.928E-08
12	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.928E-08	6.519E-08
12	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.003E-09	6.584E-10
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.828E-06	6.453E-06
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	9.928E-08	6.519E-08
12	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	7.756E-08	4.300E-08
12	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	7.835E-10	4.343E-10
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	7.679E-06	4.257E-06
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	7.756E-08	4.300E-08
12	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.072E-10
12	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.093E-12
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.051E-08
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.072E-10
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	1.056E-05	4.220E-06
12	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	1.067E-07	4.262E-08
13	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.895E-08	8.648E-08
13	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	9.995E-10	8.735E-10
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.796E-06	8.562E-06
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	9.895E-08	8.648E-08
13	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	5.623E-08	5.623E-08
13	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	5.680E-10	5.680E-10
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	5.567E-06	5.567E-06
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	5.623E-08	5.623E-08
13	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	2.072E-10	1.243E-08
13	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	2.093E-12	1.256E-10
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	2.051E-08	1.231E-06
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	2.072E-10	1.243E-08
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	2.372E-06	2.372E-06
13	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	2.396E-08	2.396E-08



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Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
14	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	1.668E-08	2.650E-08
14	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.685E-10	2.676E-10
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	1.652E-06	2.623E-06
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.668E-08	2.650E-08
14	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	8.782E-09	2.312E-08
14	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	8.871E-11	2.335E-10
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	8.694E-07	2.289E-06
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	8.782E-09	2.312E-08
14	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.072E-10
14	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.093E-12
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.051E-08
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	2.072E-10
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	3.618E-07	3.434E-06
14	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	3.654E-09	3.469E-08
15	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	1.519E-08	2.761E-09
15	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.535E-10	2.789E-11
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	1.504E-06	2.734E-07
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	1.519E-08	2.761E-09
15	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	6.175E-09	6.175E-09
15	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	6.238E-11	6.238E-11
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	6.113E-07	6.113E-07
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	6.175E-09	6.175E-09
15	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.243E-08
15	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.256E-10
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.231E-06
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.243E-08
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	3.540E-07	3.540E-07
15	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	3.576E-09	3.576E-09
16	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.768E-08	1.525E-08
16	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Large release	2.796E-10	1.540E-10



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Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.740E-06	1.510E-06
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	2.768E-08	1.525E-08
16	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Medium release	1.055E-08	1.055E-08
16	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Medium release	1.065E-10	1.065E-10
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	1.044E-06	1.044E-06
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	1.055E-08	1.055E-08
16	BLEVE from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.243E-08
16	BLEVE from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.256E-10
16	Explosion from initially unignited release	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.243E-08
16	Explosion from initially unignited release	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.256E-10
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.231E-06
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	0.000E+00	1.243E-08
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	6.048E-07	6.048E-07
16	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	6.109E-09	6.109E-09
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Large release	2.771E-06	1.540E-06
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Large release	2.799E-08	1.556E-08
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Medium release	2.843E-06	2.843E-06
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Medium release	2.871E-08	2.871E-08
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Rupture	2.051E-08	1.251E-06
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Rupture	2.072E-10	1.264E-08
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Manual shutdown	Small release	6.148E-06	6.148E-06
17	Poolfire from the release of liquid hydrocarbons	Shutdown failure	Small release	6.210E-08	6.210E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while idle)	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.447E-08	9.447E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while idle)	Shutdown failure	Large release	9.543E-10	9.543E-10
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while operating)	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.447E-08	9.447E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while operating)	Shutdown failure	Large release	9.543E-10	9.543E-10
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.353E-06	9.353E-06
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Shutdown failure	Large release	9.447E-08	9.447E-08
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Manual shutdown	Large release	9.353E-06	9.353E-06



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Section	Event	Shutdown Method	Release Size	Frequency	Frequency (Sensitivity analysis)
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Shutdown failure	Large release	9.447E-08	9.447E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while idle)	Manual shutdown	Medium release	4.435E-08	4.435E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while idle)	Shutdown failure	Medium release	4.479E-10	4.479E-10
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while operating)	Manual shutdown	Medium release	4.435E-08	4.435E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while operating)	Shutdown failure	Medium release	4.479E-10	4.479E-10
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Manual shutdown	Medium release	4.390E-06	4.390E-06
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Shutdown failure	Medium release	4.435E-08	4.435E-08
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Manual shutdown	Medium release	4.390E-06	4.390E-06
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Shutdown failure	Medium release	4.435E-08	4.435E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while idle)	Manual shutdown	Rupture	1.313E-08	1.313E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while idle)	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.326E-10	1.326E-10
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while operating)	Manual shutdown	Rupture	1.313E-08	1.313E-08
18	Explosion (from export pipe release while operating)	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.326E-10	1.326E-10
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Manual shutdown	Rupture	1.300E-06	1.300E-06
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.313E-08	1.313E-08
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Manual shutdown	Rupture	1.300E-06	1.300E-06
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Shutdown failure	Rupture	1.313E-08	1.313E-08
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Manual shutdown	Small release	6.848E-06	6.848E-06
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while idle)	Shutdown failure	Small release	6.917E-08	6.917E-08
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Manual shutdown	Small release	6.848E-06	6.848E-06
18	Poolfire (from export pipe release while operating)	Shutdown failure	Small release	6.917E-08	6.917E-08